


JPRS-NEA-92-110  
26 AUGUST 1992



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# ***JPRS Report—***

# **Near East & South Asia**

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**PAKISTAN**

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# Near East & South Asia

## PAKISTAN

JPRS-NEA-92-110

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## Regional Affairs

### Joint Ministerial Commission With Afghanistan Begun

92AS1317H Karachi DAWN in English 10 Jul 92 p 4

[Article: "Pak-Afghan Joint Body To Be Formed"]

[Text] Islamabad, July 9: Pakistan and Afghanistan have agreed to set up the Pak-Afghan Joint Ministerial Commission to strengthen and improve economic cooperation in the fields of trade, agriculture, science, technology and culture.

The Federal Minister for Finance and Economic Affairs, Mr. Sartaj Aziz and Afghan Minister for Planning, Al-Sayed Muhammad Ali Javed, signed a memorandum of understanding here on Wednesday on behalf of their respective governments. A formal agreement to set up the Joint Ministerial Commission will be ratified after the two governments have approved the proposal and the draft of the agreement.

During the visit of the Afghan Minister for Planning to Pakistan, talks were held between the representatives of the two countries. The two sides noted with satisfaction the development of bilateral relations in various fields and expressed their resolve to intensify economic relations and enlarge cooperation on a long term and sustained basis.

Later, wrapup meeting was held between the Federal Finance Minister Mr. Sartaj Aziz and the Afghan Minister for Planning Sayed Muhammad Ali Javed.

The discussions, during the meeting, centred on matters pertaining to reconstruction work and maintenance of roads in Afghanistan. The transit trade of Afghanistan through Pakistan also came up under discussion.—PPI

### JI Leaders' Travel to Afghanistan Stopped

92AS1365C Karachi JASARAT in Urdu 18 Jul 92 p 3

[Editorial: "What Do They Hope To Gain?"]

[Text] A high-level Jamaat-i-Islami [JI] delegation was prevented from travelling to Kabul even though their luggage had already been placed on the plane and boarding passes had been issued. The deputy leader of JI, Maulana Jan Mohammad Abbasi, had already boarded the plane and continued the journey. The delegation was going to Kabul at the special invitation of the Afghan president Professor Borhanuddin Rabbani and included such personalities as deputy leader Chaudhry Rahmat Illahi, leader of the North-West Frontier Province Maulana Gauhar Rahman, Professor Khalil Ahmad Hamidi, Dr. Murad Ali Shah and Professor Ibrahim.

Government officials used the awkward excuse that the delegation members did not have visas for Afghanistan whereas everyone knows that after the liberation of Afghanistan, those going to that country from Pakistan

are customarily given a visa on arrival at Kabul airport. The president of the government that issues these visas invited the delegation and arranged for their tickets as well. Would the Government of Pakistan like to say how many of the members of the large delegation, which accompanied the prime minister to Kabul recently, possessed visas for Afghanistan? What about federal minister Ejazul Haq who traveled to Kabul; did he have a prior visa? Why go so far; how many of the passengers on the plane going to Kabul [on which the JI delegates were to travel] possessed visas and how many individuals [traveling to Afghanistan] had obtained visas beforehand?

It is obvious that the government had dishonest motives in preventing the JI delegation from traveling to Kabul. These are the same JI leaders who have participated personally over the last few years in the Afghan jihad. When the present authorities showed themselves to be helpless, these people went and offered encouragement. The magnificent efforts of JI to rouse the support of the people of Pakistan for the Afghan jihad is no secret. The blood of several JI and Islami Jameat-I-Talaba workers has mingled with the blood of other martyrs in Afghanistan; the deputy leader of JI, Maulana Jan Mohammad Abbasi, lost his son in this great cause. The part played by our present authorities in the success of the Afghan jihad and the establishment of the mujahidin government may not even be worth mentioning but no one can deny the part played by JI. It is ironic that those who knowingly or unknowingly tried to defeat the jihad and rout the mojahidin are now holding JI back out of fear that relations between the present Afghan government and JI, which is now the target of the anger of the Pakistani Government and the prime minister and whose leader is being accused of being responsible for bloodshed and destruction in Afghanistan, may be further strengthened.

The question is, what will the Pakistani Government gain from such tactics. This is the same Jamat-I-Islami that until recently was a participant in IJI [Islami Jamhoori Ittehad]; which supported the government in the elections and voted to bring the present government into office. When the government itself torpedoed the IJI alliance, JI was forced to withdraw from the alliance; now the same government is resorting to tricks and using various excuses to limit the movement of JI leaders. Does the government imagine that such actions will give it stability? We think that its actions will only serve to shorten its term of office. The government is pushing its former allies one by one into the ranks of its enemies and is narrowing the circle around itself. If the Frontier government is responsible for the recent action, one can only say that the government there is in the hands of the ANP [Awami National Party], which has always been the enemy of the Afghan jihad; it cannot bear to see any relations established with the government of the Afghan mojahidin who staked their all in the jihad against the communist overlords and inflicted a shameful defeat on them; the ANP does not want to see such a relationship

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bring any stability to the mujahidin government or strengthen relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan and the ANP is present in the center as well.

The Government of Pakistan should remember that when Maulana Jan Mohammad Abbasi, a member of the delegation that was prevented by the government from traveling, arrived at Kabul airport, the prime minister of Afghanistan, Professor Farid, was there to welcome him. It is strange that a delegation to greet the prime minister of a brother Islamic country came to the airport was detained in Peshawar. Does the Government of Pakistan imagine that after detaining the delegation invited by the president of Afghanistan, its relations with the Government of Afghanistan will remain amiable? We have no doubt that any individual who has given such advice to the prime minister not only lacks honesty and vision but is also an enemy of the country.

**Balochi Chief Minister To Visit Tashkent**

*92AS1364A Karachi AMN in Urdu 9 Jul 92 p 1*

[News Report: "Taj Mohammad Jamali Will Tour Tashkent"]

[Text] Quetta, 8 July (PPI): Mir Taj Mohammad Jamali, the chief minister of Balochistan, will be visiting Tashkent. Speaking to journalists in Governor House, he said that on 13 July he and his family will leave for a week's visit to Tashkent where he will tour historical places and study the feasibility of expanding trade between Uzbekistan and Pakistan via Balochistan.

**Internal Affairs****President Called 'Totally Inflexible'**

*92AS1263A Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English  
10 Jul 92 p 7*

[Article by Altaf Gauhar: "Will Ghulam Ishaq Khan Accept the Supremacy of Parliament?"]

[Excerpt]

**The Tussle Continues**

The tussle between the President and the Parliament did not cease even after Nawaz Sharif, whom he regarded as his nominee, came to power. Ishaq thought that Nawaz Sharif would respond to his signals and carry out his instructions without any hesitation. He wanted to revise the rules of business to consolidate his control over the Prime Minister. But Nawaz Sharif, who had come to power with a thumping majority, preferred to act as a representative of the people rather than a stooge of the President. Misunderstandings were bound to arise but there was no major show-down. In this struggle for power, the army came to occupy a pivotal role. The respective strength of the protagonists in this drama depends on the support of the army. Because of the unwillingness of the President to accept the supremacy

of the Parliament and allow the Prime Minister to exercise executive authority on behalf of the people the country is being pushed into a political cul-de-sac.

Ghulam Ishaq Khan is said to be totally inflexible on the question of Benazir. He would not allow Nawaz Sharif to come to any understanding with her. Nor would he allow her party to come to power in Sindh.

Ishaq knows that he has no political constituency nor any public support. He draws comfort from the statements issued by some right wing politicians lauding his commitment to the Shariah. He is also a favourite with those groups which support the development of the nuclear deterrent against India. But both these areas won't yield any public support on which the President could rely in a crisis.

**The Options Before the President**

What are the options available to the President? He is in no position to encourage a no-confidence motion against the Nawaz Sharif Government. If the move did not succeed against Benazir Bhutto, when the opposition was in a much stronger position, it is hardly likely to succeed today. Given a choice most members of the National Assembly would go with Nawaz Sharif than anyone else whom the President might nominate.

He cannot dismiss the government though he keeps waving that card. Only the other day he told a Senator that he could take action against the government only on the basis of solid evidence. The PPP [Pakistan People's Party] obliged him by sending him a pack of documents to substantiate several charges of corruption against the government. The dismissal of the government is out because the President has been too intimately and directly involved in the administration of the affairs of the Federation. If he dismisses the government he would be morally bound to resign his office. At least that is what the people would expect of him.

That leaves the President with two alternatives:

(a) Allow the Nawaz Sharif government to come to a power-sharing arrangement with Benazir Bhutto which would provide a political umbrella for launching an agreed operations to restore law and order in Sindh. Together they could decide the kind of caretaker government they should establish to ensure free and fair elections at the appropriate time.

(b) Allow the status-quo to continue in the belief that if things don't improve the army can always be relied upon to pull the chestnuts out of the fire and put the country back on the road to democracy and progress.

The history of military interventions in different countries provides convincing evidence that military rule does not resolve the political, social and economic problems of the people. We have had three spells of military rule in Pakistan and the results are staring us in the face. Every democratic institution has been undermined.

Ethnic and linguistic assertions are challenging the federation. There is no respect for law. Corruption has become a way of life, unemployment is rising and the standards of education are falling. There is no consensus on any fundamental issue. The community is being driven back to tribalism. Let there be no doubt that another spell of military government will result in the disintegration of the country. We must not court disaster.

The ideal of Pakistani nationalism can only be preserved by letting the people manage their own affairs. This they can only do if they are allowed to choose their representatives in a free and fair manner. If fair elections could be held in 1970 and again in 1988, they can surely be held today. All that is necessary is to have a non-partisan government which should conduct the elections with the help of the armed forces.

Ghulam Ishaq Khan is getting on. With age the mind begins to rotate in the same grooves, prejudices turn into principles, and personal likes and dislikes into values. That is how one becomes inflexible. The affairs of a nation cannot be run on the basis of personal preferences—nor can the future of the country be made hostage to out-dated wisdom derived from proverbs and cliches. Whatever be the personal opinion of the President about Benazir Bhutto he must recognise the judgment of the people. Despite the references and all the propaganda by the official media, the people elected her to the National Assembly and her party is in a position to form a government in Sindh. Why should the President obstruct the PPP from coming into power in Sindh or prevent Benazir from playing her role as leader of a popular party? Under his oath of office the President must not allow his personal interest to influence his official conduct and he must "do right to all manner of people, according to law, without fear or favour, affection or illwill."

Ghulam Mohammad thought he could run the country without the politicians. He came acropper. Iskander Mirza thought the people had no right to make a mistake and there should always be somebody to supervise them. He was consigned to oblivion.

President Ghulam Ishaq Khan still has the opportunity to submit to the will of the people. Will he do so? Going by his track record the odds are less than even.

Our rulers are exhausted and demoralised. They have lost their bearings and are now wandering aimlessly in the wilderness. Now is the time that the people should disown them and dissociate themselves from the fanaticism, corruption, injustice, exploitation and repression which has been imposed on the community. Now is the time. Now.

### President Criticized for Postponing National Assembly

92AS1263B Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English  
14 Jul 92 p 12

[Article by Aroosa Alam and Mohammad Yasin: "What Is Holding Back the Convening of NA Session?"]

[Text] Islamabad, July 13—A big question is going abegging as to why President Ghulam Ishaq Khan has refused to accede to the Federal Government's request for summoning the National Assembly [NA] session from July 16.

According to highly-informed sources in the Capital, the President has indicated that the next session of the National Assembly may be held tentatively from August 3.

However, the sources maintain that the National Assembly may not be summoned on August 3. It may in all probability be summoned by the third week of August.

Meanwhile, in a major development that took place in the Capital on Monday, a number of leading MNAs [Member of National Assembly] both from the Opposition and the Treasury Benches held separate meetings with the Speaker National Assembly Gohar Ayub Khan in his chamber in the Parliament House. They reportedly expressed their serious concern over delay in summoning the next session of the National Assembly despite the urgency of the political situation obtaining in the country.

They are said to have discussed the move for requisitioning the National Assembly session by the Opposition. According to highly informed sources, the opposition parties including the PDA [People's Democratic Alliance], Jamaat-e-Islami and JUI [Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Islam] have already signed a requisition for summoning the National Assembly session to discuss the Sindh situation in the wake of the deployment of the army in the province. They are waiting for a green signal from their top leadership.

"It is just a matter of moving the requisition with the Speaker at an appropriate time," they said.

According to official sources, the President is delaying the summoning of the National Assembly session on the request of the Chief Minister of Punjab Ghulam Haider Wyne who is keen to hold a big rally of the Muslim Leaguers on August 14 as a show of strength. Mr Wyne wants to paper over the cracks that have surfaced in the PML's [Pakistan Muslim League] rank and file in the recent weeks over the on-going tussle for presidentship of the PML.

Equally well-informed political sources say that the President is resorting to dilly-dallying in summoning the National Assembly session earlier because he wants to

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promulgate certain Ordinances immediately. The President is mainly warding off the holding of the National Assembly session at this juncture to evade discussion of the Sindh situation which the President apprehends would bring the entire blame for the things going wrong in the province on his head. The political quarters feel that the President is at present the most vulnerable person because of his direct interference in the Sindh affairs and the involvement of his son-in-law, Irfanullah Marwat, in the sordid happenings in Sindh politics during the Jam era.

A number of legislators feel perturbed over the events taking place in the Capital as well as in Sindh. Expressing the point of view of such legislators, the former Law Minister and now PDA MNA Syed Iftikhar Hussain Gilani said that the offices of the President and the Prime Minister have become non-existent because they have abdicated their powers. "Their moral authority has eroded because of their conduct," he said adding that the National Assembly is being prevented to meet by the President. He said emphatically that "it is Prime Minister's constitutional and moral duty to see to it that the National Assembly meets."

However, Mr Gilani regretted that leaving aside his constituency—the Parliament—the Prime Minister looks towards the President for guidance. He said as the former Law Minister, it was his considered opinion that under Article 48 the President was bound by the advice of the Prime Minister but the file had to be submitted for the President's signature. He said if the President took unreasonable delay in signing the advice sent by the Prime Minister, the Federal Government could nevertheless issue a notification for summoning the National Assembly session after lapse of 7 days against which the President may go to the court. He said under the rules of business of the National Assembly prevalent under 1973 Constitution, the President could not delay the request for summoning the NA session beyond seven days.

Mr Gilani regretted that in 1985 drastic changes were brought about in the earlier rules, granting discriminatory powers to the President. He said that the President was treating the National Assembly as a show piece.

Referring to the possibility of the imposition of Martial Law, Syed Iftikhar Hussain Gillani said the opposition had apprehended all along that the political blunders being committed by the President and the Prime Minister would suck in the armed forces in the civil matters. To substantiate his point, he referred to the Qari scandal of which the army had taken notice.

Asked to give his assessment of the sort of Ordinance, the President may promulgate, Gillani said that the Ordinance might provide legal cover to the army personnel engaged in operation in Sindh by amending Section 31-A of the Criminal Procedure Code.

**Government, Army Credibility Said in Doubt**

*92AS1303B Lahore NAWA-I-WAQT in Urdu 10 Jul 92 p 100*

[Editorial: "Sindh Operation: Issue of Government and Army's Credibility"]

[Text] Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif visited Karachi recently and talked with various representative groups. The salient points of his talk are below.

- The military operation against Sindh's robbers, terrorists, and other criminals will continue until it is successful.
- There will be no discrimination practiced against anyone during the Sindh Operation. We may even lose some of our friends. A criminal, whether he is a member of the national assembly or a member of the provincial assembly, will not be spared.
- The MQM [Mohajir Quami Movement] has the right over Karachi. Good people are also MQM members, and they should not be worried. That is why the government has decided to contact 17 members of the MQM for their support.
- Sindh's assembly will not be broken up, nor will a governor's rule be imposed there. There is no political crisis in Sindh. The federal government has full confidence in Chief Minister Sayyed Muzaffer Hussein Shah.

The prime minister also gave the impression of supporting the operation, and at the same time has announced that he would contact the "good members" of the MQM. Both of these actions are contradictory, because declaring a party terrorist and then trying to bring it back into government via its "gentle portion" does not leave any room for action against that it. One news report claimed that after the blackmail incident involving cassettes, the government is trying to attack MQM leader Altaf Hussein in London via Islam Nabi. The government appears to be offering some kind of package to lure him to return home, so that an alliance between the IJI [Islami Jamhoori Ittehad] and the MQM can be formed. Comments made by some government officials criticizing Sindh's operations have found their ways into newspapers. This way, the present confusion in the political atmosphere is increasing, and a Pakistani citizen is amazed and stunned as to why the government has begun to act nonaligned after fully adopting the Sindh Operation. The problem is that stopping or slowing down this operation will not help our nation. The people have finally accepted the fact that the MQM was operating torture cells as exposed by this operation. They have also breathed a sigh of relief because of the widespread monitoring of the party. There is also the fact that peace and order have returned to Karachi because of this military operation. In inner Sindh, with the exception of a couple of serious incidents, there are "cool winds of peace." Even travel is possible now. The fact that the government has been deprived of its supporters is another story. The resignations submitted by members

of the party have caused a political and constitutional crisis at Sindh's state and federal levels. It is clear to every person that the by-elections to fill the seats vacated by MQM members could prove to the beginning of a political crisis. It is possible that the MQM members might win the by-elections again. If this happens, then it will be blamed on the government's ambiguous policy. It is obvious that the government has not demonstrated any solid planning in this area. It is possible that it will make it impossible for the MQM to participate in the election. Perhaps the Pakistani People's Party will win a major number of seats in the election and give birth to new problems. The government appears to be unable to face this problem. Instead, it is making the situation even more complex by issuing contradictory statements.

On the other hand, politicians looking for secret routes to power are eager to welcome another martial law regime. They cannot hide their eagerness. In this situation, it is the government's responsibility to remove the dangers to our system. The government itself, however, is running very loosely. It is important that the government sincerely support Operation Sindh and help it to be successful. Our country is in great need of law and order, and it is important that these instigators and robbers are fully eliminated. Even Nawaz Sharif himself has called this operation timely by referring to the investment. The political problems our government is facing because of this military operation should be taken care of by the government if it discusses this situation with other political parties. The government also took the initiative of establishing contact with the parliamentary opposition. However, the prime minister's statements are a big hindrance in this effort. Yesterday, he said that the PPP and al-Zulfiqar are one and the same. The question arises: If al-Zulfiqar is a terrorist organization, then shouldn't the military operation continue to totally obliterate it? It is the duty of our government to protect Operation Sindh from becoming a victim of suspicion and skepticism. It is a question of the government's own credibility.

#### **Pakhtoon Leader Demands Separate Province**

92AS1365A Karachi JASARAT in Urdu 15 Jul 92 p 4

[News Report: "Afzal Khan: 'A Pakhtoon Province Should Be Formed on the Basis of Language and Race; Discrimination Against the Pashtuns in Balochistan Is Creating Hatred; Wali Khan Has Changed His Tribal Affiliation'"]

[Text] Quetta (JASARAT Correspondent): Mohammad Afzal Khan, central leader of the national party demanding a Pakhtoon state and deputy opposition leader in the national assembly, has demanded that the provinces be divided on the basis of language and race and that a province should be carved out for the Pakhtoons. Speaking at the Press Club here on Monday, he said that the Balochis and Pashtuns who had lived together peacefully as brothers for centuries in Balochistan were being inflamed and instigated into

confrontation; both groups had equal rights and should be treated equally; unfortunately, the Pakhtuns who were forced to abandon Balochi areas during last October's disturbances were living without any shelter under the open sky near Quetta; the government had turned its back on them and the complaints of the refugees regarding [lack of] compensation were being ignored; the discrimination against Pashtuns in Balochistan was creating hatred among the provinces and if continued without any check, would prove dangerous to the country's unity. The PQP [Pakhtoonkhwa Qaumi Party] party leader said that it was the duty of the government to maintain law and order in the country and the responsibility of the army to guard the boundaries; entrusting to the army the responsibility for maintaining law and order was a sign of the government's failure and a government that could not safeguard the lives and property of the people should resign; the Sindhis were becoming a minority in their own land, which was spreading a sense of deprivation among them; the opposition should have been informed before any action was taken in Sindh. In answer to a question, Afzal Khan said that by extending his hand to Altaf Hussain, Jamat-I-Islami, and Nawaz Sharif, Wali Khan had changed his tribal affiliation. He added, "The difference between him and us is that we do not do an about-face."

#### **Diplomatic Function Attendees To Be Rotated**

92AS1349C Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English  
18 Jul 92 p 12

[Article by Aroosa Alam: "President, PM Not To Attend Diplomatic Functions"]

[Text] Islamabad, 17 Jul—The President and the Prime Minister from now onwards would not attend any diplomatic function, THE MUSLIM learned here from official sources.

The decision has been conveyed by the Cabinet Division to all the ministers and the ministers of state who have also been advised to follow the suit.

In future, after receipt of invitations for diplomatic functions, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs would nominate two ministers by rotation for attending such functions. The names of those ministers would be conveyed to the hosts.

While asking the ministers and ministers of state to keep their attendance of these functions to the minimum, the Cabinet Division had also asked them to ensure that the officials also abide by the decision. Though under the existing rules, officials were barred from going to functions arranged by foreign missions but it had been observed that a large number of them make it a point not to miss any such opportunity.

The official sources were not willing to divulge the background of the decision. However, it was gathered that this practice was being discarded as nowhere in the world the national day function arranged by Pakistani

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missions were attended by heads of government or state of the host countries. Even ministers and officials do not attend these functions. But here the President and the Prime Minister are regular visitors to the national day receptions hosted by embassies from time to time.

### 'Secularized Elite' Attacked for Promoting Ataturk Model

92ASI317B Lahore THE NATION in English 12 Jul 92  
p 6

[Article by Mushahid Hussain: "...And Now the 'Ataturk Model'"]

[Text] In the context of the Sindh operation launched by the Pakistan Army, there seems to be a sudden surfacing of nostalgia, indeed, pinning of the "Ataturk model." It has even been suggested in this context that "should the Army impose Martial Law this time around, it would be different than Zia's and it may even be of the Ataturk variety." Interestingly, this infatuation with military rule a la Ataturk has emerged from sections of Pakistan's secularised elite which spent the greater part of the last decade reviling the Pakistan Army probably because the Martial Law that it imposed the last time was not to its liking.

In their rush to "save" Pakistan through the imposition of the "Ataturk model" sections of Pakistan's secularised elite probably forgot some essential differences in the case of Turkey and Pakistan and also leave out some essentials of Pakistan's rather unfortunate, even disastrous experience under successive Martial Laws. Some examples:

- Actually, Pakistan has already had its own version of Ataturk in the form of Ayub Khan (secular moderniser attired in khaki), whose lasting legacies to Pakistan included the demise of democracy, the institutionalisation of corruption, particularly the use of state power for personal enrichment, and laying the basis of the partition of Pakistan;
- When Ataturk began his process of westernising Turkey, he did so in a historical context which is qualitatively different than that existing in Pakistan today, since he had a victorious Turkish Army that had defeated British troops and it was a popular force seeking to liberate Turkey from the extra baggage of a corrupt and decadent Khilafat;
- Unlike Turkey, whose 75 percent population is monolithic in ethnic and linguistic terms, Pakistan is a multi-ethnic federation whose army predominantly comes from two provinces only while Sindhis and the Baluch look upon the Army in a similar light as the Kurds, some 25 percent of Turkey's population, view the Turkish Army today. Therefore, Martial Law in Pakistan today will reinforce sentiments of alienation among these communities since their role in the power-structure will be further marginalised to the point of being non-existent.

To Pakistani admirers of Mustapha Kamal, the "Ataturk model" is apparently appealing on three counts:

- Ataturk's clergy bashing;
- Ataturk's secularism;
- Ataturk's Westernism.

What is forgotten while seeking to ape the "Ataturk model" is that his lasting legacy to Turkey is a major minus now for his country since Ataturk left behind an abiding identity problem for his country and the people whose pretensions, superficially at least, of being "honorary Europeans" are not matched by the realities of Turkey being an essentially Muslim and Asian state. In fact, Ataturk robbed Turkey of its identity, a vital ingredient of any country's ethos since for Europeans, Turkey is still non-White and non-Christian and hence not acceptable as part of the European family, and for Asians, the Turks come across as people seeking to clumsily clad themselves culturally as Europeans, although deep down an average Turk is as conservative and as Muslim as, say, an average Pakistani, the official ideology of secularism notwithstanding. In any case, the Ataturk ideological legacy has an increasingly larger number of detractors in Turkey with more adherents emerging of Islamic Turkey as opposed to a Turkey which many view as being politically rudderless.

It may not be out of place to mention that two of Ataturk's contemporaries who were enthusiastic exponents of his "Model" for their countries failed in their own lifetime namely Raza Shah in Iran, and Amanullah Khan in Afghanistan. Ironically, both these countries have proclaimed themselves voluntarily through the will of their own people as Islamic Republics within the last decade. Above all, all these secular modernisers of the Ataturk variety—the Shah of Iran, Ayub Khan or the late Boudiaf in Algeria—have been the worst kind of autocrats. Democracy was certainly not part of the Ataturk agenda, which clearly means that this "model" probably is perceived as being culturally "liberal" (trappings of Westernisation) but politically it is certainly not "liberal."

Strangely, sections of the Pakistani secularised elite find the "Ataturk model" so appealing now that they have gone to the extent of clamouring for Martial Law when the same elite, publicly at least, mourned the demise of democracy in Zia's Martial Law. Apparently their problem is not an aversion to Martial law per se but the kind of military rule, so it is neither a principled commitment to democracy nor a principled opposition to military rule. Rather, the issue is more, from their perspective at least, the kind of military rule with the Ziaist brand obviously unacceptable while an "Ataturk model" Martial Law is fine. This is not surprising as the secularised elite in such Muslim country as Algeria, Tunisia or the Shah's Iran, all secular clones of the West, have preferred Western-propelled authoritarianism in mufti or khaki over democracy with an indigenous or Islamist flavour.

When sections of Pakistan's secularised elite pine the "Ataturk model," they are also exposing their weakness and virtual helplessness in understanding the evolution of the political process in Pakistan which is today marked by the unravelling of a status quo that the colonials had left behind in 1947. This process has already been witnessed in the countries in the region like Iran, Afghanistan, Lebanon and more recently in Islamic Central Asia while it is also being witnessed in neighbouring India as well. There is, at one level, the secularised elite's search for a saviour, a messiah of sorts and they feel that candidates for a saviour rule may be available more in the ranks of the Pakistan Army today than outside it, in the civilian section. Additionally, such a notion of a saviour in khaki also exposes the bankruptcy of this elite since they would prefer to bank on a military coup for deliverance rather than on a political process in which the people might still be able to influence the course of events.

There is also an element of superficiality in such thinking of the secularised elite since they are apparently going by surface indicators and banking on the Chief of the Army Staff, General Asif Nawaz, as a Pakistani present-day Ataturk, since General Asif Nawaz is perceived as an "English medium" General, having been educated at St. Mary's and Sandhurst. Probably, he is seen to be the "Reader's Digest" variety of General rather than the "Urdu Digest" brand of men in khaki which was typified by General Ziaul Haq! Such an analysis, does not take a cognizance of the institution of the Pakistan Army, that General Asif Nawaz heads, and which has changed beyond recognition since 1947. The Pakistan Army today is an indigenous, Islamic, nationalist and middle-class institution. This, in a nutshell, is the collective identity of the institution that General Asif Nawaz represents. It is also an Army whose entire ethos is defined in the framework of an emerging Islamic world-view in the region in which Pakistan is located that operationally means intimacy with neighbouring Muslim countries, aversion to Indian hegemony and admiration for the Kashmiri liberation struggle, and opposition to American diktat on the nuclear issue.

In the domestic context, the army has gone a long way in evolving into a more open and self-confident institution which now interacts closely with civil society and which is thus able to do things that in the past were improbable such as a willingness to retract on mistakes such as Tando Bahawal, a readiness to go for an even-handed crackdown in Sindh, in the process, even seeking to tame a Frankenstein that the Army itself had helped create in the past and conducting a military operation in full view of the Press and the Parliament, something rare and unprecedented in Pakistan's chequered political history.

What is true in the present situation is the failure of Pakistan's ruling classes—both "English medium" and "Urdu medium"—to deliver, the PPP [Pakistan People's Party] and the IJI [Islami Jamhoori Ittehad] being representatives of these strands because they are gynaecologically from the same social classes that straddle the

political divide and who are united by unvarnished greed which means that money-making takes precedence over decent governance.

In this talk of the "Ataturk model," three aspects should be taken note of by those who are new converts to military rule. First, the Pakistan army which is today the one Pakistani institution that is still professionally compact and which is still intact in terms of its unity, discipline and chain of command, is already stretched much beyond its capabilities. It is being asked to secure the borders, make peace in Afghanistan and "settle" not just Sindh but any other area in Pakistan that may be troubled on account of ethnic, sectarian or other forms of strife. In such a situation, asking the Pakistan Army to undertake the "cleansing" of the society is a task which is above and beyond its call of duty at the national institution, and it will only help in getting it mired in the mud.

Second, historically, the army has taken over when certain conditions exist for the imposition of Martial Law and these include some abiding features as:

- situation of general instability and confusion caused by street agitation or political infighting;
- connivance with a set of politicians who want to use the Army to oust their political opponents;
- clearance from the United States, even if it is simply a wink from Washington.

Third, whenever there is military rule of the Zia, Ayub or whichever variety, the Army acts as an autonomous, political player with its own political agenda and it is then neither willing nor ready to accept any line or agenda promoted by the politicians, any political party or other civilian sections including those in the secularised elite who may have recently discovered virtues in particular brands of military rule.

#### Government Said To Use Systematic Torture Methods

92AS1263C Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English  
10 Jul 92 p 6

[Article by Syed Fahd Husain: "Cries of Anguish Echo in the Dark"; italicized words as published]

[Text] According to the U.N. Declaration of Human Rights, the term torture means "any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity."

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Torture is in widespread use in Pakistan, in most cases directly or indirectly sponsored by official agencies. It is the worst form of suppression that a human being can undergo. The extreme agony that the victim and his near ones have to go through, can be comprehended by but a few of us. In Pakistan, cases of police brutality and outright savagery by other agencies and parties have become part of our daily news. We have become insultingly immune.

The Annual Report of the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP), titled "State of Human Rights in Pakistan 1991," was recently indetail the gross violation of human rights in Pakistan last year. The introduction states:

"On the practical plane, 1991, the first full calendar year of the present government, unfortunately brought no relief. The record may even seem bleaker. No laws were adopted, no institutions set up, no moves initiated that can be regarded as significant advance towards better guaranteeing to the people their basic rights..."

Human Rights violations take on various forms ranging from political victimisation to police torture to inhuman punishments legalised by the state. The most outright and blatant violations of human dignity, however, are practised by the Pakistani police and nothing has so far been done to put a check on this. *Thanas* have become dreaded places as the uniformed "upholders of justice": torture first and ask questions later. Cases of deaths in police custody have become a routine matter and at most the official concern is "transferred" and nothing more.

Naveed Shamroz and his father Shamroz Khan were picked up from their house in Karachi by a Special Investigation Team. They were to be interrogated in an arms recovery case. For two whole days they were kept in the *thana* and brutally tortured by the members of this official team. The charge against them was not registered. They were released when no evidence against them was found. Soon Naveed developed pains in his chest which was a result of the torture inflicted by the investigating officers, and was taken to the Civil Hospital. The torture had been so severe and brutal that Naveed died in the hospital. He was buried without a post mortem examination. Two constables were arrested and that was the end of it.

Ehsanul Haq, a PPP [Pakistan People's Party] activist was taken from his house in Sangla Hill by the notorious CIA [Crime Investigation Agency]. Later, his body was dumped outside the hospital by the police.

A Malir shopkeeper, Shakeel Ahmad was picked up by a CIA team on April 25, 1990 and taken to the detention centre. As a result of torture by the CIA, he died the same day. Police refused to register a case against the CIA officials.

While searching for a doctor who had been abducted, police raided village Bilali Saher in Dadu district. There

they arrested Soomar Khoso, an 80-year-old man. He was taken to his house and beaten up so savagely that he died on the spot.

Such tales of horror are countless in number, and no one is held accountable. These crimes have now become institutionalised. As a result, police have developed an attitude where they consider common citizens worse than animals. This attitude spills over into all their actions, be it the checking of a petty traffic violation or the dispersal of a peaceful crowd.

On June 5, an Assistant Sub-Inspector [ASI] of Police was lightly brushed by the bumper of a vehicle which was almost stationary. The ASI dragged the driver out of the car and thrashed him with his baton, all the time cursing profusely. For the ASI that was the natural way to react.

In December, 1991, a group of women protesting against violence against women in Karachi, were baton-charged by the police. About a dozen were hurt and had to undergo medical treatment.

The same month, a small crowd of women was protesting peacefully in front of the Parliament building. Police used tear gas to disperse the crowd. Many people were beaten up and women were pulled by the hair and dragged. This excessive use of force was totally unwarranted.

At one of these demonstrations, one of the women yelled at the cops: "Do you also treat your mothers and sisters like this?"

The Aasia Ayub case brought to the fore the extent of police brutality. Aasia Ayub was brought to the Banni police station Rawalpindi on suspicion of a theft case. The mere fact that she was detained all night was illegal. The case went to court and the accused SHO [Station House Officer] was "honourably" acquitted.

After the acquittal, as the SHO and his colleagues were coming out of the court, they threatened newsmen of dire consequences. The Press had a major role in bringing this case to light. The correspondent who had vigorously pursued the case was also harassed by the local police. She even received a taunting letter from them after the acquittal.

It is only recently that an appeal has been filed and the case will be re-opened.

Political victimisation has also become a part and parcel of everyday political activity. It has come to be accepted as an extension of the Pakistani *realpolitik*. Under Jam Sadiq Ali, Sindh witnessed the worst form of state-sponsored political victimisation. As long as PPP was kept at bay, the federal government was content in letting Jam Sadiq have his way.

According to the HRCP report: "In addition to the police ... even private militias acting in political support of the government, like the Hurs, were widely accused of pursuing, holding and even torturing the workers and

sympathisers of the opposition. There were reports of torture chambers being quietly maintained, allegedly by the Rangers inside the Mehran Sugar Mills in Tando Allahyar."

The recent unearthing of MQM [Mujahir Qaumi Movement] torture cells is a testimony to the extent that people can go to safeguard their own political interests.

The case of Raheela Tiwana is well known. She was picked up from her home in Karachi on December 25, 1990. She had been the president of the girl's wing of the Karachi Division of the People's Student Federation (PSF), Student Wing of the PPP. Her torture began by denial of food. She was hung upside down for hours on end till she started bleeding from the nose and lost consciousness. Her father and her brother were tortured in front of her.

The HRCP report says that the demands of her torturers were that "she sign a confessional statement saying that Ms Benazir Bhutto and her husband were involved in all the murder and corruption cases that they were charged with, that she herself had been sent to India by Mrs Nusrat Bhutto for training in terrorism and that she was involved in gun-running between Hyderabad and Karachi."

When she was finally forced on drugs, she had to sign blank sheets because she had totally lost control of her senses.

Unless people become aware of these inhuman practices being meted out by the very people who are supposed to safeguard the rights of citizens, and unless people raise their voice against this blatant savagery, human right violations will continue unabated. Who knows who could be next?

#### Nation Seen Increasingly Ungovernable

92AS1317D Lahore THE NATION in English 9 Jul 92  
p 9

[Article by Mubashir Hasan: "See the Woods Not the Trees"]

[Text] The increasing involvement of our defence forces in maintaining internal law and order is tending to endanger the security of the state of Pakistan. For students of history, the writing on the wall is easy to read; for others it is almost impossible to decipher.

Many intelligent and patriotic Pakistanis genuinely believe that if, through the current operations in Sindh, murderers, kidnappers, dacoits, rapists and torturers were arrested and convicted, peace would return and the sailing would be smooth for democratic functioning of the province and the country. There are others who agree, but insist that such operations can meet only with partial success, and in certain cases make the situation worse, unless they have full support of the popular political elements.

There are still some others who believe that the problems of that tormented land are not merely those of impartial enforcement of law and order and of letting a democratic polity function but have still deeper roots. The uneven economic development of the country, the feeling of social and economic deprivation among various ethnic groups, inflation, unemployment, lack of civic amenities, poor education and the culture of oppression and authoritarianism have substantially contributed to the present conditions.

Very few amongst us realise that the foregoing diagnosis and prescriptions are at best a list of symptoms along with some suggestions for directing their treatment. Most of us tend to overlook the cancer-like disease that afflicts the polity of Pakistan and which constitutes the basic cause of the present grave situation. The hard reality is that the laws, rules and regulations enacted by the British to govern the subcontinent and the civil apparatus sculptured by them to rule over a subject people is in an advanced state of contamination, crumbling and disintegration, more so in Pakistan than in India and Bangladesh. In Sri Lanka, it had collapsed nearly a decade ago.

The arrangement to govern the subcontinent through the notorious "steel-framework" of a hierarchy of civil officers, backed by intelligence networks and ultimately by the armed power of the military, began to come under strain as the urge for political freedom and economic emancipation among the people mounted at the end of World War I. The attempts by the British rulers to keep India peaceful, on the one hand through use of force and on the other, through promulgation of measures of "self-rule" failed to give the required results. In 1939, draconian measures in the form of the Defence of India Rules, which gave total power to local and provincial officials had to be introduced but they too failed to stem the rot of the colonial dispensation of the state and the ability of the government to govern continued to diminish unabated.

All the evils that one grieves about in the civil society and the official world in Pakistan today were present in the decade of the forties in India but in a milder form. However, alarm bells rang in Delhi. True to form, the government, headed by General Wavell, came out with the stock proposal that the physical force of the state, being inadequate, needed to be augmented. At the end of World War II, he requested the government in London either to send six divisions of British troops or to take the decision to pack up and leave India. The politicians in the White Hall decided to in favour of the latter.

Following the assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan the officers of the apparatus of the state took over the business of governing Pakistan. Under the leadership of Ghulam Mohammad, Iskander Mirza, Ayub Khan, Yahya Khan, Ziaul Haq, Ghulam Ishaq and Aslam Beg, officers have ruled over Pakistan. Feudals, lawyers, civil servants and opportunists from all classes, now including big businessmen, have chosen to serve under them as

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Prime Ministers, Chief Ministers and Governors. These, so-called rulers, have reigned but not ruled. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto tried to establish his supremacy over the civil and military establishments and paid with his dear life.

The great lesson implicit in the story of Pakistanis is that the organisation to run the state has continued to lose its legitimacy and effectiveness. Efforts made by every government at improving it have failed. Each successive government has done worse than its predecessor. The ability of the government to perform its primary duties, such as providing security of person and property, dispensation of justice, collection of taxes has not ceased to become less and less.

The virus of the colonial organisation of the state, that has afflicted Pakistan, has proved to be immune to the antibiotics of change after change in the country's constitution. Ayub Khan's Basic Democracy, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's socialism turned into Musawaat-e-Muhammadi, and Islamisation of Ziaul Haq have had little effect on our pace of deterioration. Unending changes in laws, bestowing more and more power to the executive and strengthening of police force and magistracy, through regular and irregular additions of manpower and equipment, have proved to be of little avail.

Personal character of our rulers, their intelligence or integrity, or lack of them, by the feudals, liberals, generals or nobodies, also failed to stem the tide of the deterioration, which has proved to be quite independent of the personalities, programmes or the will of the rulers.

The principal attribute of the colonial apparatus for this rule over Pakistan, is that political, social and economic power should be highly centralised. The top should comprise of officers of the state, advised by omnipresent intelligence agencies. The existence of elected bodies, from federal legislatures to village councils, and the fate of their decisions should be at the mercy the salaried executive at the top. They should have powers to dismiss elected bodies and to over rule their decisions, all perfectly legal, with the sanction and support of the highest courts.

The prevailing scheme of governing Pakistan has made it increasingly ungovernable. During the last quarter of a century, our polity has witnessed rapid and extraordinary growth of two forces. The first is a diffused and unorganised force of numerous nuclei, comprising of many heterogeneous elements, often clashing with and antagonistic to each other, yet ultimately, destined to confront and weaken the authority of the state. This is the force of crime, sectarian and fundamentalist violence and of discontented and desperate elements who raid police stations and face the police in the so-called encounters. The second is the physical arm of the state which has been providing itself with bulging manpower, better arms and equipment, extensive intelligence networks and speedier courts.

For the purpose of maintenance of law and order in the country, the rapid and extraordinary growth of the

physical arm of the state is manifestly a response to the growth of the forces challenging or violating the authority of the state. Now the growth of the physical arms of the state can only take place within the resources of the state which have strict physical limits. While the growth of the challenge has virtually no limits, because it is the product to the very fertile ground provided by the increasing degree of the failure of the state and its structure. The deceptive gaining of the upper hand by the state such as that in 1969, 1977 and 1983 was invariably followed by the next challenge—more violent in nature and more dangerous than the one that preceded it. Meanwhile the collapse of the organisation of the state and degeneration of the society has proceeded with full speed. The writing on the wall is bold and clear. Unless we reform our organisation of the state a terrible tragedy is in store for us and no measures, howsoever wisely executed in Sindh would be of no avail.

#### MQM, Potential Changes After Sindh Operation Appraised

##### Press Free From Fear

92AS1261A Lahore THE FRIDAY TIMES in English  
9 Jul 92 p 5

[Article by Mohammad Hanif: "Who Will Have the Last Laugh?"; quotation marks as published]

[Text] The recent media extravaganza highlighting the MQM's [Mujahir Qaumi Movement] atrocities is undoubtedly the revenge that the Karachi press is exacting from the MQM. But while highlighting the evil side of the MQM, the news bonanza has also exposed the limitations, largely self-imposed, of the Karachi press which did not print even a fraction of what it knew about the party for the past many years.

For a long time, the MQM dictated not only the headlines, but even the content of newspaper stories. The oversized pictures and verbose, rambling statements of Altaf Hussain which haunted the front pages of Karachi newspapers for years, were suddenly replaced by photographs of the MQM Haqeeqi leaders flashing victory signs. In the backdrop, one could see smug ISPR [Inter-Services Public Relations] officials—the engineers of the aggressive anti-MQM media campaign which continues to unfold like a grandmaster's chess game.

A sense of cautious optimism prevailed in Karachi newsrooms for the first few days of the crackdown. For most of Karachi's hacks, who had all but given up any real reporting on the MQM, it was simply too good to be true. JANG, which had perfected the art of turning whatever nonsense Altaf Hussain uttered during the day into a lead story, went for the MQM's jugular after two days of sitting on the fence. Although it couldn't muster up enough courage to name the MQM in its lead story on the day the coup took place, it tried to make amends by running graphic stories of the MQM's torture techniques, comparing them to the Nazis. Even QAUMI

AKHBAR, Karachi's largest Urdu eveninger, which was tamed by Altaf Hussain into an MQM mouthpiece, decided to throw in its lot with the dissidents.

The English press did slightly better than its Urdu counterpart. THE NEWS launched a media blitz on the MQM as soon as the crackdown began. Desperate to catch up, DAWN jumped on the bandwagon a few days later, and went overboard in the process. In a front-page report, one of its Karachi reporters claimed an unusual "scoop." He "unearthed" a dismembered nose in a torture cell which had been closed for over a year. Then one of the paper's Islamabad correspondents reported that Interpol was being contacted to help extradite Altaf Hussain, a story promptly denied by the government.

All the euphemistic phrases ("urban-based ethnic organisation," "the biggest political party in urban Sindh," etc.) that the Karachi press had coined over the years for the MQM, on those rare occasions when they had to do a negative story, were instantly trashed.

But in its enthusiasm to avenge its enforced silence by the MQM, the press played right into the ISPRs hands. Newspapers lapped up with unconcealed gratitude whatever the ISPR had to offer. As the guided tours of torture cells and the regular briefings became passe, wild speculation became the order of the day. Saleem Shehzad, who according to local papers was arrested while trying to cross over to Balochistan, was still at large at the time of our going to press. That was just one of the many news faux pas that found their way into the born again Karachi press.

But the English press reaction was positively tame compared to the Sindhi newspapers and the Jamaat Islami organs, JASAARAT and TAKBEER, which really went wild. TAKBEER eulogised the dissident leaders as revolutionaries and saviours of Pakistan. It also discovered RAW plans to dismember Sindh in every MQM office and commissioned investigative pieces on Altaf Hussain's sexual preferences. Sindhi newspapers for the first time, extensively quoted, for once, 'reliable' military sources.

With the MQM's infamous information apparatus now paralysed, their version of the story filtered through only when their leaders on the run called up newspaper offices on their mobile phones. The Pir of Karachi personally phones prominent journalists in the city from London and, in conversations sometimes exceeding an hour, entreated them to help save his party which had become the victim of vicious persecution. How the mighty had fallen.

However, its no-holds-barred coverage does not absolve the Karachi press of its sins of omission in the past. For too long, the Karachi media remained by and large, a silent spectator, if not a downright supporter, of whatever the MQM dished out. The onus of reporting on the MQM's dark side fell on an incongruous alignment of

liberal and fundamentalist periodicals of limited circulation. It was TAKBEER, NEWSLINE, HERALD and JASARAT, that continued to report on the MQM despite its threats.

Two years ago, when the Karachi-based monthly, NEWSLINE, broke the story of the MQM's torture cells, the existence of a dissident group within the MQM and the party's witch-hunt against the dissidents (NEWSLINE, An Armed Rebellion, October 1990) Altaf Hussain launched a frontal assault on the magazine. In his election rallies following the publication of the article, he did more than cry foul about his favourite nemesis. Describing them as part of the unseen, omnipresent mohajir-dushman lobby, he hurled vile invectives at the magazine's female editorial staff, accused them, oddly enough, of wearing their hair short, drinking French mineral water and generally being the kind of people who could be purchased with a bottle of liquor. Despite the threat of violence, the magazine continued to publish follow-up stories on the MQM's activities.

The newspapers had every reason to be scared. Over the last five years, the MQM systematically targeted all the media outlets that dared to report independently. JANG and DAWN's offices were ransacked repeatedly and their hawkers were kidnapped and beaten up. TAKBEER had to shift its publishing operation to Lahore after its editor's house and the magazine office was burnt down. Last year, Zafar Abbas, the HERALD and BBC correspondent, was severely beaten by thugs who forced their way into his house. Zafar was patched up with 14 stitches.

Today, the most obvious element in the screaming-headlines indicting the MQM is that they are merely confirming what their readers in this city have known for years. But the present coverage on the MQM is again completely subjective—albeit in reverse. It is excessively reliant on ISPR, off the record comments of intelligence people, and short on any real reporting. The MQM's nefarious activities are reported in grisly detail, but few reporters have bothered to venture into Altaf Hussain's areas of support to find out what the Pir's disciples are thinking.

The question remains: Will this glasnost last? Much depends on how the MQM saga ends. Some Karachi dailies are already receiving threatening phone calls from the MQM, promising that they'll get even when the party is back in power. Perhaps that's why most of the stories indicting the MQM don't carry the reporters' by-lines—just in case...

#### All MQM Elements Rotten

92AS1261B Lahore THE FRIDAY TIMES in English  
9 Jul 92 p 9

[Article by Zeid Bakr: "Seek the Sober in Stables"]

[Text] Many things come from Sindh. And many have yet to come, the nature of which is difficult to predict.

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But none, perhaps, will so intrigue posterity as the strange spectacle of a cabinet, several of whose members have gone into hiding, presumably to evade the coercive apparatus which, as partners in the government, they are supposed to direct. In cultures with a firmly established law, this could only happen if the fugitives had committed a crime. And if they had, they would quickly cease to be members of cabinet. In other political cultures, it would be possible to conceive of ministers falling foul of the political supremo and, weighing discretion and valour in the balance, deciding to make themselves scarce. This, let us not forget, implies the kind of political culture associated with the name of such support luminaries as Idi Amin. I am not saying that we, today, stand at the spot mortalised by the likes of Idi but, palpably, we are nowhere close to the culture of law. Hence the puzzle of the disappearing MPAs [Member of Provincial Assembly]. As long as they belonged to the ruling side, what worries need they have of transgressions past or present. And yet, they vanish. Or not quite. From subterranean depths, their plaintive voices still reach us. Righteous indignation at having been betrayed. Commitment to principles and resignations. Firm resolve to continue to serve the downtrodden masses of Karachi (presumably through addressing mammoth rallies on the telephone from London). And not a word about what those torture cells were doing there.

One of the lessons driven home by the Sindh Sanitisation campaign appears to be that metamorphosis is the basic characteristic of the political animal. Or, perhaps, a series of mutations. The MQM [Muhajir Quami Movement] crowd were bad guys when they associated themselves with the PPP [Pakistan People's Party]. They became saints and Pirs when they threw in their lot with the right crowd and it does not do to enquire too closely into what the saints are doing for they move in mysterious ways. And now, when what they have been doing during their reign of terror cannot be hidden any more, it is imperative to allow a little daylight to be seen between allies. Even now, however, there is an obvious temptation to cling to them. A new word has, therefore, been added to the political jargon of the country—"sober elements."

Muzaffar Hussain Shah, in case you have been wondering lately, is the Chief Minister of Sindh. Since one can be the Chief Minister only if one commands a majority in the Assembly, it is no surprise that Mr Shah claims that he has a majority in the Sindh legislature. This may be true but how does he prove it? A substantial number of the MPAs, as we have seen, are nowhere to be seen. Indeed, they are reported to have informed all and sundry that they do not intend to be seen in the Assembly. The Speaker of that august body, too, has bid a long farewell to the house. How, then, does the Chief Minister prove his claim? The answer is that he does not. He asks the opposition to disprove his claim. He, himself, is secure in the knowledge that the missing MPAs, "despite the apprehensions in their minds about the army operation, had extended support to him." (THE

NEWS July 3, 1992). Now, in our political culture, those who are in power seem never to lose support and never feel under any compulsion to substantiate their claim.

That the Chief Minister has been assured of this support by "MQM-backed ministers and the top leadership of the party" may well be right. But how does he expect others to believe him without producing these gentlemen to state publicly what they have told him privately? Even if he were to do this, however, he would have to answer the further question of why he should continue in alliance with those who were either directly involved in torture and murder or were otherwise responsible for it—if nothing else, as accessories after the fact? No wonder, then, that "this support raised a number of eyes in the press conference where the Chief Minister clarified that the sober elements inside the MQM were without any criminal background." Perhaps they were not. But they could still be charged with either having condoned what their party was doing or were so stupid that they did not know what was going on. And where is the sense in having people burdened with such stupidity in positions of leadership? But no, it is argued by the "sober elements," it was the terror of the MQM that prevented them from speaking up. Had they opposed the "high command," they would have ended up dead or worse. Now fear for one's life is a perfectly natural emotion—in an ordinary mortal. But an ordinary mortal does not push himself forward in a position from which he expects to lead the ordinary mortal. The domination of fear in a leader is always in inverse proportion to his commitment to principles. Whatever the conditions under which the leaders failed, they were unable to cope with them. That does not lead to too much confidence in their being able to do better in the future. And what if, having once proved that they are not ready to do the right thing when the going gets rough, they again do nothing to prevent terrorism, tyranny and torture?

Neither the sober nor the inspired elements in MQM are worth cultivating. And those who decide to continue with them behind a veil of sophistries will have to be judged accordingly. But Mr Shah is not really worried about losing a majority in the Sindh Assembly. He points out that a vote of no confidence would require 55 "sitting" MPAs to succeed. Several of these, as we all know, may be sitting but we don't know where. A judgment can, after all, be made about the effectiveness of a government that can produce neither its ministers nor its legislators on demand. But hold your breath. Mr Shah has gone on to reveal that several of the MPAs who have requisitioned a session of the Sindh Assembly have been in touch with him. Mr Shah considers this information significant. As it is. But only in our political culture. In normal societies, the Chief Minister has no occasion for boasting if he meets opposition MPAs occasionally. There is more to this than a mere boast about social prowess. There is a whiff of the Augean stables about the whole thing. Are the "sober" elements of the MQM not enough for Mr Shah? Does he also need

knights in shining armour to come riding to his aid on horses that have been traded?

### Rehabilitation Required

92AS1261C Karachi DAWN in English 6 Jul 92 p 7

[Article by A.R. Siddiqi: "Mohajirs and Crackdown on MQM"; italicised words, quotation marks as published]

[Text] In a wide-ranging statement, the Prime Minister's Special Assistant Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan spoke feelingly of the fears of the Urdu-speaking Muhajirs of Karachi in the wake of the recent crackdown on the MQM [Mujahir Qaumi Movement] strongholds and action against the party's high command—Ministers, MNAs [Member of National Assembly] and MPAs [Member of Provincial Assembly].

A masterpiece of candour and sensitiveness, rarely associated with the ministerial class, Choudhry Nasir made a strong case for measures at the federal level to allay the fears and misgivings about the operation taking the shape of an action against the Urdu-speaking people of Karachi. He said: "The Sindh situation has turned into a game of politics and it is regrettable that everyone has lost sight of the interests of Sindh."

Since the June 19 crackdown, Karachiites, by and large, have been living in the long shadow of fear and uncertainty about their own safety and security as a class and a community. The feeling ensues largely from the menacing likelihood of the entire Urdu-speaking Muhajir community, at some stage or the other, being identified as MQM supporters and activists—by the authorities concerned and proceeded against.

There has been a progressive loss of faith in the "even-handedness" of the operation. The thrust and the direction of the operation has changed from the rural areas to Karachi.

In the words of Chaudhry Nisar Ali, the army action was "initially" envisaged against anti-State elements and terrorists and the "thrust" was supposed to be in the "rural areas where these were mainly based." This would appear to be the case no longer as the operation has changed its course at least for the time being.

Another debatable point engaging public attention pertains to the wisdom or folly of Mr Altaf Hussain's directive to the MQM ministers (federal and provincial) MPAs and MNAs to resign *enmasse* from their portfolios and assembly seats.

Whether the exodus of the MQM's elected representatives from the corridors of power would help either the MQM or the Muhajirs at large remains to be seen. However, a strong feeling exists in favour of their choosing to put in their places and make a stand rather than quit in so great a hurry. At all events, they would have done much better to wait for the government to make the next move and capitalise to the maximum.

Chances were that after the exposure of the terrorist activities of the party and the unearthing of the 'torture' and 'rape' cells, the government itself would have, sooner than later, moved against the party collectively as an organisation or against its stalwarts individually. In either case, the vital question of violations of human rights would have arisen to invest the party and the individuals with a martyr's halo. After all, the party's electoral credentials remain beyond question to provide it its best chance to fight and possibly win a legal/constitutional battle. That opportunity however, had been wantonly thrown away.

Beyond the debate about the wisdom or folly of MQM's *tour de force* in quitting the centres of power arose the thorny and agonizing question about what lay in store for the Muhajirs in the future. The one, dominant and commonly-shared fear pertained to all Urdu-speaking Muhajirs being looked at as MQM-wallas. The likelihood of the MQM label attaching to the Sindhi Muhajir community as a whole has been the one depressing thought weighing on everybody's mind.

Already projected as a 'terrorist' body, MQM or its high command, at any rate, must one day, sooner or later, face and answer the charges or the 'references' brought against it. It would be a most difficult situation with the supreme leader, still a fugitive in London, and half the party's high command incommunicado. Who in their absence will face the music? Anyone who makes the fine distinction between 'Quaf' and 'Kaf', 'Seen' and 'Sheen' in conversation?—a frightening prospect, shared half in jest, half in earnestness.

It's a fact that MQM, its sweeping electoral success notwithstanding, was not endorsed, least of all supported, by a very large section of the muhajir community. It has (or had?) been essentially a party of the youth, by the youth and for the youth in age groups between 20 and 35 (40-45 in rare cases). None over 45 (except for a handful of ministers and senators) would qualify him or herself for party membership. The bulk of his party's activists or 'militants' consisted of graduate engineers, lawyers, doctors, etc., looking for a job, without finding one.

Maturer and socially better placed Muhajirs hardly ever subscribed to MQM's militant political posture. Even in Karachi and Hyderabad, its two major power centres, its writ ran only in certain parts of the twin cities rather through its length and breadth.

What is in store for MQM remains to be seen. The problem slowly but compulsively emerging pertains to the rehabilitation of the morale of the Urdu-speaking Muhajir community as a whole. It is a highly delicate issue calling for the utmost sensitivity and sense of responsibility on the part of the Establishment—civil and military.

**Will Further Divide Country**

*92AS1261D Karachi DAWN in English 5 Jul 92 p 6*

[Text] Rawalpindi, July 4—MQM [Mohajir Quami Movement] Senator Ishtiaq Azhar has said the present “one-sided military operation” in Sindh would create an East-Pakistan like situation which had forced half of the country to separate.

Speaking at the Meet the Press programme here at Rawalpindi Press Club on Saturday, he criticised the military action in Sindh and termed it as perilous for the stability and integrity of the country.

He said “one-sided operation against MQM” was going on in Karachi and referred to the statements of Chief Minister of Punjab Ghulam Haider Wyne, Federal Minister for Petroleum and Natural Resources Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan and Nasir Wali Khan to support his contention. He said they had rightly warned of dire consequences in the province.

He claimed that the MQM was still a major political force of the province with a dynamic and youthful leadership from the middle class people of the society.

He refuted that there were any differences amongst the MQM and said the MQM workers were united under the leadership of Altaf Hussain. He said economic and political problems of the province should also be addressed by the government.

Replying to a question about Mr Altaf Hussain, he said that Mr Altaf Hussain had serious threat to his life. “We have advised him to remain out of the country,” he said.

He alleged that false and fabricated cases were being registered against MQM workers by implicating them in false cases of abduction. “Look how can I abduct in this age. I am already 65 and I am charged of kidnapping a person in the car of my son and later demanding ransom for his release.”

Replying to a question about abduction and torture of Major Majid Arshed by the MQM workers, he said Majid Arshed was caught by MQM workers while he was carrying illegal weapons in plain clothes.

To another question he said that MQM was a disciplined party and had every respect for the Pakistan army, he recalled that the MQM had welcomed the operation against the dacoits and subversive elements active in the province. But he regretted that under a well-hatched conspiracy it was turned against the MQM.

**JUP Wants Investigation**

*92AS1261E Karachi DAWN in English 3 Jul 92 p 4*

[Text] Sukkur, July 2—Leader of Jamiatul Ulema-i-Pakistan (JUP) Maulana Shah Ahmed Noorani has demanded the setting up of a judicial commission, headed by a Judge of the Supreme Court, to review the activities of MQM [Mohajir Quami Movement],

including all the political parties and the groups who are involved in acts of “terrorism” in Sindh, to bring into light all the facts regarding brutality and terrorism.

Maulana Shah Ahmed Noorani was speaking at a Press conference here on Thursday. He said unless the political parties encouraging the separatist powers, providing shelter to them and those who were ignoring their acts of terrorism were not exposed the ends of justice could not be met. He stressed that the government itself should file references in the Supreme Court in this connection, so that MQM, including all other separatist powers involved acts of terrorism, the political parties, the government functionaries and the Prime Minister himself could be held accountable. This commission should make the facts public, he added.

He said a law should be enacted to ban all such organisations, and stressed that till such action was not taken, the acts of terrorism and the torture chambers would continue springing. He emphasised that the ends of justice would only be met when from Kashmor to Karachi all such persons were arrested by the military who are responsible for destroying the peace of the people.

He urged that all the criminals involved in the carnages of Aligarh Colony, Qasba Colony, Sohrab Goth and Hyderabad be arrested and hanged if the goal of the military operation was to be achieved. He said the terrorists were continuously speaking into Pakistan from a neighbouring country and youngmen were being sent there for receiving training in terrorism and for this purpose the Rajasthan route is being used. It is, therefore, imperative that this border should be sealed forthwith, he added.

The JUP leader alleged that the separatist and the terrorist organisations are being provided shelter under a pre-planned scheme, and by installing them in the government the terrorist activities are being encouraged and the incidents of serious nature were being ignored. “The present government could not be acquitted of this, in all such activities the government equally shared, the people could not be deceived,” he alleged.

He said it is therefore, imperative, that all those in power be held responsible and references against them filed in the Supreme Court. Maulana Noorani demanded that those who opened firing in my meeting on September 22 be arrested at once.

He reiterated that during the period of military operation all licensed weapons be confiscated. He said the situation in the country was so bad that the party in power is perplexed as to what should be done to improve the situation.

Earlier, addressing the Sukkur Bar Association he said that the situation in Sindh worsened and the activities of the dacoits and terrorists increased just after the MRD movement, during this movement in jails. Sindh were

broken and the hardened criminals were released and the political parties availed their services for their vested interests.

After that, in the Zia regime the 1973 Constitution was violated and under a pre-planned scheme the separatist and the terrorist groups were encouraged.

### Mohajir Attitude Needs Changing

92AS1261F Karachi DAWN in English 4 Jul 92 p 4

[Article by Azizur Rahman Bughio: "Change of Mohajir Mind Essential"]

[Excerpt] The Army operation and its other allied aspects including avoidance of incomplete process, taking people of Sindh into confidence and Punjab Chief Minister's doubts about impartiality of military action have formed topics for editorial discussion in the Sindhi Press which continues to stress upon political and economic measures to resolve Sindh's problem. Besides, the need of change in the Mohajir mind and restoration of people's right to represent in the national affairs have also been emphasised, in the wake of what has emerged in Karachi, as a result of the army action.

Analysing the outcome of the action in Karachi, the Awami Awaz (1/7) feels disappointed on two scores. One, the recovered 100 Kalashnikovs is a hopeless performance when compared to one lakh and forty thousands unofficial figure and sixty thousands recorded with secret agencies. Two, no big fish have been arrested and the reports about the arrests of persons like Azim Tariq and Salim Shahzad were not correct, as they are carrying on their activities. According to the paper, the impression is there that Altaf's MQM [Mujahir Quami Movement] group is intact, its structure and people could not be broken. "Under such circumstances, what would happen of those people (and the city itself) who sided with MQM(H) and the authorities? asks the paper.

Another aspect criticised by the daily pertains to what the paper describes as political side unduly projected "giving an impression that there exists a governmental, political or constitutional crisis in Sindh. Thus, political aspect of the operation has emerged more apparent than its real objective to eliminate crimes." The paper believes that such a situation has led certain circles to suspect that this incomplete operation might help restore falling credibility of the MQM.

A popular daily KAWISH of Hyderabad (1/7) is of the view that, undoubtedly, the operation clean-up of Karachi has arrested the dwindling confidence of the Sindhis, "but the demand of Ms Benazir Bhutto is not irrelevant that the country needs such a leadership as enjoys confidence of the people and the army." According to the paper, what Benazir Bhutto had in mind was the fact that "on one hand, continued Martial Laws had left dreadful and dangerous effects of the army on the psychology of the people of Sindh and, on the other, wrong propaganda has led the non-Sindhi law-enforcing

agencies to believe that all Sindhis are anti-country people." Thus, the question of taking the people of Sindh into confidence has emerged emphatically to remove this serious misunderstanding, observes the paper.

The paper says that what smells as rebellious in the posture of Sindhis is, actually, angry and aggrieved state of mind, as a result of their long and cruel exploitation which calls for kind and accommodative rather than harsh handling, in the name of operation. "Slogans written on the walls in the areas of Sindhi population signify their complete resentful reaction to social exploitation. Considering it a conspiracy against federation of Pakistan, would be a mistake, because conspiracy is not hatched publicly," opines the paper.

Referring to Punjab Chief Minister's expression of doubts on the impartiality of army operation, the Hilal-i-Pakistan(1/7) observes that at the first place, Mr Wyne has no right to comment on the exercise of operation which was undertaken on the requisition of the Sindh government and on the approval of the federal government. Secondly, the paper thinks that he disapproves of it because the operation has exposed MQM which is partner with his IJI government in Islamabad which he views purely from the point of his liking and disliking. The paper considers it as unfair on the part of Punjab Chief Minister to look at an issue which does not concern him.

THE JAGO (30/6) commenting on the aftermath of army action in Karachi, exposing the real face of MQM, feels that lakhs of Urdu-speaking people in Sindh, who had fallen victim to this ethnic and fascist group, created by dictator Ziaul Haq, are presently in a state of shock and disappointment. The paper is of the opinion that "they should be taken out from this dejection and despair and thinks that this is the task of political parties to approach them at this moment of their loneliness and link their broken contact with the rest of population provided they adopt a reasonable attitude.

The paper observes: "unfortunately, the general psychology of the Urdu-speaking population carries all germs of historical downfalls in the sub-continent, with the result that it fell victim to dictatorial mischiefs in Pakistan, on several occasions." The paper feels sorry to find that despite being among the people of Sindh who never succumb or surrender to the evil forces working against human values, the Urdu-speaking people did not learn any lesson from Sindhis. "They are in a delusion that they have remained a ruling minority in India for several hundred years and they aspire to have that rule in their same status of minority. It is correct that they enjoyed that stage during Jam regime but their arrogant leadership did not come to their expectations due to selfishness and short-sightedness," argues the paper.

The paper says that the Urdu-speaking population should feel that its real and eternal objective and interest lie with those of the people of Sindh and earlier they give

up false claim of superiority and merge among Sindhis, the better it would be for them." [passage omitted]

### Split With IJI Irreversible

*92AS1261G Karachi DAWN in English 2 Jul 92 p 8*

[Article by Nisar Osnmani: "MQM Goes its Own Way"; quotation marks as published]

[Text] Lahore, July 1—And so the parting of ways has come following the "recent disclosures." Thanks to operation clean-up, the Pakistan Muslim League [PML] is now convinced that the MQM [Mohajir Qaumi Movement], its major coalescing partner for a full 20 months both at the Centre and in Sindh, has been engaged in terrorist activities such as exterminating political opponents or "running torture cells" and that, therefore, relations with it should be severed.

The situation that has emerged in the wake of these "disclosures" is both interesting and intriguing. Inside the ruling Muslim League there appears to be no sense of guilt, hardly any remorse or sorrow over the departure of the once "darling patriotic party" which had rendered timely and valuable assistance to it in forming a "political government" in Sindh and keeping the "undesirable PDA [People's Democratic Alliance]" out of power. During its 20-months rule, the Muslim League saw no evil, heard no evil and spoke no evil about its partner, chief minister Jam Sadiq Ali, the founder of and the "moving spirit" behind the coalition, would be on a pilgrimage to Azizabad every now and then and would lose no opportunity to benefit from the advice and the guidance of the 'Pir Sahib'.

Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif himself made it [a] point to visit the residence at Altaf Bhai for exchange of views in a brotherly atmosphere if and when he chose to go to Karachi or even London.

The equation was enviable, so much so that during the absence of C.M. Jam Sadiq from the country, it was a member of the MQM, Mr Tariq Javed, who was considered competent and reliable enough to officiate as the chief executive of the province.

In fact, the Muslim League is taking the situation caused by the en-bloc resignations of the MQM legislators as anything but abnormal or alarming. The central working committee of the League, which met in Islamabad appeared to be least bothered about the fact that the exposure of its coalescing partner could also tarnish its own image. Nor is the League interested in responding to the demand that there is no justification for the Sindh Government to continue in office. Again, there appears to be no concern that the problem in the province is essentially political and hence an attempt should be made to take the opposition into confidence. Marriages of convenience between political parties have not been unheard of in the past but the manner in which the IJI [Islami Jamhoori Ittehad]-MQM marriage fell apart leaves one fighting for word to describe it.

The suggestion of the PML President, Mr Mohammad Khan Junejo, that an all-party conference be arranged to discuss the situation in Sindh, appears to have fallen on deaf ears. Instead, the PDA has been accused of attempting to seize power through the back door.

Again, efforts are being made to persuade the MQM legislators to withdraw or disown their resignation and join the Muslim League instead. But if the resignations are accepted, the Muslim League should seize the opportunity and fill the political vacuum by contesting the by-elections. All in all, the party is behaving as if nothing has happened.

The PPP [Pakistan People's Party], on the other hand, is on the horns of a dilemma. It appears to be in a position to topple or at least destabilise the Muzaffar Shah government but is conscious of the fact that Mr Shah's removal may not necessarily bring it into power. It could very well lead to the imposition of Governor's rule. Again, who could like to form a government and that, too, a coalition in the present circumstances in Sindh? A civilian government in the province is likely to remain ineffective as long as operation clean-up continues. Even otherwise, a PDA Government in Sindh may not have smooth sailing with a hostile government at the Centre, the PDA would not like to face the music today.

In the PDA's assessment, the IJI Government has never been so weak and vulnerable. It would, therefore, not budge from its stand that a change should come at the Centre as well and that the electorate should be asked to give its verdict through fresh elections.

The best option, before the PDA probably is not to hit the Shah government. And so a queer situation has now developed. Unless something worrying or embarrassing takes place, such as the arrest of its own ministers or members a withdrawal of support by some more MPAs, the minority government is likely to continue.

It is to be seen if all the resignations attributed to the MQM legislators are owned by them, and how many of them are accepted and when. And if the seats fall vacant, will the MQM (Altaf group) decide to recontest? It is also to be seen that if the MQM is dismembered, who will fill the vacuum? Will urban Sindh once again revert to the pre-MQM parties such as the Jamaat-i-Islami and the JUP [Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Pakistan]? Will some of the voters choose to support the PDA? Will the Sindh Assembly itself be able to stand the shocks and above all, will the democratic set-up as a whole survive or will the story of May 1988, and August 1990, be repeated to clear the way for fresh elections?

### MQM Calls Government Terrorist

*92AS1261H Karachi DAWN in English 4 Jul 92 p 16*

[Text] Karachi, July 3—Members of the Central Committee of Mohajir Qaumi Movement [MQM] have

expressed concern over the reported recovery of eight mutilated bodies from different parts of the city which had torture marks on them.

They said, in a statement faxed to DAWN on Friday, the mystery about any [of] these bodies had not yet been solved. They recalled that since June 19, when MQM offices were raided, dozens of its activists had been kidnapped by armed terrorists.

They had informed the Prime Minister, Federal Home Minister, Sindh Chief Minister and other high officials about these kidnappings but even after two weeks, there was no information on their whereabouts and the government had not taken any step to recover them, the message said.

They said the reports of recovery of mutilated bodies were cause of deep concern and urged the administration to identify these bodies and inform the people about their names.

Expressing their surprise, the committee members said when the government was claiming of restoration of law and order in the wake of operation and had setup police posts everywhere, why it failed to take notice of these brutal killings and arrest the murderers.

They appealed to President Ghulam Ishaq Khan to take notice of this serious matter and order investigation and take measures to free Ahmad Salim Siddiqui and other kidnapped MQM leaders and activists.

They said if any harm was caused to their colleagues, Prime Minister Nawar Sharif, Home Minister Shujaat Hussain and Chief Minister Muzaffar Hussain Shah would be held responsible.

MQM Chairman Azim Ahmad Tariq has condemned raids on the houses of his party supporters and activists and indiscriminate arrests in Karachi, Hyderabad, Tando Allahyar, Nawabshah, Mirpurkhas and other towns in Sindh.

He said in a statement, attacks by armed terrorists under patronage of the government on the houses of Haq Parast elected representatives and kidnapping of MQM leaders, activists and their relatives were deplorable.

Mr Azim Tariq said the government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was bent upon to create disunity in the ranks of Muhajirs and eliminate MQM by use of its brute force.

He pointed out that last week Syed Mohammad Aslam's house, who has resigned from his seat in National Assembly, was attacked by armed terrorists and plundered, and now they had occupied it and posted their own guard. Likewise, other elected Haq Parast representatives were being victimised and woe to alienate them from MQM chief Altaf Hussain.

He said not only elected representatives but their family members were being harassed and kidnapped and then

messages were sent to the MQM leaders and activists to announce their separation from Altaf Hussain to get their relatives freed.

Mr Azim Tariq said last night Nadeem was arrested from his house after a raid conducted at the Zonal Office in Nawabshah. Three activists Syed Intizar Hussain, Naved and Shakil were held from Mirpurkhas and in Tando Allahyar MQM activist Shaukat's house was raided and his brother was arrested. Aftab Alam, Shahid Wahab, Ishtiaq, Bholu and Zafar Shah's houses were raided and their fathers and Manzar Alam's brother were arrested and Amir Iqbal's house was ransacked.

He said the government's repression was at extreme when each and every house was searched in Baldia town by breaking doors and manhandling women and looting their jewelry, prize bonds, cash, TV and other expensive items.

Mr Azim Tariq paying tributes to righteous people and party activists reiterated his confidence that the government would fail in its conspiracy to make any dent or create division in the MQM ranks.

He also appealed to President Ghulam Ishaq Khan to take due notice of the government's naked brutalities and repression.

Mr Tariq Mahmoud, who has resigned from National Assembly seat and from office of Minister of Housing and Works, appealed to President Ghulam Ishaq Khan and National Assembly Speaker Gohar Ayub to take early decision on resignations tendered by MQM-MNAs [Mujahir Qaumi Movement-Member of National Assembly] and discharge their constitutional responsibility in this regard.

He told DAWN on phone, it was a big tragedy that a main political party and its leaders, workers and elected representatives were made victim of the state tyranny which had forced them to resign from their assembly seats.

He said now that these Haq Parast legislators had resigned on the instruction of their party chief, their resignations were not being accepted and suggestions were being made to resolve political differences.

Mr Tariq Mahmoud denied any contact with the government and deplored efforts to create division in MQM ranks.

He said Kanwer Khalid Yunus was arrested soon after he reached his home which was a clear indication about government intentions. He also condemned manhandling of the family members of Kanwer Khalid Yunus.

#### Will Cooperate With PPP

92AS12611 Karachi DAWN in English 4 Jul 92 p 16

[Article by Liaqat Adeel: "MQM Willing To Cooperate With PPP"]

[Text] Karachi, July 4—The Mohajir Qaumi Movement [MQM] is willing to cooperate with Pakistan People's

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Party [PPP] if the latter stopped criticising it as harshly as it has been doing for the last two weeks.

An MQM leader, who did not want to be identified at this stage, told DAWN that the MQM leadership had realised that it was a political blunder to part ways with a party (PPP) that had overwhelming majority in Sindh. "There were some people who did not want the PPP and MQM to work together. The PPP knows them very well. Now we have also recognised them. Therefore, we hope that the representatives of rural and urban Sindh will soon be sitting together."

He said the chief minister had tried to contact some MQM MPAs [Mujahir Qaumi Movement] [Member of Provincial Assembly] but he was "snubbed" and told not to try to contact any one of them individually. "One thing is that we do not intend to violate party discipline. And the other reason is that we think the chief minister's efforts are nothing less than horse trading in which we do not want to indulge."

He said there was little chance that the MQM would have anything to do with the IJI [Islami Jamhoori Ittehad] which had betrayed it. "The Prime Minister and the chief minister say sober elements among the MQM would be contacted. Who are those sober elements? If Nawaz Sharif thinks that those MQM leaders who will go against the leadership and join hands with him, are sober elements, then he is in for a disappointment."

He said a little bit of "accommodation" on the part of the PPP would immediately bring the urban and rural population closer together as the two parties were the only representatives of the province.

Talking about the possibility of an alliance with the PPP, he said: "PPP is a big party. It is in fact the only national party. We would expect large-heartedness from them. Of course, we have made mistakes. We are willing to accept that. The PPP, too, has made mistakes. And we would want them to accept that, as well. The moment they do that, we shall be together. At present we are the ones who are in a weaker position. Or perhaps I should say at the moment the PPP is in a position to show magnanimity and extend their support to us. We do not want them to say nothing against us. They may say the MQM is an abnormally or extraordinarily militant group. We do not mind that. But they should not call us terrorists. In past they have suffered the same fate at the hands of the IJI and the agencies. Today we are suffering. If the PPP could only confront the government with the question how could it come to know only after June 19 that the MQM was running torture cells, our hearts would soften towards PPP."

He complained that the PPP leadership had shown little political sense by not exploiting the present situation in its favour. "When we started having problems with the PPP, the IJI was quick enough to approach us. But today we see that no PPP leader has tried to contact Altaf Bhai.

Amin Fahim is the only person who had called on him but that also before the start of the operation."

He regretted that the polarisation between the PPP and MQM was so deep that perhaps both the parties had stopped thinking of any patch-up.

He appreciated the Jamaat-i-Islami leadership for avoiding to criticise MQM in a harsh manner. He also thanked Choudhry Nisar Ali for having the courage to speak out against the partiality of the operation.

### Sindh Crisis: 'Peace Prospects' Viewed

#### Political Dialogue Recommended

*92AS1347A Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English  
10 Jul 92 p 3*

[Article by Afiya Khalil: "Political Dialogue in Sindh: A Way Out of the Crisis"]

[Text] The democratic political structure of Pakistan is again under pressure as one of its provinces is facing grave politico-ethnic problems.

The situation in Sindh today is a direct outcome of the internal chaotic conditions, which intensified under the government of Jam Sadiq Ali, supported by MQM [Mujahir Qaumi Movement], the group which repeatedly swept the polls at all levels in urban Sindh.

The coalition had provoked Sindhi nationalism further as PPP [Pakistan People's Party], the largest political party in rural Sindh, was kept out of power. The tussle between the Jam Government and the People's Party led to a complete breakdown of law and order both in urban and rural Sindh.

To prevent further degeneration of the politico-ethnic situation, the Government called in the army. This decision was taken by the present regime as a last resort to try and restore harmony in the province.

The army started military operations in Sindh early last month. After some minor operations in interior Sindh, the army's credibility in the area was eroded because of the "Jamshoro incident," in which nine innocent people were killed and dubbed Indian trained terrorists.

The army then started the second phase of the Operation Clean-Up in urban Sindh, hoping to restore its falling credibility. In the process, it attacked, with the dissident group of the party in the forefront, offices of the MQM, arrested many of its senior leaders and unearthed what it called torture cells allegedly operated by the MQM.

Will it help if the present leaders of the MQM, discredited as terrorists, are replaced by another set of individuals, is not clear yet.

Whatever the ultimate results may be of this Army action in Sindh, it is evident that it will not help remove the distortions prevailing in the province because of the

urban-rural divide which is likely to continue in the absence of any meaningful effort to resolve the basic issues, i.e., socioeconomic deprivation and political exploitation. The urban-rural duality will remain the core problem in the province. In other words, if the vested interests continue to support one group at the cost of the other, the political structure of Sindh will remain distorted.

Thus, the urban-rural dichotomy calls for a reconciliation between the two major groups of Sindh. This can come about only when the genuine representatives of these groups, which in the present scenario are PPP and MQM come together to negotiate and arrive at a workable arrangement. Only in this way can the people of Sindh as a whole cooperate for the larger benefit of the province and for the political betterment of national politics.

Ms. Benazir Bhutto referred to the same problem in Multan the other day when she said, "We saw the birth of contradictions within provinces. In NWFP, Hazara versus non-Hazara; in Sindh Urdu-speaking versus Sindhi-speaking; in Punjab, Saraiki versus non-Saraiki, and in Balochistan, Pushtoon versus Baloch."

Beyond provincial autonomy, as pointed out by Benazir, what is pertinent is the resolution of the political contradictions at the provincial level through consensus and cooperation of the major groups.

Frequent references to the East Pakistan debacle in the context of the crisis in Sindh underline the urgency of the resolution of the problem. Although there are few similarities between the two situations, the magnitude of the threat to national cohesion and integrity is almost the same.

Our immediate concern, therefore, should be to normalise the situation in the province because right now, the local contradictions are most acute there. Whatever the ultimate result of the military operation in Sindh, the solution of the local contradiction, i.e., reconciliation between the rural and urban Sindh will go a long way in helping to resolve similar contradictions in other provinces.

As Operation Clean-up focussed sharply on urban Sindh, the MQM leadership reacted by directing its legislators to resign from the membership in the Assemblies as a protest against what it said was victimisation of its people. The central committee of MQM also announced the dissolution of the entire party structure at the lowest level.

By early last week, it was confirmed that 24 out of a total of 28 Provincial and 13 out of 15 National Assembly members of MQM have responded to the directive of their central leadership. This decision of the MQM leadership goes to show their confidence in their electorate and also the faith of the MQM legislators in their leadership.

Whether and when these resignations are accepted is not relevant. The fact remains that the resignations of MQM's elected representatives have created a vacuum in politics, particularly in the Sindh province.

In the given scenario, it is immaterial to talk about by-elections, Sindh elections, or national elections. To tackle this problem purely in political terms, a meaningful and effective dialogue between the genuine representatives of the urban and rural Sindh is needed. Any attempt of interference by the Government or any agency on its behalf, or on behalf of any other political party will adversely affect the chances of a free and frank dialogue between the true representatives of the two groups in Sindh.

It is imperative that the two major parties representing rural and urban Sindh, the PPP and the MQM, should be allowed to work out "a new balance...where each works in a complementing fashion" for common goals and objectives. There is every reason to believe that they can agree to such a balance which could provide a new beginning. This understanding, with or without new elections in Sindh, will need to be respected by everyone.

This looks to be the only way for the democratic political structure to survive.

#### Economic Overhaul Sought

92AS1347B Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English  
11 Jul 92 p 6

[Article by S. Ahmed: "If the Army Action Is to Be a Lasting Success"; paragraph numbers as published]

[Text] The army action in Sindh has, of course, to continue. What other option is there when the political failure in the province is absolute and the police is part of the crime and its substantial promoter and beneficiary, instead of being a part of the solution?

Of course, if the Centre had opted for a real political settlement in Sindh the task of suppressing the big criminal gangs and other lawless elements might have become less arduous or more manageable. But that is not what the Centre wants. The centre wants the *status quo* even after the exit of MQM from the Sindh Assembly and cabinet.

If earlier President Ghulam Ishaq and Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif wanted a government in Sindh without the largest party—PPP [Pakistan People's Party]—and grabbed a part of that through coercion and overt seduction, they are now trying to run the provincial government without the second largest party—the MQM whose 24 members out of 28 in the Provincial Assembly have resigned.

The self-assured Chief Minister Muzaffar Shah wants to continue in office as long as the going is good. What matters to him is not whether he has a majority support in the Sindh Assembly of 109 members—which he certainly does not have—but that the PPP could not oust

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him from office without the support of 55 members which it does not have now.

The PPP's 36 members plus six of the Jatoi Group make only 42 members. Hence it is making efforts to win back the 12 PPP MPAs [members of Provincial Assembly] who had deserted to Jam Sadiq Ali and some IJI [Islami Jamhoori Ittehad] or independent members backing Mr. Muzaffar Shah. But Mr. Shah is making sure that the MQM resignations are not accepted readily so that the strength of the assembly is not reduced and the PPP-Jatoi group is not enabled to have a majority in the Assembly of sitting members. After the MQM resignations are accepted the total membership of the Assembly will be reduced to 85, and the PPP may be able to command a majority of 43 members which can make official legislation impossible even if the PPP cannot oust Mr. Shah until it mobilises 55 members. Whether it would need 55 members even after the resignations of the MQM members are accepted is a moot constitutional point.

Meanwhile the army action has to continue as otherwise the dacoits and other criminals will be emboldened and may step up their crimes, including mass kidnappings which have become in vogue. The recent kidnapping of 20 persons from the Baiji Sharif shrine near Punnu Aquil after killing eight persons—10 old and sick persons have since been released—and the hijacking of a wagon with six passengers near Larkana on Monday underscore the kind of challenge the army faces in Sindh even when a large number of criminals have gone underground or moved away from their traditional scenes of operation.

In addition, too many dead bodies abandoned after killing are surfacing here and there in Karachi. Who they are, and who killed them is not obvious. And in the absence of relations to claim their bodies and press for police enquiries, not much of investigation into the causes of their death and identity of the killers is undertaken. The MQM has hence asked for investigation in regard to ten mutilated bodies found in the city from different places.

All that makes it imperative for the military action to continue, despite the lack of a political settlement, as the number of criminals and their promoters and beneficiaries have been increasing steadily. And if the army action is aborted leaving the dacoits where they are more young men may take to crimes in a big way.

The Prime Minister met the Press on Wednesday with Governor Mahmoud Haroon and Chief Minister Muzaffar Shah flanking him. He wanted to ascertain the Press or popular reaction to the campaign. The fact is the popular reaction to it is not a constant one. To begin with, the campaign has just begun after being delayed for six to eight weeks which gave enough time to the culprits and their patrons to escape. Only Mr. Salim Shahzad vice President of the MQM was nabbed by the police

while crossing into Balochistan. And it remains unclear now whether he is in the custody of the police and is free or half-free.

There was real jubilation in the interior Sindh as the crackdown on the MQM began in the name of rounding up criminals and busting their 123 torture cells. But now the interior of Sindh awaits the promised full-blooded action in those areas. If improper acts or excesses are committed through excessive zeal or misguided approach of some elements in the law enforcing agencies, the reaction in the interior can be very adverse as it was following the Tando Bahawal killings, and the death of four persons during interrogation there, including Mr. Jhakrani, friend and political organiser of the Federal Minister Mir Hazar Khan Bijrani.

That means that each major action the army takes from now on has to be positive to produce a positive reaction in the people and avoid a negative fall-out.

Reports of torture of Junwar Khalid MQM MNA [member of the National Assembly], whom the Prime Minister regards as a good and decent person, has upset people in Karachi. He was arrested on a murder charge and investigations could have been conducted without torture and employing primitive methods to extract evidence or force out any kind of confession. The Prime Minister has promised to hold an inquiry and ascertain facts.

The Prime Minister as well as others maintain that the army action is directed against criminals regardless of their party affiliations, including the Muslim League. So far no big persons have been arrested, except Kunwar Khalid and Mr. Salim Shahzad. Will more of them be picked up later?

According to Mr. Mumtaz Bhutto of the Sindh National Front the number of big time criminals, including Patharidars among them is around 2,000. Some of them have been killed and a few arrested. The policy since Jam Sadiq became CM has been to kill the big dacoits in action to the maximum possible extent instead of trying to arrest them and face trouble in the courts as the requisite evidence to convict them is seldom available because of the mortal fear of instant & reprisal from dacoit gangs. Anyway the army action is going to be a long haul as the dacoits who vanished from their scenes of operation have either to return or be located and challenged elsewhere in Sindh or outside the province.

The army has been hoping that the rains would come soon and flood the Katcha areas and force the dacoits who operate from such dense areas to move out. They could be picked up or shot at that stage. But the rains have been late in coming. And some experts say that when the rains or floods come the dacoits would know how to escape from the Katcha areas without being confronted by the army or police.

If the campaign is to be a long term success and not a short term triumph, it needs a four-pronged approach.

First the big criminals in the urban and rural areas of Sindh and their promoters and beneficiaries have to be eliminated.

2. The police and the civil administration, including the local officials in the interior of Sindh, have to be rid of all corrupt and criminal elements so that Sindh can have a clean and efficient administration. That could mean booting out many of the elements brought in by Jam Sadiq or propped up to high offices and invested with excessive authority.

3. A real political settlement that does not deny the PPP, which is the largest single party, its legitimate role in the government or at least permits to function openly and peacefully. The local officials in the province discriminate against the PPP leaders, workers and others.

4. A comprehensive economic rehabilitation plan for Sindh which creates a large number of jobs in both the rural and urban areas. That could mean a large investment and its effective utilisation. If the bulk of the money comes out of Centre the other provinces, particularly the NWFP [North-West Frontier Province] and Balochistan, may claim similar contribution. So it may be advisable to seek external aid for the purpose or give the amount as a special loan. Without such a massive job creation, while the present criminals are arrested or shot, new waves of unemployed young may take to crime as their predecessors did for economic survival and then for instant prosperity.

If instead the Centre approaches it as a largely law and order problem and maintains that Sindh has now a democratic set-up or elected government, it would be cruelly deluding itself and making its task exceedingly difficult and its exertions at a high political cost to itself, futile. And the Centre should not manage things in Sindh in such a manner that the political failure in Sindh is neutralised by the army now, and the political vacuum which may arise at the Centre later will be filled by the armed forces themselves willy nilly as in the tragic past.

#### Ishaq Khan, Sharif Meet

92AS1347C Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English  
15 Jul 92 p 12

[Article by Mohammad Saleh Zaafir: "President, PM Review Sindh Operation"]

[Text] Islamabad, 14 Jul—Prime Minister [PM] Mohammad Nawaz Sharif had an unscheduled lengthy meeting with President Ghulam Ishaq Khan here at the Aiwan-e-Sadr on Tuesday.

The Prime Minister, who was to proceed to Peshawar, Dir and Nowshera in the morning, cancelled his programme due to inclement weather and instead made a call on the President.

The Prime Minister left for Peshawar in the evening. However he would not go to Dir, as earlier planned.

The President-PM meeting started at 9:45 am and went on till the afternoon.

The President's House or the Prime Minister's Secretariat officially gave no details about the meeting. But THE MUSLIM learned on reliable authority that the operation clean-up in Sindh was the major subject of discussion. General Asif Nawaz, Chief of the Army Staff, had a detailed meeting with the President on Monday. It was stated that the COAS [Chief of the Army Staff] briefed the President on the 'impediments' the local commanders were facing in carrying forward the clean-up operation.

It is believed the President briefed the Prime Minister on the views expressed by the COAS a day earlier.

It was stated that the President and the Prime Minister agreed to clear all the hurdles in the way of the army in carrying forward the clean-up operation. The proposed legislation to provide a legal cover to the Sindh operation also came under discussion.

The National Assembly's session, which was reportedly requisitioned for 16 July, had not been summoned by the President, because, sources said, an Ordinance might be issued by the President to give a legal cover to the army for the Sindh operation.

Meanwhile the spokesman of the Aiwan-e-Sadr has termed as speculative a news item appearing in a section of the press that a message was given by the President through Mir Afzal Khan, Chief Minister NWFP [North-West Frontier Province], to the PPP [Pakistan People's Party] leaders that he (President) would dissolve the National Assembly, the moment he received the resignations of the members of the National Assembly belonging to the opposition. The spokesman denied any such contact between the President and the Opposition leader.

Political observers are of the view that the President would under no circumstances exercise this option because if he dissolved the Assembly he would be required to appoint leader of the Opposition Benazir Bhutto as the care-taker Prime Minister, as per the precedent he set himself when he appointed the then leader of the opposition Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi as the care-taker Prime Minister when he dissolved Benazir Bhutto's government.

Observers point out this is the one option that President Ghulam Ishaq Khan would not like to opt.

#### Results of Military Operation in Sindh Viewed

##### IJI, PPP Switch Roles

92AS1312A Peshawar THE FRONTIER POST  
in English 10 Jul 92 pp 10-11

[Article by Mushahid Hussain: "Sindh Situation—An Ironical Reversal of Roles"]

[Text] As the recent situation in Sindh testifies, that the province remains true to its reputation of being the Achilles' heel of successive governments. [sentence as published] In the past, ever since the last martial law knocked out Pakistan's first Sindhi prime minister and later hanged him as well, there was simmering discontent, which exploded in its full fury in 1983, with the result that it created the "compulsion" for a Sindhi prime minister. Then, three Sindhi prime ministers followed in quick succession: Mohammad Khan Junejo, Benazir Bhutto and Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi.

Sindh is also politically important, because of the presence of Pakistan's biggest industrial base in its capital, Karachi, which also serves as Pakistan's principal port (90 percent of Pakistan's foreign trade is carried through the sea), and Sindh also is Pakistan's version of an ethnic "melting pot" with representation of all provinces in substantial numbers.

The current situation in Sindh, after the army was called out on May 19 by the federal government to "clean up" Sindh, presents the picture of an ironical reversal of roles, with the PPP [Pakistan People's Party] substituted by the IJI [Islami Jamhoori Ittehad] and the spring and summer of 1990 substituted by the summer of 1992. Some examples:

- The IJI government is being blamed for being "anti-army" and it is also being accused of "not allowing the army to have a free hand in Sindh;"
- The PPP is lauding the army for its "even-handedness" while IJI circles are publicly saying that the army is being "not even-handed;"
- Some PPP circles have even asked that the army be given enhanced powers under Article 245 of the constitution, which would mean suspension of higher courts jurisdiction in those areas, where the army is operating, while the IJI government is insisting that Article 147 of the Pakistan constitution, which is the legal cover for the army's current role in Sindh and which stipulates that "officials of the federal government can be placed at the disposal of the province to assist it," is enough;
- Army circles are angry over the lack of cooperation from the official electronic media on the Sindh situation;
- The IJI government thinks that the army is only hounding the MQM [Mujahir Qaumi Movement], while in the past, the PPP government had felt that the army was protecting the MQM, in both instances, Islamabad's perception being that the army's political agenda is separate than that of the government, at whose behest it has been called out to act in Sindh.

Three aspects of the situation are noteworthy. First, the sheer opportunism of Pakistani politicians and political parties since politicians, while in government, have a different attitude and approach on an issue and when they are outside the government, they have a different

line. For instance, the same IJI, when it was in opposition to the PPP, was clamouring for granting full powers to the army in the summer of 1990 under Article 245, which the PPP was resisting and on that score the PPP's opponents had accused it of being "anti-army." Now, precisely the reverse has happened with the PPP emerging as an exponent of the army's role in Sindh, while the IJI is on the defensive since some of its stalwarts have expressed public reservations on the army's operation.

Second, in the context of Sindh, the army has emerged as a key political player, a role apparently accepted by both the PPP and the IJI, and the army seems to have come out better than both through the recent operation since it is perceived to be trying to clean the political mess, which has been created by successive governments, both political and military.

Third, there is the interesting sight that the present situation in Sindh, apparently, presents a sort of "confession time" among politicians. There is the recent statement of the prime minister's special assistant, Ch. Nissar Ali, that it was the then chief of army staff, General Aslam Beg, who "delivered MQM to us" in October 1989, on the eve of the no-confidence motion against Benazir Bhutto's government. This statement does reveal a couple of unfortunate homotruths about Pakistani politics, namely, the army's deep involvement in politics despite the absence of martial law and the IJI's collaboration with the army to oust the PPP government.

If politicians and political parties, of whatever orientation, allow themselves to be used by the army, then it is obvious that establishing civil supremacy over the army becomes an uphill, if not impossible, task. If yesterday, the IJI knowingly linked up with the army against the PPP, then it should not be too shocked if the army also maintains linkages now with the PPP, since it would be part of a political role of the army that the IJI accepted in the past.

As the Sindh situation exemplifies, a dichotomy between the purposes of the civilian government and the army emerges whenever the army is called out in situations where the civil government has been unable to resolve or defuse problems. The reason for this dichotomy is simple: the army's objective in such situations is essentially to protect its institutional interest, since the army in Pakistan has always been an autonomous political player, while the civil government probably feels that the army can be used to promote its own political or partisan interests—something the army is not able to do.

Even in 1969, when Field Marshal Ayub Khan asked the army to move in support of his efforts to quell the popular upsurge against him, the army under General Yahya Khan refused, because they clearly felt, apart from any other considerations, that helping to prolong Ayub's tenure against popular wishes would be detrimental to the army's institutional interests. Then, in 1971, Yahya Khan's cronies, particularly General Abdul

Hamid Khan, tried to stay on in office despite the defeat in Dhaka, but senior army officers led by General Gul Hasan would not allow such a situation, because the army's institutional interest would not be served by sustaining a discredited junta in office. And in 1977, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto made the cardinal mistake of viewing the army's initial support to him against the PNA [Pakistan National Alliance] as a sort of permanent political loyalty to his government, which was not the case as he discovered to his lasting regret on July 5, 1977. Hopefully the IJI government will learn this basic lesson that despite its initial intimacy with the army, particularly at its inception, since the roles in politics are defined by interests rather than any personal intimacy or past relationship.

What is unfortunate in the present situation is that not just the government or politicians, but also sections of the press, have become victim to conspiracy theories, and some have even gone to the ridiculous extent of asking the chief of army staff, General Asif Nawaz, whether he was "planning to impose martial law." Apart from the irresponsibility of such a question being formally put by a journalist to an army chief at a diplomatic reception, the absurdity of such a question is also obvious, because, after all, the army will neither request anybody's permission, nor publicly announce its intentions even if, in the worst case scenario, it has decided to impose martial law!

### Lull Before the Storm

92AS1312B Lahore THE NATION in English 17 Jul 92  
pp 2-3

[Article by M. A. Niazi: "Lull Before the Storm"; quotation marks as published]

[Text] After the test of strength in the Sindh Assembly, in which Chief Minister Syed Muzaffar Hussain Shah squeaked through with a barely working majority, the province is experiencing a fragile peace that is only the lull before the storm.

While the parliamentary manoeuvrings loom large on the horizon, they seem more like shadow boxing when the realities on the ground come into focus: the popular sentiment in Karachi, the actual progress of the clean-up operation and the power relationships in Islamabad.

At the same time, Muzaffar's triumph in the House was a muted one, and it is not unreasonable to assume that a government as vulnerable as his would continue to be under pressure. He has too many independents in his ranks, too many floocrossers, to be secure. He is the only member of his party, the PML [Pakistan Muslim League], in the House, and enjoys no backing from it either in the House, to bolster his strength, or outside, to act in swaying public opinion.

Opposing him is the PDA [People's Democratic Alliance], in the last of its electoral strongholds. Had it not been for the strong-arm methods of the late Jam Sadiq

Ali, the PDA would have held the government. The Jam lived long enough to build a solid coalition, consisting of independents personally loyal to him of PDA members frightened or cajoled into floocrossing, and of the MQM [Muhajir Qaumi Movement]. This coalition was inherited by Muzaffar after the Jam's death, but the Army's operation upset what was a carefully balanced applecart.

What began as yet another of a series of inconclusive 'anti-dacoity' sweeps through the province sprang a major surprise on everyone when it turned towards Karachi, and became a crackdown on the MQM, Prime Minister Mian Nawaz Sharif's 'most allied ally' since November 1989. The Army, after a lot of public hand wringing, had been sent into the province on the strength of a request by the provincial government under Article 147 for the Federal Government to allow a Federal Agency—the Army—to be used for law enforcement duties.

The Army faced a grave situation in the interior of the province, where the law-enforcing machinery apparently had collapsed entirely, but the MQM stronghold of Karachi was relatively better off. While abductions for ransom dacoities and killings were going on, they had come down. One reason was certainly that the major criminals operating in the city had taken the protection of the MQM. For example, one large gang consisted of members of all ethnic groups, but its Muhajir members used their MQM likes to ensure immunity, and got a disproportionate share of the loot in exchange. However, Karachi was in better shape on the surface than it actually was, and while the corruption among the police and administration had reached new heights, the ordinary citizen who had little to lose in terms of material possessions, and who avoided politics, was largely left in peace.

The same could not be said about the interior, where road travel had become impossible after dusk, and where ordinary poor peasants would find themselves abducted and released for paltry ransoms. More disturbing, intelligence agencies were worried by evidence of increasing cross-border activity and increasing attacks on the means of communication.

The Army's timing seemed right, with the interior's ordinary people sick of the chronic fear, and the average Karachiite also uneasy about the tentacles of the MQM. However, the Tando Bahawal fiasco proved a morale-sapper for the Army itself, and it was rightly felt that it had destroyed the credibility of the Army, already low in the interior.

It is almost as if the Army was panicked into tackling the Karachi problem as a sort of response, and much Sindhi opinion seems to have been placated by this evidence of the much desired 'even-handedness.' However, the Army's operation thereby precipitated a political crisis in Sindh, as well as a crisis of conscience in the Punjab, where the Federal Government's parliamentary majority is rooted.

Sentiment in Karachi remains divided, though the supporters of the Altaf camp appear to be in the ascendant. They quickly seized upon the fact that the Haqiqi Group, headed jointly by Amir Khan and Afaq Ahmad, also known collectively as 'Amir-Afaq,' made its entry into Karachi in coordination with the Army. There were solid reasons for this alliance, the main one for the Army being the fear of widespread bloodshed if they went in without 'pathfinders,' while the Haqiqis felt they could not move in until the administration was not completely against them. With hindsight, it damaged both the Haqiqi Group and the Army. The Army, because it moved only with a political force, is under suspicion as being engaged in an attempt to destroy the MQM, and the Haqiqi Group is dismissed as a mere tool of the Army in this attempt. The Army privately acknowledges that the Haqiqi alternative had to be used because the dangers of a political vacuum were so strong. The Army is trying to distance itself from the Haqiqis, but the impact of the original impression is far from being removed.

However, the Haqiqi Group is at work, playing its best card for all it is worth—physical presence in the absence of the rightful leader of the MQM. The Haqiqi leaders, Amir and Afaq, have their roots in the organisation rather than in the public, and it is among these that they have been working with the most telling effect.

The MQM loyalists are strident in their claims that the absence of Altaf Hussain makes no difference, that their lines of communication and control are intact. However, the drift of the men who compose the party machinery is visible. The MQM was organised in four tiers: Markaz, five zones, 222 sectors and about 230 units (roughly corresponding to the 202 Zonal Municipal Committee wards). The zonal and sector incharges have drifted towards the Haqiqis, and unless there is a masterstroke in the shape of a return by Altaf Hussain, the Haqiqi Group is set for an internal takeover.

The MQM workers seem to have lost a focal authority, and though many of them, probably the majority, still believe in the Altaf legend, practicalities are forcing them to join the Haqiqis. Most of them are being forced to choose between going underground for an indefinite period, of being harassed by the police and administration, of constant fear of arrest on charges genuine or false, or switching for the time being, retaining in the bargain the political levers for Altaf's return.

However, the longer he does not return, the more they will compromise themselves. No matter how lukewarm they are, they will have to put in at least a token effort for the Haqiqis in the coming by-elections, whenever they take place, for example.

Then the matter turns to the hands of the people. While Altaf is indeed a name to conjure with, still he is after all a symbol. The Haqiqis are pale shadows into the colourful reality that is Altaf Hussain, especially the carefully cultivated aura that is around him. Yet, if forced to choose between the Haqiqis and the death of

the MQM, the Muhajirs of Karachi will certainly choose the Haqiqis. After all, Altaf's great contribution was of focus the Muhajir consciousness, to give them a vehicle, to give them pride. That will not be given up so easily.

At least at present, the political forces that previously had a hold in Karachi's politics, the Jama'at-i-Islami and the Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan [JUP], do not seem to fit into the equation. The JUP in particular has been virtually wiped out as a serious alternative, while the Jama'at, though its hard core of cadres is intact, is also waiting and seeing, and has not been able to take advantage of the situation. The problem for the Jama'at is that it has found it impossible to integrate an effective challenge to the Muhajir problem with its national political stance. Also, the weaker the party gets in Karachi, the less influence do such figures as Professor Ghafoor Ahmad have in Mansoora, which has to balance the needs of a national constituency with those of the constituency's components.

The populace of Karachi, after living with the reality of the MQM for so long, has no idea of the impact of the disclosures of torture cells on the imagination of the Punjabi public. While the people of the Punjab are readier to believe in MQM villainy than the MQM's support base, it was also a greater shock. However, they interpreted it in different terms: the question hanging over the head of Mian Nawaz Sharif is how he went along with such goings-on for so long, and a constant theme is of his guilt by association.

This has much more far-reaching consequences than is apparent, and the statements by PM's [Prime Minister] Special Assistant, Ch. Nissar Ali and Punjab, Chief Minister, Ghulam Haider Wyne are just the tip of an iceberg. They reflect the only possible defence of Mian Nawaz's exposed weakness, which is one of virtual denial, of shifting the focus of attention away from the MQM, even if it at the cost of riling the Army. By contrast is the almost gleeful support of the PPP for the action insofar as it applies to Karachi, exploiting the proverbial shortness of public memory, ignoring the 11 months the MQM was in coalition with the PPP.

The Army, whose view of the world usually has harmonised quite effectively with that of the IJI in the past, has definitely diverged. Part of the reason is the personal experience of the present Chief of the Army Staff, Gen. Asif Nawaz Janjua, as Corps Commander, Karachi, while part is the general revulsion that the misdeeds of the MQM evoke. The MQM might well have been a product of a Zia-directed ISI [Information Service of India] attempt to finish off the Jama'at in Karachi, but Altaf was no longer anyone's tool, if he ever had been. It was felt to be an organisation out of control.

However, the Army also hoped to flush out the interior of major patrons of the dacoits. That has come to a halt, though the Army still has its hopes. The main reason is that the action against the MQM has so badly destabilised the Sindh government, that any further movement

by the Army will bring it down. It is an open secret that the criminalisation of Sindh politics has gone so far that a proper sweep would find MNAs [member of National Assembly] and MPAs [member of Provincial Assembly] on both the Treasury and the Opposition benches behind bars. To a certain extent, these politicians had no other choice, but nonetheless, if the Opposition figures are nabbed, the PDA will shriek of persecution and might well follow the MQM example of resigning its seats, while Muzaffar Shah in particular would find his position in government badly weakened. Already, the MQM resignations drama reached crisis proportions for him, leaving his majority in the Sindh Assembly hollow.

The immediate effects on Mian Nawaz's majority in the National Assembly will be less drastic, but he also has to plan for the future. The key is the success of the clean-up operation, but that has gloomy prospects. The Army itself is clear that military action alone is not the solution, though the military aspect is what they are best at. So far, they have killed nearly 100 dacoits, as well as captured almost twice that number, suffering only two fatalities up to the time of writing. However, it is probably impossible to just kill off all the dacoits. One reason is that the Army may well be facing an insurgency, but it is also clear that at least some of the so-called dacoits have access to training, arming and sanctuaries across the border. Under these circumstances, some of their worst fears appear sensible enough to be taken seriously.

However, the Army itself has to step carefully around the restrictions that are found to circumscribe its freedom of action. While claiming to remain aloof from politics, the Army realises that the political backing necessary for the operation must be generated. Unfortunately, its efforts so far, which reflect the ordered hierarchical military mind, do not seem to be bearing fruit.

The roots of the problem are old, but some are as recent as the 1990 elections, when according to all logic, it was the PPP which should have formed the government. Instead, the Jam-MQM coalition came into existence. Because of this, now that the coalition has unravelled, the coalition is now highly unstable, and will need constant propping up. Muzaffar is fit for his 46 years, but his position resembles nothing more than that of Humpty-dumpty after his great fall, but before the King's men give up their attempts to put him together again.

The differences that have arisen in Islamabad over the handling of the entire issue, while muted, remain. The silence of the President, who has found himself involved in Sindh personally through the person of his extremely controversial son-in-law, Irfanullah Marwat, can mean almost anything. He may well be biding his time, or else he is simply lying low. However, it is unlikely that he has in any way changed his profoundly anti-PPP sentiments, and therefore, is likely to be in harmony with the hardliners like Wyne and Ch. Nissar.

For the first time since the present post-Eighth-Amendment dispensation came into effect in 1985, the President and the Prime Minister appear to be converging on a position at a time when the Army is diverging. The consequences of this may be passing, as the passage of time and the progress of the operation realigns perceptions. On the other hand, the consequences might be momentous.

Karachi, at least, is feeling wrung out after a pretty tempestuous four weeks. But the army has not requested six months to carry out its operation for nothing. Though the immediate initiative was made by Mian Nawaz in May, who found it an opportune time to force Muzaffar into making the formal request which Jam Sadiq had resisted to the end, it is known that the Army has been raising the issue almost from the day General Janjua took over. The roller-coaster ride is far from over.

#### Disarray in Government

92AS1312C Lahore THE NATION in English 15 Jul 92  
p 4

[Article by Abbas Rashid: "Disarray Over Sindh"; quotation marks as published]

[Text] In what was a fairly-belated damage limitation exercise on the part of the government it announced recently, the formation of a three-member committee which would give out "correct" information regarding the army operation in Sindh. It would comprise of one member each from the army, the Information Ministry and the interior Ministry. Additionally, in order to make the objective of presenting a 'United Front' clear to the meanest intelligence the Interior Minister reportedly disclosed that a circular issued by no less than the Prime Minister [PM] himself directed Federal Ministers and others not directly concerned to desist from issuing statements on the Sindh operations. The outcome of these efforts remains to be seen. But it is unlikely that they will dispel the impression of serious cracks within the establishment developing as a consequence of the operation and the aura of rank opportunism that is pervasive, unprecedented even for a government such as this one which has followed a singularly low level moral trajectory ever since assuming power.

Here was the nation still trying to recover from the impact of the army's disclosures, the ironic aspect aside, of scores of torture cells in Karachi run by the MQM and the allegations of murder, rape and torture against much of its top leaderships. The Chief of the Army staff [COAS], in the course of an interview, called the MQM a terrorist organisation. For some unfamiliar with this under side of the organisation, the disclosures came as a shock. For others it was a relief to know that the establishment had finally acknowledged what they had known for a long time. Surely, or so the general assessment went during those early 'idealistic' days, the government would not want to be seen to associate with such an organisation, regardless of the political cost. Of

course, only a few naive souls would have expected the government to resign. As it turned out, however, the people were treated to the sorry spectacle of the MQM [MQM MNAs member of National Assembly] and MPAs [members of Provincial Assembly] being importuned to stay on come hell or high water. A far cry indeed from expectations that a reference may be filed against it before the Supreme Court possibly invoking the Political Parties Act and seeking its penalisation for "...operating in a manner prejudicial to the...integrity or security of Pakistan, or morality or maintenance of public order."

But the first clear signs of dissension reflecting anger as well as a sense of betrayal on the part of the government came from two of the Prime Minister's closest confidants. The first was an emotionally-charged outburst from Chaudhary Nissar Ali, Federal Minister for Petroleum and Natural Resources, Special Assistant to the Prime Minister and widely recognised as the unofficial deputy prime minister. The army, be observed, in effect, had transgressed its mandate. It had been sent in to sort out matters in rural Sindh. Those concerned, not least the President, had studiously avoided giving it a free hand by opting for Article 147 instead of Article 245 of the Constitution for providing legal cover to the operation—a radical change of heart on the President's part since the not-too-distant days of Benazir Bhutto and Gen. Aslam Beg of the "chasing shadows" fame. In any case, as Chaudhary Nissar Ali argues, in sum, the army had taken upon itself to unilaterally alter the parameters of the operation by turning the focus of its attention to urban Sindh. This had seriously undermined the government's allies at the Centre as well as the Province. In a subsequent clarification which was dedicated in equal parts to refuting reports that he had actually broken down and wept in the course of outlining just how badly the Sindh operation had gone wrong and pleading that his remarks should not be construed as being anti-army, the Minister nevertheless ended up reaffirming his views on the Sindh operation.

The other stalwart to take up the (un)even-handed thesis with regard to the army action against the MQM [Mohajir Quami Movement] was the 'old faithful' Ghulam Haider Wyne, Chief Minister of Punjab, from whom it would be totally out of character to have a statement questioning the army's role in Sindh unless he had been prompted by the 'appropriate' quarters to do so. What Mr. Wyne meant exactly by his "Pakistaniyat" apprehending the Sindh operation to be not quite even-handed only he can say but the COAS apparently understood it as some sort of an attack on his patriotic credentials and felt it necessary to emphasise in response his standing as a "thoroughbred" Pakistani. Subsequently, yet another series of observations 'putting the army in its place' reportedly made by Mr. Wyne during the course of a meeting of the provincial cabinet were strongly denied by the Chief Minister.

All of which brings us back to the three-member committee mentioned earlier. But even if the government manages through this and other means to project the

appearance of consensus within the establishment as to how the Sindh operation is to proceed, that is not quite the same thing as a consensus, in reality. Apart from all the frenzied behind the scenes manoeuvring we now have the Prime Minister himself making comments such as the MQM having a "right" over Karachi. Meanwhile, the Federal Government is also clearly of the view that the Muzaffar Shah government in Sindh should carry on regardless—without the MQM Haqiqi which has rapidly become an option as well as the MQM Haq Parast (for the moment) which is not willing to cooperate without the green light from Altaf Hussain. Whether or not it is true that Mr. Islam Nabi, the 'Minister' of Production, who presided over the colossal and systematic loot of the Pakistan Steel Mills by the MQM has been nominated to act as a go-between the Nawaz Sharif government and Altaf Hussain, it seems that the strategy of the government is to try and get Altaf Hussain's long distance blessings to recruit the "saner" and "sharif" elements from within the MQM Haq Parast second tier leadership, as allies. Whether the army, which had initially backed the 'Haqiqi' option, at least as a tactical move goes along with this is another matter. While the President is likely to support the PM in this regard, it is not certain that he carries the weight he once did within the troika. It would be useful in this context to see if the Army proceeds against his son-in-law Irfanullah Marwat against whom there are numerous allegations of a serious criminal nature.

In any case, over the last few weeks the army has massively enlarged its political space. Among other things it can use the opportunity to now move against the PPP. Whether it chooses to do so depends on the lessons it has learnt from past spells of military rule and Martial Law. As it assumes the role of policeman and peace-keeper in urban and rural Sindh, not to forget Balochistan or for that matter Jhang and Gilgit, it can ponder its options from a position greatly strengthened in the recent past, vis-a-vis the civilian and political order.

#### Article 245 Required

92AS1312D Lahore THE NATION in English 14 Jul 92  
p 7

[Article by Inayat Ullah: "Sindh Operation: Two Crucial Pre-Requisites"]

[Text] Thanks to the ever-ready Opposition to find fault with anything the IJI [Islami Jamhoori Ittehad] Government says or does and paint a doomsday scenario, as also to our excessively vigilant Press ever prone to expose and highlight any of the ruling regime's faults and foibles the Sindh operation is being sought to be projected as if a Gargantuan crisis has hit the Government of Pakistan and its end is just around the corner. The air is thick with all kinds of rumours and speculations. Eager and imaginative journalists do not hesitate not even to file reports that predict a martial law, as if martial law is the panacea for our ills and evils. In answer to a question by an

energetic reporter the chief of the Army Staff [COAS] himself had to dispel such wishful thinking.

Unrealistic it would be at the same time not to hold the IJI Government responsible for much of its troubles. By and large, its relationship with the Press leaves much to be desired. Something is certainly wrong somewhere. Aside from the fact that all governments are vulnerable to scathing criticism by the Opposition, which finds expression in the print media, the present Federal administration has generally been unsuccessful in evoking a positive response from the Press, in spite of its considerable achievements. This is partly due to (a) the manner in which decisions are taken and (b) how these are articulated. It may not be an exaggeration to say that this government deserves more vocal and better-briefed ministers holding such vital portfolios as information, interior and foreign affairs. To a considerable extent the success of governments in modern times depends on the image their leaders forge in the minds of the people. And that image is created not only by what they do but also how they communicate and project their point of view. The present government needs to review its performance in this respect and strengthen its capacity and capability to communicate better and more effectively.

The Army action in Sindh was launched in consultation with the Sindh Government and the formality of a request from the Chief Minister for such Federal assistance was duly observed. The matter was debated in the National Assembly before the commencement of the operation. It has also been the subject of discussion in the Senate in its recent session. Nobody has denied the need for it. It has in fact been acknowledged to be overdue. Had such an action been taken earlier the people of Sindh would have been saved much pain and misery. Something drastic has to be done if dacoits and robbers begin to operate with impunity and the sense of security of the citizen is hijacked by forces of violence and disorder.

The magnitude and the complex nature of the task entrusted to the Army demands a proportionately adequate authority as well as politically conducive conditions. It is a well-known axiom that responsibility has to be correlated with authority.

The problems of law and order are seldom, in Sindh in particular, an isolated phenomenon. These are rooted in ethnic, economic and political distortions and contradictions. Add to these the proliferation of arms and the rise of the drug mafia as also India's subversive involvement, and one begins to see the contours of a horrendous scenario. The old Sindhis for various reasons feel deprived and alienated while the muhajirs, pushed by their own compulsions, have developed into a formidable entity and their grievances and ambitions have been manipulated by a fascist leadership. Their continuing confrontation has further complicated the law and order situation. The extremist and violent elements on both sides have to be defanged and conditions created for a reasonably normal political environment. Such a

bizarre and gruesome situation needs dexterous handling and if the Army has been entrusted with the initial task of clearing the ground for long-term solutions. It has to be provided with the necessary wherewithal and it must be fully empowered to cope with the challenge. Article 147 in this context fails to meet the requirements. In addition, under the existing circumstances, it may not permit the operation to proceed smoothly.

The present Sindh government is by no means a stable entity. The MQM [Mohajur Qaumi Movement] MPAs [members of Provincial Assembly] resignations have further weakened it. Its image in terms of the involvement of its supporters in criminal activities already stands tarnished. How on earth can it provide guidance and support to the Army which of necessity has to be even-handed and uncompromising in its dealings with the anti-social elements? The first pre-requisite therefore is that this lame-duck administration is immediately replaced by a constitutionally-sanctioned Governor's rule under a person who possesses the necessary qualifications and is also in a position to inspire confidence amongst various political elements in the province and additionally, is capable enough to organise a civil initiative to bring about a positive change in the social and economic life of the people. It is myopic to try to save or seek to strengthen a tottering make-shift provincial government. Nawaz Sharif has to understand that by doing so, not only will he be weakening the Federal government but also jeopardising the Army operation which must succeed if Singh and the future of Pakistan itself has to be preserved and protected. It has to be realised that it is the manifest failure of the provincial government to discharge its primary duty of protecting the life and property of its citizens which has prompted the induction of the Army to do the job. Any more delay or dilly-dallying on the part of the Central government in the hope of somehow keeping the Muzaffar Shah government afloat will be self-defeating and destructive of its own interests. Considering the complexities characterising the politics of Sindh, it would be desirable and necessary to hold fair and free elections after the Army has done its job so that the people of Sindh are provided the opportunity of managing their own affairs. It would be undemocratic and indeed unwise on the part of the IJI rulers not to do so for fear of PPP [Pakistan People's Party] returning to power in the province. The PPP after all is a major national political party and on no account should it be assumed that its coming into power in Sindh will spell a disaster for the country. And there is no certainty that after six months or so, the PPP necessarily will be in a position to constitute a government entirely on its own. The scenario probably will remain one in which only coalition governments will run the provincial affairs.

The second equally urgent pre-requisite is the invocation of Article 245 of the Constitution for Army's operation in Sindh.

The Army must have a free hand in pursuing its task. The current situation with regard to arrangements for

bringing the culprits to book is by no means satisfactory. The provincial government is certainly not in a position to ensure adequate and speedy prosecution of cases filed against the criminals caught by the Army. The impression one has at present of the judiciary and bureaucracy at the district level is not one of competence and integrity. Even otherwise, the nature and extent of criminal activities in Sindh and the deep involvement of waderas and provincial politicians with the undesirable elements calls for a freer hand for the Army. It is imperative for the success of the operation as also of the vindication of the Army and its image that effective action is totally ensured. Article 147 is just not adequate for the mission entrusted to the COAS. It cannot help in removing the "impediments" currently faced by the Army. It, in fact, will add to the hurdles and hindrances making the task all the more difficult and complicated. By taking these two steps-handing over the Sindh administration to a competent governor and providing the necessary authority and discretion to the Army under Article 245 to ensure success of the crucial operation, Nawaz Sharif will not only be doing a lot of good to the long suffering people of Sindh. His own government at the Centre will also be spared, to a large extent, unwholesome wheelings and dealings. It may also help in persuading the Press to be less intrusive and less inclined to indulge in unwelcome speculation and unnecessary rumour-mongering. The Prime Minister's courageous initiative to undertake the clean-up operation must be matched by equally bold decisions and appropriate exercise of constitutional authority.

The earlier the IJI Government realises the urgency of taking these two initiatives the better it will be for everyone-for Sindh, for Pakistan, for the government itself and of course for our brave soldiers.

#### **Chief Minister Roadblock**

92AS1312E Lahore *THE NATION* in English 14 Jul 92  
p 6

[Editorial: "Inhibitions on Sindh Clean-Up?"]

[Text] The recent successes of the Army-led clean-up operation in the interior of Sindh, one example of which is the recovery of nearly twenty abductees from the dacoits in a single swoop, do keep alive hopes of bringing the province back to normalcy. In Karachi too, there has been some success in uncovering scores of torture cells and the vast network of terror spreading even into hospitals, that the MQM [Mohajir Quami Movement] had allegedly been running. Yet the impression that political factors may be interfering in the conduct of the operation, persists. The Prime Minister is of course on record having stated that regardless of a person's status or party affiliation, no one involved in any crime is to be spared. Those in charge of the clean-up operation too have given no indication that they think differently. Yet certain obvious slow-downs in launching parts of the operation and strategic halts, when the operation is seemingly at the point of capturing the main culprits,

worry people. For example, there was too long a delay between the announcement of the operation in Karachi and its actual implementation. It allowed the majority of the criminals to hide their weapons and their political patrons to go underground. In Karachi and Hyderabad, therefore, the recovery of arms and the arrests of the suspects has been very disappointing. And when this is seen in the context of the Sindh Chief Minister's desperate attempts to woo back the people in hiding or on the run, the whole thing starts looking suspect. The priority of the Chief Minister, some believe, is not necessarily the same that the Prime Minister has. The Prime Minister, it is said, is seeking an early completion of the Sindh operation. But if that weakens the political support to a pro-IJI [Islami Jamhoori Ittehad] set-up, the Chief Minister would obviously be in no hurry. And since the Chief Minister, technically speaking, is supposed to be the head of the operation, the surmise that his own survival must take precedence over everything else, gains plausibility.

To a layman, saving Sindh is much more important than saving the Sindh government. Not that such a conflict of interests necessarily exists. The operation clean-up could yet be allowed to go on to its logical conclusion. And despite delays or holdbacks, deliberate or otherwise, it may yet be possible to save the Chief Minister's support from collapsing. But if there is even one per cent chance that such holdbacks would fatally damage the operation, then the choice is clear. The operation must be saved, not the Chief Minister's job. The stakes are too high for political compromises and deals. The real danger is that our decision-makers may not be aware of those stakes. One is that those who escape the not now may resurface later to cause even greater harm, especially when vast quantities of illegal arms remain with them. The other is that once the operation is botched up, as it is likely to because of the Chief Minister's priorities, the government may not be able to launch it again, without putting democracy as also national security on the line. Sparing of influential wrong-doers to protect vested interests at this stage would be the greatest disservice one could do to the country.

#### **President, Prime Minister Weakened**

92AS1312F Lahore *THE NATION* in English 15 Jul 92  
p 9

[Article by Anwar H. Syed: "The Army Operation in Sindh"]

[Text] The army's operation in urban Sindh has far-reaching consequences for the political system in Pakistan. Let me identify the premises from which I shall argue. Independent journalists in the country treat the following propositions as self-evident truths: (1) The ruling "establishment" is a Troika, consisting of the President (who derives his authority partly from the amended Constitution and partly from his rapport with the higher bureaucracy), the Prime Minister (whose constitutional authority is weakened by the charges of

corruption against his team and by the alleged rigging of the 1990 election) and the chief of the army staff (whose power, not authority, comes from his control of guns and the men who fire them). (2) Since his dismissal of the Benazir government on August 6, 1990, the President has, in effect, been governing Sindh. He appointed Jam Sadiq Ali (an accused in a murder case) as the caretaker Chief Minister, helped him put together a coalition to remain in office following the 1990 election and endorsed his mission of destroying the PPP in the province, in pursuing which he committed a train of illegalities (or crimes), which the President either applauded or overlooked. (3) Jam Sadiq Ali could not be the chief Minister without the support of the MQM [Mohajir Qaumi Movement] members in the Sindh Assembly. (4) The MQM committed lawless violence of which not only Jam Sadiq Ali but the Prime Minister and the President were aware, and which they chose to ignore.

The lawlessness of Jam Sadiq Ali and his allies in the MQM had been alleged by their opponents and reported in the Press repeatedly, but it was not confirmed by any government agency. The President and others could wave it aside as merely an unproven accusation. But not any more. The army, which is pre-eminently a government agency, has shown the MQM—partner in the governing of Sindh—to have been a group of terrorists, murderers, rapists, torturers, kidnappers, extortionists and swindlers. It comes out also, via Mirza Aslam Beg, that the MQM's character and crimes were known to the President and the Prime Minister, but that they overlooked these crimes to keep power and presumably to continue their chosen policies in Sindh.

The President and the Prime Minister are, thus, shown to have been the allies, patrons, and protectors of a bunch of dreadful criminals. This is not a pretty picture. Benazir Bhutto and Ejaz Jatoi have recently said that they should be tried on charges of complicity in the MQM's crimes. The army's discoveries may have opened the President to the possibility of impeachment and the Prime Minister to that of a no-confidence motion in the National Assembly. None of this will actually happen because, for the most part, the Assembly is just as unrighteous. But of this I am certain that any moral authority the President and the Prime Minister might have had is now gone.

There is more to it than the loss of moral authority which may not mean very much to these gentlemen. But consider a couple of other things. It may be taken for granted that, following their custom, the intelligence agencies, including those in the military, have kept an eye not only on the regime's opponents but also on the President, the Prime Minister and cabinet members. They have, most probably, tapped their telephones and listened to their conversations not all of which may have been innocent. They may also have kept track of instances of corruption, misuse of authority, participation in "horse-trading" and electoral rigging involving these dignitaries. At the appropriate time, the military

can confront them with relevant files and threaten exposure or even prosecution once they are out of office. The President and the Prime Minister are, thus, open to severe intimidation. This possibility did always exist, but it has now become a probability for the following reasons.

While the President and the Prime Minister, appearing as allies of criminals, have lost credibility and moral authority, the military is rising in public esteem by catching the very same criminals. It is assuming a heroic posture and its moral authority is soaring. Add to this a couple of other facts. Politicians and journalists have been saying for months that the military may soon overthrow the government and impose Martial Law. Some of them have even been urging the military to do so. In other words, the politicians and the Press have prepared the public mind for military intervention and may even have inclined it favourably toward the same. Will the military then overthrow the President and his government? I don't think so.

The military, as an institution, is already taking virtually all of the Central government's revenue after the service charges on the national debt have been paid. There is simply no more in the treasury for the military to take. Nothing would then be gained by overthrowing the government. If it did become the ruler the military would bear responsibility for solving the country's problems, which are horrendous and cannot be solved in a hurry. It will invite the odium of failure and fall in public esteem as has been the case in the past. At the individual level, high-ranking officers may already be receiving their share of the advantages that rulership can bestow. It is true that some of the bribes and other forms of illegal gratification, are currently going to politicians and not to the officers. But crude corruption is a double-edged sword and the military may not want to grab it. I am, therefore, inclined to think that the military will not opt for a coup d'état. What will it do?

It will exercise power without taking the responsibility for what is done. It will exploit the weakness of the President and the Prime Minister to reduce them to the status of its errand boys. It did always have a share in government decision-making. It will now enlarge that share to the point of dictating to others in all policy areas that happen to engage its interest. It will do so without inhibition. The President and the Prime Minister will fully deserve the ignominy that awaits them, if it has not already befallen them. But did the country deserve to be placed in the tragic situation where those exercising power will bear no responsibility for the decisions they dictate, and those appearing to have responsibility will exercise no real power?

It has often been said of the President that, having spent some fifty years in the public service, he is immensely competent. But it is clear that he has not been wise, for

wisdom must include some commitment to moral principles, a sense of balance and proportion and an understanding of the limits beyond which rulership degenerates into capriciousness. He is now shown to have had none of these ingredients of wisdom. He and the Prime Minister have done the country and its political system a great deal of harm and, if they care for such things as honour, the honourable thing for them to do now is simply to go away.

### Army Under Pressure

*92AS1312G Lahore THE NATION in English 20 Jul 92 pp 1, 4*

[Article by Nusrat Javeed: "Army Will Now Be More Under Pressure To Deliver"]

[Text] Islamabad—After eight weeks of exposure to the messy law and order situation in Sindh, each tier of the law-enforcing agencies commanding "troops, aiding and assisting the civil administration" under Article 147 of the Constitution, firmly believed that the assigned task can only be executed if the Federal Government is willing to concede more powers to them. Now that they have finally got more powers with retrospective effect, the armed forces would be under more pressure to deliver goods.

Immediately sought was the right of "search and arrest," the suspects without involving police and magistracy as the current legal framework commands which has now been given under the new Ordinance. The civil Government appeared to be reluctant to let the big fish be caught.

This correspondent could gauge the simmering feelings amongst the troops in Sindh after five days of hectic heli-hops from Pannu Aqil to Hyderabad and Karachi. Three General Officers Commanding [GOC] and a number of formation commanders briefed the 12-member team of journalists from Islamabad. It is only after such an intense familiarisation that one can appreciate the formidable targets given to the Army in Sindh. Though none of the briefing officers would officially talk of impediments.

On the surface things looked enormously improved since the deployment of troops on May 23. Trucks, cars and buses are now plying in the night. Thanks to round-the-clock patrollings. Villagers are busy at their farms and average citizen is somewhat relaxed. Probably for the first time in the history of Pakistan, Sindhis are not very critical of Army's presence among them. But scratch the surface and you are exposed to an incredible situation.

From the point A of entering Sindh, all along the mighty and moody Indus, there are two to 12-kilometre stretches on both banks of the river known as Katcha. The regularly inundated lands are blotted with miles of dense jungles which cannot be peeped into even at cloudless noons from combat choppers. Temperature

varies from 50 degrees to 56 degrees and nights are unbearable because of humidity and ferocious mosquitoes. "The delta conditions" become knotty when Balochistan begins meeting Sindh through the barren mountains of Kirthar on the west side of Larkana and Dadu districts. Hyderabad and Karachi, on their turn, prove to be impenetrable human jungles.

Inter-Services Public Relations [ISPR] was perhaps compelled to arrange the trip because an average newspaper-reader in this country gets the impression as if troops were only taking on the MQM in cities. It looks as if the Tando Bahawal mishap steered them to cities for establishing the "even-handed" credentials of the operation clean-up in Sindh.

The truth, however, is that almost on daily basis well-thought-out operations are being conducted in the difficult terrain of rural Sindh. Encounters are frequently taking place between dacoits and troops.

For concrete military reasons catching a dacoit is an impossible task. Even the discredited electronic media of Pakistan is underplaying or ignoring these happenings.

The troops feel that their job was made very difficult by the independent media at the outset which correctly reported differences between the Army and civil leadership regarding much-delayed issuance of the legal cover under Article 147. Then came the announcement that the Army would remain in the province for six months which transmitted criminals the message that lie low during this period to escape persecution. Still catching the negligible number who was not able to flee is proving very laborious.

Police and civil intelligence gathering agencies do not have photographs or authentic sketches of the notorious criminals. Local population is shy of cooperating. The culture looks down upon the "informers" and fears are that "once the Army is not there, persons reported about would retaliate." But even after getting hard information, troops are at great disadvantage. They are not familiar with the terrain. Hideouts can only be reached after swimming through eight to 10 feet deep waters. Big scale mobilities alert the "enemy" who can swim like a fish and reach secure islands of marsh. If need be he can remain under water camouflaged by a bush on head and breathing through weeds as the Viet Congs were doing.

Once the danger is over, he comes to the settled areas for an easy and innocent mingling with the ordinary citizens. There also are several influentials, Patharidars, who are willing to provide them with sanctuaries at their comfortable houses. Patharidars, who are the "banks and negotiators" of dacoits can afford to do so because "police and local administration is properly looked after by them." If a decisive Commanding Officer decides to search their houses information is leaked.

But what appears to be adding insult to injury is the order that houses of a sitting MNA [members of National Assembly] or MPA [members of Provincial

Assembly] must not be raided without prior approval of the Civil Government. A very senior officer was right to comment in Karachi that in such a situation, "the two divisions of the Army deployed in the interior is in fact looking for pins in haystacks. And the problem is that pins are moving."

Syed Muzaffar Hussain Shah, the Chief Minister, is supposed to be the overall in charge of operation clean-up. His government is crucially dependent on the support provided by the MQM and independent MPAs joined by the PPP [Pakistan People's Party] deserters. He has to protect the suspect MPAs to remain in office.

The removal of GOC Hyderabad and Brigade Commander Major Arshad found to be involved in Tando Bahawal incident demoralised the troops further. They have to be cautious and careful. But "correcting measures" after the mishap are encouraging questions that why the civil leadership was protecting suspects under its wings.[sentence as published]

Summing up the odds, a senior officer commented in private: "my boys are asked to deliver with a hand-tide fast on the back. They should arrest hardened criminals who put the kidnapped persons as the human shield or slip into the average households and frustratingly witness the so-called noble ones everyone in the village is pointing at for being the harbour and protector of criminals."

Another officer candidly admitted: "I wish my unit was posted at Siachin rather than put in this no win situation." But an officer who is living in the province for almost a decade was too blunt.

Our conductors, the ISPR officials, were in deep soup. They did not want the journalist to report the candid bickering of their officers. Sometimes, a few briefing officers were found to be too blunt on the record. The ISI [Inter-Services Intelligence] monitors of the group were to underplay the possible impact of such a straight talk by the "dedicated soldiers." Situation at times demanded a very very embarrassing intervention by the conducting officers. "Juniors" were forced to ask their seniors in public to stay cool. The media managers of army were right to apprehend that the cynics amongst the group would feel as if the whole trip was arranged to manoeuvre more powers from the government.

One could have dismissed the privately expressed opinions of officers as a "routine talk." Engaged soldiers all over the world are known for being dismissive of the "messy civilians." The front ranking officers in Sindh sound cool and dispassionate checking the bickerings of their juniors. But mess talk is bound to be listened to at the end of the day by senior officers and civilian leaders if troops are to deliver what the elected representatives failed to, i.e., restoration of the writ of state and maintenance of the supremacy of law.

### Mood in Karachi Sullen

92AS1312H Lahore THE NATION in English 20 Jul 92  
pp 1, 4

[Article by Mushahid Hussain: "Karachi Mood Sullen and Suspicious"]

[Text] Karachi—At the end of a 5-day journey to Sindh that began in Pannu Aqil and ended in Karachi, the mood in the provincial capital was best reflected at two places at the Airport. Just outside the Airport's domestic departure lounge, a group of people huddled around a car radio listening intently—and quietly—to a BBC Urdu Service despatch on Altaf Hussain. Inside the departure lounge, as the ticket counter, a PIA [Pakistan International Airlines] ground hostess, realising she was talking to journalists, haltingly commented "people are scared here and afraid to talk. They are confused and don't know what is going to happen next. Please do something so that an atmosphere of relaxation and happiness returns to Karachi."

The Army action in Sindh seems to have had different effects, at the popular level, in rural and urban areas. These reactions, interestingly, are a reminder of the famous June 1990 statement of the then Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto when she stated that "while people in the rural areas look up to the police for protection, the urban population looks up to the Army." If the Sindhis heaved a sign of relief after the military operations began on May 19, conversely, following the "surprise" of June 19, when the crackdown against the MQM [Mohajir Qaumi Movement] terror network began, Karachi's mood is somewhat sullen, even suspicious of the Army's intentions. Initially, according to those who are discernible observers in Karachi, there was a sense of satisfaction, even welcome, that the Army had finally moved against an organisation that had undoubtedly created "a state within a state" and who many accused of holding Karachi hostage to the whims and caprices of Altaf Hussain and his group.

Altaf Hussain acted virtually like a mafia chieftain, always appearing in public in dark glasses with hair that was puffed up, and, apart from mesmerising the people with powerful oratory, he was running a highly-secretive and centralised organisation, ordering assassinations of those suspected of "treason to the Quaid-e-Tehrik," and behaving like a political and spiritual Pir who could do no wrong and who was not accountable to anybody. There was an element of arrogance also in Altaf Hussain's demeanour which was characterised by physical attacks on those—Pressmen included—who differed from the Altaf line.

However, a month alter after the Army presence in Karachi, the initial satisfaction, a sigh of relief and welcome to the khaki has given way to what can best be termed as a "backlash" within a climate of fear and uncertainty. Three reasons can be cited for this change of mood in Karachi in the last one month. First, what began as a crackdown on the terrorist wing of the MQM is now

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perceived by the Urdu-speaking community in Karachi as "MQM-bashing" while the more extreme among them would even go to the extent of viewing it as "Mohajir-bashing." An unfortunate perception given the fact that so far the Army has not fired a single bullet in Karachi since it moved in on June 19. An added aspect of this perception is that since most of the MQM Parliamentarians have tendered their resignations, the Urdu-speaking community is not represented at all in the provincial Cabinet. This has spawned feelings of deprivation and alienation.

Second, there is lack of credibility of the MQM (Haqiqi) since no top leader of the MQM has joined it and it is still not seen as a group capable of filling the vacuum that may be created in the aftermath of the crackdown on Altaf Hussain's MQM. There were hopes that Azim Ahmed Tariq, Chairman, MQM, would switch over to Haqiqi but he has still not done so although he is said to be in communication with the Army through "back channels." In the minds of most MQM supporters, the MQM (Haqiqi) does not provide for a cleaner alternative to the MQM headed by Altaf Hussain since it is alleged that the Haqiqi leadership was as much a component of the terror network as, say, Altaf Hussain or his Vice-Chairman, Salim Shahzad, who is wanted and on the run.

The third reason for this new mood in Karachi is the perception, which is completely erroneous and without any foundation in fact, that the Army is solely engaged in "bashing" up the MQM while "stopping operations" in rural Sindh. The fact is that after an intensive tour of the interior of Sindh, it is apparent to anyone who cares to see for himself that the Army is out in the small towns, highways, even forests to combat the dacoit menace and while several Sindhis have been killed during the Army's operations in the interior, including nine innocents in Tando Bahawal, not a single member of the Urdu-speaking community has been killed at the hands of the Army since the Army moved in Karachi on June 19.

The fact also remains that the dissent that emerged within the MQM was genuine and internally caused by those who were disaffected by Altaf Hussain and his leadership. Amir Khan and his MQM (Haqiqi) came in handy because it was feared that if the Army moved in directly into the fortress-like strongholds of the MQM in heavily-congested Karachi without the buffer of the dissidents, the Army could be fired upon and in the process there would not just be military casualties but also those of innocent civilians in encounters with armed MQM loyalists. The five deaths in Karachi on June 19 were caused by a clash between the dissidents and the loyalists of the MQM.

A meeting with the leader of the dissident faction, Amir Khan, provided an interesting perspective on the revolt from within that divided the MQM. Amir Khan receives visitors at his stronghold in Landhi. He is a handsome, 28-year-old young man who has the looks of a left-wing Latin American intellectual—fair-coloured, thick

drooping moustache with sleepy, hazel eyes which are covered by tinted, see-through spectacles. He is polite, soft-spoken almost to the point of being shy. He was probably a lethal force within the MQM since he rapidly rose in the last 12 years within the organisation, having started at 16 in 1980. He accuses Altaf Hussain of being a "coward and a terrorist" but denies any personal responsibility for the wrong-doings of MQM while he was in it. Conversely, he is accused by his detractors, Altaf Hussain and Co., of embezzling Rs[rupees]55 crore over the years from MQM funds as one of the three chiefs of Sectors in Karachi who were primarily responsible for its organisation and administration, which also goes to show the amount of funds at the MQM's disposal.

Visits to MQM torture cells were also instructive in providing insights into the more unsavoury aspects of the MQM. One of the torture cells looked pretty harmless by Pakistani standards, resembling something probably no worse than an ordinary police station or, more apt in the context of Karachi, one of the CIA [Crime Investigation Agency] the direction of Irfanullah Marwat when he was Adviser to the Chief Minister of Home Affairs. Although it was at this torture chamber that Major Kalim of the Rangers was picked up and tortured by the MQM in June 1991. Another torture chamber in the Lines Area, where the population density is so high that 500,000 people are cramped in four square miles, looked quite lethal since it was complete with chains, acid, drilling equipment and nail-pluckers.

Karachi's new political profile is evidenced by what one can see and hear in this bustling city of 10 million:

- There is quite a battle of wall chalkings with MQM (Haqiqi) slogans freshly painted over those of Altaf which have either been erased or mutilated like most of his photographs on boardings. But occasionally, pro-Altaf messages can be seen on walls and even in the centre of Karachi, the most favourite being "Jeay Altaf" and "nobody can purchase MQM and Pir Sahib;"
- Slogans in the "liberated areas" in Karachi where the Army has moved in full force have frequent chalked references of "Pakistan Army Zindabad, General Asif Nawaz Zindabad;"
- In conversations with the political-conscious people living in these areas, there are references to a term that recurs with regularity, "agencies" which in local parlance means intelligence organisations like the Intelligence Bureau, Inter-Services Intelligence and the Military Intelligence. Uncertainty in Karachi is compounded by unanswered questions:

- Will Altaf Hussain return to Karachi?
- What is the future of MQM?
- Will Islamabad make up with the MQM, as signals emanating from the government seem to indicate?
- What will happen if or when the Army does go back to the barracks?

As a mother who narrated the horror story about her son murdered by the MQM said that she had been constantly receiving messages from the MQM loyalists that "we will sort you out, when the Army goes." What can be said with certainty in the present situation is that there is no prospect of that happening in the near future, either in Karachi or in the rest of Sindh, for that matter.

### Army, President Differ

92AS1312I Lahore THE NATION in English 19 Jul 92  
p 6

[Editorial: "Conflicting Perceptions"]

[Text] Irrespective of the validity or otherwise of the briefing given to Pressmen about the Sindh operation by the spokesman of the Army, it unfortunately is clear that there is a large gap in perception between the Army and the civilian administration. This gap pertains to the identity of the terrorist organisations and the anti-state elements. Among the anti-state elements, according to the civilian authorities, the main culprit has been the Al-Zulfikar, which it has been claimed at the highest level, is a wing of the PPP [Pakistan People's Party]. The Army, however, feels now that the link between the PPP and Al-Zulfikar, if any, should be a cause of little concern. Again, the civilian authorities see in MQM [Mohajir Qaumi Movement] or a part of it as a party worth cultivating and worth giving a share of the power. The Army, however, says that the MQM leadership has been working towards the disintegration of the country and substantial evidence in support of it has been found. It is possible that the civilian perception, apparently prompted more by political considerations of running down a rival and building up an ally, was hasty but the fact that two arms of the government are seen holding completely different views about the security of the state, does not augur well. One of the two will have to back down, if the image of a consensus in the top leadership of the country had to be maintained. Of course, it would be wrong to conclude that the Army, on the basis of its own investigation, exonerated the PPP as a whole and finds the MQM guilty, again as a whole. The extremist in the PPP could be, according to the Army, sympathetic to Al-Zulfikar, as the moderates in the MQM, could be unaware of the plans that its leaders had prepared for the break up of the country. But that should be hardly a source of consolidation to the civilian authority.

That does not mean that because of its perceptions having been proved wrong, civilian supremacy has become irrelevant. It only means that given the proofs, the civilian authority should adjust its course. It must stop protecting and cultivating the anti-state elements among its allies, whatever the compulsions, and accept the claim of the Opposition to a place of honour in the affairs of the state, which among other things, implies protection against political vendetta, however hateful such a switch may personally be to some in the ruling circles. It also means that without compromising the principle of civilian supremacy, the Army should be

given such powers that are necessary for the successful completion of its mission. And last but not the least, it means that those found involved, irrespective of the value of their association with the government, in acts of treason, must be brought to book. Saving the country, it must be remembered, is far more important than saving a particular provincial government.

### Army Setting Agenda

92AS1312J Lahore THE NATION in English 19 Jul 92  
p 6

[Article by Mushahid Hussain: "Army's New Role: An Appraisal"]

[Text] Eight weeks into the Army's deployment in the troubled Sindh province, a preliminary analysis of the situation there, based on an extensive four-day visit to its interior reveals interesting, new perspectives. The visit, as part of a journalistic tour, included areas of Army deployment, namely, Pannu Aqil, Dokri, Kandiaro (where an Army Captain lost his life in an encounter with dacoits), Hyderabad, Sehwan and Naing in the Kirthar Range.

Probably for the first time in the history of the Pakistan Army's conducting operations in Sindh (the Army was used for political and anti-dacoit operations in 1983 and 1986 with negative results), this time around, the Army operations are seen in a positive light by a populace that was living in fear under a virtual dacoit raj which spawned insecurity and fear, disrupted economic life and adversely affected road and rail transportation. The change, and a good one at that, is that for the first time in the Army's conduct of operations, the Sindhis are apparently no longer viewing it as an "army of occupation." The welcome accorded to the Army's current role in the interior of Sindh is, in large measure, due to a number of factors; the extent of criminal activities which even did not spare women and children, with the result that people were fed up with dacoit raj, the Army's public willingness to retract on the Tando Bahawal blunder by removing the entire chain of command—another first for the Pakistan Army, the Army's demonstration of even-handedness by extending the clean-up operation into urban Sindh as well, including cracking down on MQM [Mohajir Qaumi Movement] terrorism, the Army's supplementing of its operations in Sindh with an approach of empathy that includes medical and other assistance to remote areas of rural Sindh and the leadership of the Army in the field in the hands of those who are sensitive to Sindhi aspirations, particularly the Corps Commander Lt.-Gen. Naseer Akhter, probably the Army's most experienced and knowledgeable senior officer on Sindh.

In the process, the Army is managing to heal many of the wounds that Sindh suffered under General Zia's Martial Law when Sindh was virtually written off by Islamabad due to the "crime" of being Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's home province and the only province which defied Pakistan's

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longest-running Martial Law regime in 1983 with a massive popular upsurge which shook General Zia.

However, important road-blocks remain in the path of the Army's operations which, over time, could create morale and other problems for forces operating in a trying environment characterised by exceptionally hot weather (in some areas, the mercury even touches a whopping 56 centigrade), unfamiliar terrain particularly riverine, thick forests running for miles where dacoits take sanctuary and where operations can only be launched after wading through 4-6 feet of water, and operating against an enemy which is always not visible, almost akin to guerilla warfare. In this context of road-blocks, five are noteworthy. First the Army feels it is operating in Sindh without adequate legal powers, since it cannot search or arrest anyone suspected of being a dacoit or a terrorist, something which only the police and the Rangers can do. Reliable military officials now say that after long deliberation, the government has agreed to amend the Criminal Procedure Code so that these search and arrest powers can be given to the Army. The decision for this is likely to be finalised at the July 20 meeting in Rawalpindi at which the President, Prime Minister, Chief of Army Staff, Sindh Chief Minister and Karachi's Corps Commander, Lt.-Gen. Naseer Akhter, will be present.

Despite these additional powers likely to be conferred on the Army, there is still the problem of trial of those arrested by the Army, who are handed over to a slow and tedious judicial process which, more often than not, ends up releasing those that the Army may have captured. This could only be obviated by invoking Article 245 of the Constitution, a demand that is voiced in low-key by Army officers, which the government opposes for political reasons, but which it will be increasingly under pressure to concede as the Army's operation proceeds in the coming months.

Second, there is the problem of lack of intelligence to serve as the road-map for the Army's operations in both rural and urban Sindh. For instance, in most cases, the army doesn't even have photographs or other detailed descriptions of the dacoits that it is going after. And in the case of MQM, it seems that the Army hardly had any independent sources of intelligence on it other than the dissidents, and this is evidenced by the failure to nab those perceived to be heading to MQM's terrorist wing like former MNA [member of National Assembly] and MQM Vice-Chairman Salim Shahzad or recover ammunition and arms in large quantities. Only 405 Kalashnikovs and other weapons have been recovered in Karachi so far. But this problem is compounded by the fact that in 1991 alone, the Jam Sadiq Ali government, which was in coalition with the MQM, issued no less than 40,000 arms licences.

The third road-block for the Army in Sindh is the lack of effective cooperation from the police and local administration. The extent of politicisation of the services in

Sindh has meant that the police and local administration are guided, to a large extent, by vested and other partisan interests.

The fourth road-block is that problem in Sindh is not merely one of what is termed in bureaucratic euphemism as "law and order," but it has larger political and socio-economic dimensions. It is thus no accident that politically, the Army is seeking to advance goals in Sindh that could end up being contradictory given its triangular objectives: Propping the Muzaffar Hussain Shah government (the Army has assured Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif that there would be no adverse fallout of the Sindh operation on the Provincial Government led by Muzaffar Shah who enjoys the khaki's full confidence and support, taming the MQM, the purpose being to delink MQM from Altaf Hussain and purge it of its terrorist elements (for instance, there is an unofficial back-channel existing with MQM Chairman Azim Tariq) and carrying the PPP [Pakistan People's Party] along, since it is seen as a force for stability in Sindh. The Army feels that the Al-Zulfiqar Organisation (AZO) no longer forms part of the PPP, although it feels that AZO is still run by Benazir's brother, Murtaza Bhutto, who is alleged to be maintaining frequent contact with the Indians for training and money, and the Army circles believe that Murtaza's mother, Begum Nusrat Bhutto, is the AZO's "silent patron." But, significantly, Benazir Bhutto is exonerated of any AZO connection and so is the top PPP hierarchy. However, the Army is said to have a list of approximately 600 AZO "Indian-trained terrorists" in Sindh, waiting to be nabbed. One evidence of the Army's attitude towards PPP is the fact of PPP Sindh Assembly Opposition Leader, Syed Qaim Ali Shah, being invited to a recent dinner hosted by the Corps Commander for Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. The two—Nawaz Sharif and Qaim Ali Shah—sat opposite each during the dinner for over 90 minutes without even saying a word to each other!

As far as a socio-economic package is concerned, the Federal Government has allocated Rs [rupees] 2,000 million as part of a special Sindh package over a two-year timeframe. Rs 1,500 will be for employment of educated youth and Rs 500 million for upgrading the police. According to Chief Minister Muzaffar Hussain Shah, there are approximately 40,000 educated unemployed in Sindh, including 10,000 doctors!

Finally, what is perceived as a major road-block in the Army's path in Sindh, which, in fact, has generated anger and resentment among the officers corps particularly those operating in the field, is the lukewarm support to the Army's role in Sindh from both President Ghulam Ishaq Khan and Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. The President, for instance, is said to have instructed the Army soon after Jun 19, when the dissidents took over MQM offices in Karachi, that these should be got vacated and handed back to Altaf's MQM. The Army did not oblige on the plea that it was not their business to get involved in what they term as "MQM infighting." Additionally, the President's obduracy in the matter of

his son-in-law, Irfanullah Marwat, whom the Army would prefer to see out of Sindh's politics but who is increasingly seen to be "protected" by his father-in-law is another sore point in the Army's perception vis-a-vis the President.

As far as the Prime Minister is concerned, the Army is quite cut up over what it sees as his retraction from the Sindh operation, more so when he was said to have endorsed the broad outlines of the Sindh operation in the first briefing on May 19. He had then been told that this operation could affect his alliance with the MQM and as a result, the latter could even quit the government. Nawaz Sharif is said to have been enthusiastic in his endorsement of the Army's operational plan for Sindh, except that he added a rider to the Army's action by ordering that it be delayed till after the passage of the Budget by the Sindh Assembly. The Prime Minister's dilly-dallying on showing scenes of MQM torture cells on Pakistan Television, after he had promised that it would promptly be done, added to the Army-Nawaz Sharif friction. Compounding these difficulties were statements of the Prime Minister's confidantes, Chaudhary Nissar Ali and Ghulam Haider Wyne. And then in what is probably yet another first for Pakistan that a Prime Minister personally ordered the transfer of a Police SHO [Station House Officer] in Karachi (the one who had hauled up MQM MNA, Kunwar Khalid Younas), the Army felt that he was being guided by "political considerations."

Army sources also add that, of late, both the President and Prime Minister are now "on board" the Sindh operation and they are confident that the July 20 meeting will set the pace for a more cohesive position of the power structure on Sindh. But the fact remains that on Sindh, it is the Army that is now clearly in the driving seat, not the President nor the Prime Minister, and it is the Army which is setting Sindh's political agenda in a manner it sees fit and according to its priorities. By a combination of procrastination and lack of direction, the political initiative in Sindh has passed out of the hands of the President and Prime Minister, who remain stuck in the groove of PPP-bashing while the Army proceeds, slowly but surely, to reshape the political order in the province.

#### Civilian-Military Misunderstanding

92AS1312K Lahore THE NATION in English 9 Jul 92  
p 1

[Article by Nusrat Javeed and Mariana Baabar: "Misunderstanding Between Government and Army Witnessed"]

[Text] Islamabad—Although for the public consumption, the Army and Nawaz Sharif government are repeatedly asserting that there were no differences of perception amongst them, yet misunderstanding between the two continues to grow.

A very recent example of the same was witnessed on Tuesday at Lahore. Our sources from the provincial capital claim that a white jeep shadowed the most trusted aide of the Prime Minister throughout his stay in Lahore where he had primarily gone to talk to JI [Jamaat-i-Islami] leader, Qazi Hussain Ahmad. Chaudhary Nissar Ali was driving his own car and Shahbaz Sharif, younger brother of the Prime Minister, was sitting next to him, when the people noticed a "cat-and-a-mouse chase" in the Defence Colony. At one stage, the Petroleum Minister is claimed to have come out of his car to find the reason of his being chased. They happened to be the personnel of an intelligence agency working for the military. The incident, THE NATION learnt thorough highly reliable sources, has been properly protested at the "appropriate quarters."

Before the Tuesday incident, Chaudhary Nissar was also in trouble with the snooping boys of the military when they were seen in his constituency to find whether he removed a board giving credit to the building of a road to Chakwal to a Retired General while inaugurating its widening with a huge cost of Rs 5 crore a week ago.

It is to be recalled that the informal deliberations of the Cabinet last Monday were presented to newsmen, by a set of Ministers suspected of "playing someone else's game" as if the whole show was conducted to witness Nissar weeping.

Nissar reacted sharply to the "weeping story." After getting permission from the Prime Minister, he talked to THE NATION and made the startling disclosure that it was the former COAS [Chief of Army Staff], Aslam Beg, who "delivered the MQM [Mohajir Qaumi Movement] to me" when the IJI [Islami Jamhoori Ittehad] forced a headcount on Ms. Benazir Bhutto through a motion of no-confidence in September 1989. The Petroleum Minister insisted while talking with his colleagues, regarding the on-going operation in Sindh, that he had apprehensions that the same might solidify the Urdu-speaking population against a Punjabi Prime Minister and chief of the Army Staff. Referring to the situations in East Pakistan, Balochistan and Sindh, he desired that the operation be handled politically so that we do not end up with "another Mujibur Rehman-Altaf Hussain."

It is not the Army and Nawaz Sharif government only who are substantiating the impression that there was chaos and confusion amongst the elite of Pakistan. Qazi Hussain Ahmad, leader of a party which had recently parted ways with the IJI, added into it after going on record after meeting Nissar at Lahore on Tuesday.

He claimed that Sardar Farooq Leghari at a recent meeting with him had desired that the JI MNAs [members of National Assembly] should join the PDA [People's Democratic Alliance] in resigning from the Assembly which would result in a "constitutional crisis" leading to the resignation of the President and the Prime Minister. The JI sources insist that Farooq Leghari believed that the crisis created by the resignations would

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bring in the Senate Chairman Wasim Sajjad to the Presidency who had to dissolve Assemblies to let the formation of a national government, which is the only way out left in the given conditions.

The JI leader is believed to have expressed doubts that the national government, comprising different parties, could not function smoothly when even "Cabinets of the same party find it difficult to coordinate." The JI sources claim that Leghari agreed to the said perception and confessed that the things were heading towards Martial Law. But he was confident that the PPP [Pakistan People's Party] would not be singled out for repression by the would be Martial Law government, a JI source claimed when "Qazi Saib wondered whether an Army government could be of some help to the PPP." "The Army does not have the same mental block against Benazir like it had under Zia," Leghari is reported to have replied. It was perhaps after sounding Leghari that Qazi Sahib suspected that some backroom deal had been struck between the PPP and the Army and he reiterated his position that the Army could not deliver.

It looks that the President, the Nawaz Sharif government, the MQM and their allies and sympathisers who were stunned during the initial days of Army's taking on the MQM were now putting their act together. President had scored a point after the return of Marwat from abroad. Since his leaving, news stories were repeatedly speculating that his son-in-law escaped prosecution. He was alleged to have been put on the exit control list and included among the list of wanted persons, "troops aiding and assisting the civil administration in Sindh" had recommended to nab. With him have come Jam Mashooq Ali and Sibghat Rashdi—sons of Jam and Pir Pagaro—who were also suspected to have fled.

The Prime Minister, who initially preferred deliberate distance from the operation in Sindh in the beginning, thanks to extended stays abroad, is now engaging himself in the Sindh affairs quite visibly. He established his own communication channels with Islam Nabi, the MQM-nominated Minister of Production and arranged hospitalisation of Kunwar Khalid Younus in Islamabad. Younus was brought in police custody to the capital to meet the NA [National Assembly] Speaker to confirm whether he had resigned from the Assembly. After doing the same he addressed a crowded Press conference to tell the long tale of his torture. The former MNA had been arrested under murder charges.

The Nawaz Sharif Government is also very disturbed over the impression that it resist action against the MQM. Chaudhary Nissar Ali is repeatedly asserting that before beginning of the operation the military provided them with a list of suspected Assembly Members which included the MQM activists. "Fully comprehending the political implications of the same, the Prime Minister categorically told the Army not to spare anyone, even if he belongs to the MQM." The Army suggested that

before nabbing any MNA and MPA [members of Provincial Assembly] they will seek the permission of the government.

But the Prime Minister made it clear that "if you have enough evidence against some public representatives, do not wait for my permission."

The Army is also having second thoughts. It was jubilant when torture cells were recovered and dissidents could break into the MQM strongholds without bloodshed. But it now looks that they are somewhat disappointed at the end of the day. "Probably they relied too much on the dissidents and thought the information provided by them would lead to rapid and massive discovery of arms believed to have been amassed by the MQM. No sensational arm caches, however, could be delivered," a Sindh government source said. The Army is yet not about to arrest Salim Shehzad, whom the dissidents claimed could be delivered in one day.

A senior Sindh government source claims that before launching of the operation, the MQM leadership was too panicky. They told the Prime Minister to provide them with a list of persons wanted from its ranks for trials. But it was not given to them probably due to the concern for secrecy.

The source who had a long experience of handling the law and order problems of Sindh and holds no sympathy for the MQM claimed that the ethnic organisation was staging a great comeback since the operation.

A very well-placed and highly reliable source claimed that during in-house discussions the Army elite was also very apprehensive of a possible MQM backlash. During recent meetings with the political leadership the advice is: "Do not break your contacts with the MQM, especially those rallying around Azim Tariq."

Our sources claim that at the beginning the government was even willing to impose Governor's rule in Sindh to facilitate a smooth operation but the Army opposed it and preferred a democratic facade. It seems it would still want to let Muzaffar Shah be there as the Chief Minister.

The military and the Nawaz Sharif government are separately admitting that if by-elections were held, the MQM nominees would be returned with a massive vote, though it was initially thought that after the operation, the same might only be able to send nine persons to the National Assembly instead of 15.

Political observers in Islamabad opine that the Tando Bahawal incident and death of four persons in the interior of Sindh gave the impression as if the troops were only operating in urban Sindh. To dispel this notion "dissident sported" action against the MQM was rushed. It now looks that efforts are on to stage a major operation in some rural area so that the impression of even-handedness is substantiated. An indication of the same was provided by a senior military source which told THE NATION on Sunday that "in a few days you

will hear a big news from the interior of Sindh." It is to be noted here that a Captain had already been killed in action in the rural areas.

A consensus is emerging between the senior representatives of the Nawaz government that a review of the on-going operation in Sindh be made to correct and retrieve the situation. But as yet it has not been trickled down to the lower ranks and functionaries. There is a lot of bickering and passing the buck of responsibility. If you talk to the military sources of the middle and lower ranks they would give an impression that they were not able to quickly and effectively deliver in Sindh because the government of Nawaz Sharif was not serious to remove "impediments" they faced in the field. The role of electronic media is criticised too. Pakistan Television is supposed to have ignored or played down the discovery of torture cells. The government, however, claims that the torture cells were in effect run by Aamir Group. They were long abandoned and people in Karachi were laughing at the "blue ropes." They feared that an overkill of the torture cells might fire back. The information wizards of Prime Minister want some fresh discovery of arms dens and torture cells which were still in use for a splash.

Poor Press is the sole victim of their bickering. The Nawaz government is claiming that newspapers, especially the ENGLISH PRESS, was not sympathetic to them and was coming out with critical pieces, projecting the impression as if Nawaz Sharif was blocking a smooth operation in Sindh for political reasons. It is pretty obvious that active journalists working for the ENGLISH PRESS are being intensely monitored. Because contacts between people from Rawalpindi and active newscasters are subtly referred to by the "complaining ministers from the kitchen cabinet."

The Army does not seem to be happy with newsmen either. A highly reliable source claimed that during a recent meeting the Army representatives told the Prime Minister and his colleagues that "there are some newscasters who were creating misunderstanding between you and us. Please do something to control them."

### Urdu Desh Plan Unearthed

92AS1312L Lahore THE NATION in English 18 Jul 92  
p 1

[Article: "MQM Planned To Create Urdu Desh in Sindh"; first paragraph is THE NATION introduction]

[Text] Altaf real face erodes his image: ISPR [Inter-Service Public Relations].

Karachi—An Army spokesman admitted here on Friday that "there were confirmed intelligence reports that the MQM [Mohajir Qaumi Movement] leadership was actively pursuing the idea of carving out some areas of Sindh for the purpose of declaring them as Jinnahpur or Urdu Desh." The spokesman made this observation

while answering questions of a group of newsmen visiting Sindh on the invitation of ISPR from Islamabad. The spokesman was reluctant to elaborate as to who among the top MQM leadership was pursuing such a secessionist idea.

The spokesman regretted that "Press was ignoring the achievement of troops aiding and assisting the Government of Sindh in the rural areas and focus has been shifted to happenings in Karachi since June 19."

He insisted that Army never fired "even a bullet" since coming into Karachi while in the interior of Sindh such incidents were reported daily. So far more than a 100 dacoits had been killed. One Captain of Army Ajaz died in action while others were injured. He insisted that Army never provided any cover to the MQM dissidents who took over office on June 19. He said that patrolling on that day was somewhat visible because Anjuman-i-Sipah-e-Sahaba had announced to bring out a procession which could have led to sectarian violence.

The spokesman frankly admitted that Altaf Hussain still "holds sway" but it may not be lasting because his image is considerably eroded with the coming into public of the real face of the organisation he was heading. He was not sure how long the constituency of Altaf would live with the face of militancy and internal killings, torture and money extortions now being revealed. The spokesman, however, stressed that Army was not in Sindh to perform some political role. It was there to restore peace for the citizens. "We are not for or against any political group," he repeated.

When told by the newsmen that in comparison to the independent media the government-controlled electronic media was not keen to project what Army is considered to have achieved so far in operation. He admitted that PTV [Pakistan Television] was not cooperating with the ISPR. He wondered why the PTV had failed to show reports exposing the torture of dissidents and allegations levelled by families of the missing persons suspected to have been picked up by the MQM goons when "more than 47 TV networks have shown them all over the globe."

Insisting that Army was not busy in "witch hunting" the MQM, the spokesman admitted that not much of weapons could be unearthed in Karachi and it was due to the reason that MQM cadres had been directed to disperse and hide the weapons. But he was happy over the fact that because of the Army presence in Karachi and Hyderabad the "link between weapon and operator" had been cut.

### Sharif Appeasing MQM

92AS1312M Lahore THE NATION in English  
10 Jul 92 p 8

[Editorial: "Appeasing the MQM"; quotation marks as published]

## POLITICAL

[Text] What did the Prime Minister exactly mean when he proclaimed the other day that the 'MQM [Mohajir Qaumi Movement] has a right on Karachi'? Was he trying to assure his erstwhile allies that, regardless of the outcome of the military operation, their besieged 'empire' will not be allowed to fall apart, and no matter how serious are the charges of the MQM's involvement in terrorism, it will have his 'blessings' to remain in business as usual. To declare, on the one hand, that the military operation will be taken to its logical end and, on the other hand, publicly certify that a 'proclaimed offender' was qualified to sustain its power base, has been, to say the least, an instance of resorting to a self-defeating logic. The Prime Minister has obviously been saying conflicting things and thus making confusion worse confounded. Nevertheless, one can read enough in between the lines to be able to sift his 'real concerns' from what he has been pronouncing as his 'avowed objective,' largely because of the compulsions of circumstances in which he has to function as a co-sharer of power. What has by now been clearly brought home that had he the initiative he would have either called off the military operation in Sindh, or at least not let it proceed in the direction it has gone so far.

The Prime Minister's reluctance to endorse the crackdown on the MQM and a continuing urge to salvage a modicum of political relationship with it is self-revealing. He is, by all accounts, not willing to pay the price of a total break with the MQM for the success of operation clean-up and herein lies the divergence of perceptions between him and the Army leadership. Perhaps the Prime Minister does not realise that, in the wake of his pronounced desire to placate the MQM, statements like 'taking the military operation to its logical end' do not make sense and by working at cross-purposes with what the Army leadership thinks has been an even-handed operation, he is letting himself drift to a political stalemate. Why does the Prime Minister consider it so essential to go on pursuing a policy of appeasement towards the MQM is anybody's guess. It is by no means crucial for his political survival. By all reckoning, he would still be the Prime Minister even if as a consequence of the MQM's withdrawal from the government the province of Sindh was lost to the IJI [Islami Jamhoori Ittehad]. On the contrary, it may be in his larger interest to emerge out of the current impasse as a politician who has the vision to compromise with his political opponents for the sake of strengthening democratic system. It would thus be more appropriate for the Prime Minister to let the people decide as to who has a right on Karachi, rather than passing value judgments which may be seen as partisan and politically motivated.

#### Mohajirs Face Dilemma

92AS1312N Lahore THE NATION in English 20 Jul 92  
p 8

[Article by A. R. Siddiqi: "The Mohajir Dilemma"; quotation marks as published]

[Text] The so-called 'Urdu-speaking' (for who is not Urdu-speaking in Pakistan and isn't Urdu our national

language?) mohajirs of urban Sindh (Karachi and Hyderabad in particular) appear to have been at the horns of a dilemma ever since the Jun 19 crackdown on the MQM [Mohajir Qaumi Movement] strongholds in Karachi. Whereas nobody-mohajir or non-mohajir-would call in question the electoral supremacy of the MQM as the predominant representative of the mohajir community, its credentials as the sole organ of the mohajirs remain open to question.

A very large number of mohajirs-particularly mature, relatively saner and well-placed elements-hardly ever subscribed to the MQM credo. Others felt free to join mainstream parties like the PPP [Pakistan People's Party], Pakistan Muslim League, Jama'at-i-Islami, Jamiat Ulma-i-Islam and so on, in direct opposition to the MQM.

In the pro-MQM upsurge released after its sweeping victories in the 1988 and 1990 general elections, MQM acquired much the same popular status as the All-India Muslim League had after the 1945 general elections in undivided India. Its lackluster performance in the Punjab and NWFP [North-West Frontier Province]-the two major Muslim Majority provinces eventually to form part of Western Pakistan, notwithstanding-the All-India Muslim League emerged as the only representative and its President, Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, as the sole spokesman of Muslim India.

The nationalist, Congressite Muslims, despite their unflinching commitment to a united India and unswerving loyalties to the All-India National Congress were looked upon as political pariahs or charlatans, even a Muslim Leaguer at heart and Congressites in appearance only. A great many politically-minded and peace-loving Indian Muslims even pretended to be Congressite for fear of reprisals from Hindus fanatics in the euphoria of the power and authority following independence.

Today Karachi mohajirs face more or less the same predicament. To most Sindhis, Punjabis and Pakhtuns they are, rather must be MQM men, sympathisers or activists, overt or covert. The assumption is palpably incorrect, unfair and unjust. The mohajirs outside the MQM pale had had the same awe of and admiration for the MQM as non-mohajirs. Awe of its blatantly authoritarian ways and admiration for its organisational discipline and meteoric rise. Everyone, president, prime minister, leaders of public opinion of the eminence of Benazir Bhutto (once a coalition partner of the MQM), Khan Abdul Wali Khan, Mustafa Jatoi, Maulana Kausar Niazi together with the man in the street, would wax eloquent of the party organisation at one time or another.

With the MQM in a cleft stick, the so-called Urdu-speaking mohajirs find themselves in a state of growing

uncertainty about their individual and collective security. At most social gatherings, this remains the topic of the day.

The other day I happened to attend the walima dinner of a friend's son. It was a typical Karachi gathering with a preponderance of the Urdu-speaking (native) mohajirs as opposed to our other Urdu-speaking naturalised Pakistanis-a sprinkling of Sindhis, Punjabis, Patans, etc.

It was as festive an occasion as it should have been; ladies covered in silks and gold, men dressed in a motley of awami and western garments-one or two also in the traditional shewani-Aligarh style ensemble.

On that day (June 28) MQM ('Asli te waddi' as opposed to "Haqiqi") MNAs [members of National Assembly] and MPAs [members of Provincial Assembly] and ministers, under the orders of their supreme leader Altaf Hussain sojourning in London, had announced mass resignations from their assembly seats and ministerial portfolios.

Most of the guests thought it might have been a master-stroke of political manoeuvre on the part of Altaf Hussain. By this single act, MQM had left the provincial government high-and-dry and the central government in the lurch.

Others would not take that rosy a view of the ensuing situation. Whether the mass exodus of the MQM elected representatives from the corridors of power would help either the MQM or the mohajirs at large, remains to be seen.

Since June 19 crackdown, Karachiites, by and large, have been living in the long shadow of fear and uncertainty about their own safety and security as a class and a community. The feeling ensues largely from the menacing likelihood of the entire Urdu-speaking mohajir community, at some stage or the other, being identified as MQM supporters and activists by the authorities concerned, and proceeded against.

There has been a progressive loss of faith in the "even-handedness" of the operation. The thrust and the direction of the operation has changed from the pretargeted rural areas to 'post-scripted' Karachi. The Prime Minister's Special Assistant Chaudhary Nissar Ali Khan spoke feelingly of the fears of the Urdu-speaking mohajirs of Karachi in the wake of the crackdown on the MQM strongholds and action against the party's high command-ministers MNAs and MPAs. A masterpiece of candour and sensitiveness, rarely associated with the ministerial class. Chaudhary Nissar made a strong case for measures at the federal level to allay the fears and misgivings about the operation taking the shape of an action against the Urdu-speaking people of Karachi. He said; "The Sindh situation has turned into a game of politics and it is regrettable that everyone has lost sight of the interests of Sindh."

In the words of Chaudhary Nissar Ali the army action was "initially" envisaged against anti-state elements and terrorists and the "thrust" was supposed to be in the "rural areas where these were mainly based." This would appear to be the case no longer as the operation has changed its course at least for the time being.

Another debatable point engaged public attention pertains to the wisdom or folly of Mr. Altaf Hussain's directive to the MQM Ministers (Federal and Provincial) MPAs and MNAs to resign en masse from their portfolios and assembly sets.

Whether the exodus of the MQM elected representatives from the corridors of power helps either the MQM or the mohajirs at large, still remains to be seen. However, a strong feeling exists in favour of their choosing to stay put in their places and make stand rather than quit in so great a hurry. At all events, they would have done much better to wait for the government to make the next move and capitalise that to the maximum.

Chances were that after the exposure of the terrorist activities of the party and the unearthing of the 'torture' and 'rape cells,' the government itself would have, sooner than later, moved against the party collectively as an organisation or against its stalwarts individually. In either case, the vital question of violation of human rights would have arisen to invest the party and the individuals with a martyr's halo. After all, the party's electoral credentials remain beyond question to provide it, its best chance to fight, and possibly win a legal/constitutional battle. That opportunity, however, had been wantonly thrown away.

Beyond the debate about the wisdom or folly of MQM's tour de force in quitting the centres of power, arose the thorny and agonising question about what lay in store for the mohajirs in the future. The one dominant and commonly shared fear pertained to all Urdu-speaking mohajirs being looked at as MQM-wallas as sons or fathers of the party activists. The likelihood of the MQM label attaching to the Sindhi mohajir community as a whole, has been the one depressing thought weighing on everybody's mind.

Already projected as a 'terrorist' body, MQM or its high command, at any rate, must one day, sooner or later, face and answer the charges-or his references brought against it. It would be a most difficult situation with the supreme leader, still a fugitive in London, and half the party's high command incommunicado. Who in their absence will face the music? Anyone who makes the fine distinction between 'Quaf' and 'Kaf,' 'Seen' and 'Sheen' in conversation? A frightening prospect, shared half in jest half in earnestness.

It's a fact that MQM, its sweeping electoral success, notwithstanding, was not endorsed, least of all supported, by a very large section of the mohajir community. It has (or had?) been essentially a party of the youth, by the youth and for the youth in age groups between 20 and 35 (40-45 in rare cases). None over 45 (except for a

handful of ministers, Senators etc.) would qualify him or herself for party membership. The bulk of his party's activists or 'militants' consisted of graduate engineers, lawyers, doctors, etc., looking for a job, without finding one.

Mature and socially better placed mohajirs hardly ever subscribed to MQM's militant political posture. Even in Karachi and Hyderabad, its two major power centres, its writ ran only in certain parts of the twin cities rather through its length and breadth.

What is in store for MQM remains to be seen. The problem slowly but compulsively emerging pertains to the rehabilitation of the morale of the Urdu-speaking mohajir community as a whole. It is a highly delicate issue calling for the utmost sensitivity and sense of responsibility on the part of the establishment-civil and military.

#### **Joint Strategy Lacking**

*92AS1312O Peshawar THE FRONTIER POST  
(supplement) in English 10 Jul 92 p I*

[Article: "Ruling Out the Third Option"; quotation marks as published]

[Text] Soon after the Corps Commanders Conference in Murree on July 5, 1992, Gen. Asif Nawaz is reported to have replied to a question about the possible imposition of martial law with the words, "For God's sake what are you talking about? It doesn't happen that way."

Obviously, the Sindh Operation, with all its complexity is beginning to cause confusion. There is possible divergence of opinion between those conducting the operation, those who asked them to conduct it and those who are at the receiving end. The General may be clear that there will be no martial law but journalists and some sections of the public are less certain.

To the extent that the Nawaz Sharif government and the Sindh authorities approved the operation and the armed forces are only carrying out their mandate, talk of martial law seems unjustified. To the extent that the government is having second thoughts about the political fallout of the Sindh operation and the army may be unwilling to accommodate 'new concerns,' the situation could become more of a test of civilian government supremacy.

The whole issue of another martial law in Pakistan deserves serious consideration even aside from the Sindh operation. Sections of the public that print posters asking the COAS [Chief of Army Staff] to help restore law and order in the rest of the country along with Sindh and members of the Nawaz Sharif cabinet who refer to the armed forces as the "saviours of the country" are really talking about an option that strikes at the root of representative democracy.

The menace of lawlessness and armed political groups running a parallel government in the cities or the interior

of the country cannot be rooted out by military action alone. The Sindh situation is the creation of selfish, near-sighted, opportunist politics and after the dacoits and the terrorists have been contained, Sindh will again have to face the basic questions of creating a political system that can handle the competing demands of the urban and rural populations and the Sindhi Mohajir identity.

Martial Law should never again be an option in Pakistan because long after the Sindh operation is over, we will need leaders from the civilian sector to come forward and practice the kind of politics which educates the Sindhis as well as the Mohajir to coexist. After the MQM [Mohajir Qaumi Movement] terrorists and the Sindhi dacoits have been evenhandedly disarmed, a representative government that can chart a real future for all the people of Sindh must begin to function.

Gen. Asif Nawaz's impatience with questions about martial law is understandable because the ground for it is always prepared by civilian politics. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif or Benazir Bhutto are in a much better position to answer the question than the COAS. When the MQM, a former ally of PPP [Pakistan People's Party] and IJI [Islami Jamhoori Ittehad] in Sindh is discredited, and when a relative of our head of State is supposed to have played havoc with the rights of the Sindhi opposition, then the ground is being prepared by the civilian leadership not the army.

The fact that representative governments in Pakistan do not feel any sense of accountability for bad decisions and are not concerned about creating a modern political party organisation is more significant in terms of the prospects for martial law than the fact that there may be some resentment in army circles about statements of politicians regarding the Sindh operation.

Blunders committed by the army or elected representatives must be subject to open public debate. In today's Pakistan, no section of the government or the services should set itself up as above the reach of the people. The real saviours of a nation are its people, those who elect the rulers and pay the bill for the services. Comments on the Sindh operation are bound to be made and are likely to be controversial, but the Army should not enter such debate. It is up to the Federal Government to deal with these comments and questions. The army should confine itself to doing the job which has been given to it under the Constitution and should communicate its feelings through the political government.

For the future, governments in Pakistan may want to consider the possibility of doing a little more home work before approving something like the Sindh Operation. The Sindh dacoits as well as the MQM torture cells were not operating in a vacuum. The political context in which they operated should have been more carefully considered. It would have prevented the kind of surprise that Mr. Wyne received when the MQM was hit.

Sindh Operation, whether one agrees with its objectives or not, has created some political space. This is space which only a civilian government can fill. Instead of talking of martial law, the need of the hour is for the Nawaz Sharif Government and the PPP Opposition to move quickly to agree on a strategy to fill this space before the ethnic and anti-democratic forces move in again.

### Sharif Opposes Impartial Solution

92AS1312P Peshawar THE FRONTIER POST  
in English 11 Jul 92 p 10

[Editorial: "PM Reverts to Old Line?"; quotation marks as published]

[Text] The prime minister [PM] has transferred the police officer who had arrested MQM [Mohajir Qaumi Movement] MNA [member National Assembly] Kanwar Khalid Younas, registered a kidnapping case against MQM Senator Ishtiaq Azhar and had remained in the forefront of the anti-MQM operations in Karachi. Strict disciplinary action has also been ordered against SHO [Station House Officer] North Nazimabad, Anwar Ahmed Khan.

The move, reportedly, has not been 'appreciated' by local military commanders who considered Anwar as one of the most effective police officers in the field. His appointment as SHO North Nazimabad, an MQM stronghold, too had been made on the recommendation of the corps headquarters. The action against Anwar Khan is being perceived as another signal of changing priorities in Islamabad. Of late, the ruling circles have been voicing their concern over the harshness of military action against MQM, albeit the prime minister himself has been extremely cautious about antagonising the armed forces. Instead of telling the army to lay off the MQM, he has taken the safer option of aligning with the 'saner elements' of the organisation. However, the impression that the saner element was an oblique reference to the new Haqqi group was dispelled by the PM's latest denial of any links with the group. The PM, while dissociating his party from the Haqqi group, has also talked about supporting 17 selected 'decent' persons to fill in the resigned seats. This could be an indication of a secret deal brokered between the government and the Altaf faction. The statement comes in the wake of reports that the hounded MQM chief, is in possession of highly incriminatory evidence (comprising video tapes, cheques, etc.) of his meetings with the prime minister and his emissaries. This record is supposed to be a minute-by-minute record of all promises, payments and pledges made by the IJI [Islami Jamhoori Ittehad] head to wean the MQM from the PPP [Pakistan People's Party] government. In legal terms, it would be tantamount to a damning proof of horse-trading. Even if there was no truth in such reports, the manner in which the IJI is springing to MQM's defence betrays the fact that its plans about Sindh operation may have gone awry. In his latest remarks, the prime minister has described PPP

and the terrorist AZO [Al-Zulfiqar Organisation] as one and the same thing.' In allowing the army action in Sindh, the government had probably pinned its hopes on the routing of PPP but a seemingly fair action by the army has turned the tables on its own allies. The public questioning of impartiality of army operations by the chief ministers of Punjab, Balochistan and a federal minister may have been an attempt to put the army on the defensive and thus win a respite for the beleaguered MQM. However, a curt response emanating from the recent corps commanders' meeting and the expression of annoyance by the top army brass about 'certain impediments' which may have forced the government to back down. The latest statements of the prime minister suggest that the government may finally have decided to impose its political priorities over those of the armed forces in Sindh. By declaring MQM's right over Karachi, the prime minister has strengthened the impression of clear lines having been drawn between the civil and military set-ups. His latest stance also suggests that the foremost concern of his party was to hang on to power, even at the cost of an unresolved Sindh issue.

### President Khan Supports Terrorism

92AS1312Q Peshawar THE FRONTIER POST  
in English 11 Jul 92 pp 10-11

[Article by Ahmed Bashir: "Terrorists All of Them"]

[Text] Altaf Hussain and his MQM [Mohajir Qaumi Movement] compatriots are not the only terrorists we have in Pakistan. All those, who patronised and protected them, are terrorists, Ghulam Ishaq Khan above all.

Mian Nawaz Sharif was also not unaware of what went on in Karachi. But to save his coalition government, he looked the other way.

He is a terrorist, too. Benazir tried to stop the MQM. It was demanded of her to withdraw all cases registered against the terrorists of the MQM. When she did not oblige, her government was dismissed. She had a film made of the torture halls of the MQM. Copies were sent to the president, the then army chief, General Mirza Aslam Beg, and some journalists of Islamabad were shown the video. She wanted to release it for the general public.

But the showing of the film was banned, either by Ghulam Ishaq Khan or the general, whose sympathies for the MQM were never a secret. He later sent his platoon for the Hyderabad Pucca Qila operation. The police wanted to recover arms from the MQM stores.

The MQM gangsters called out their women and children and tried to block the road. Besides them, walked the terrorists, who fired at the police under the cover of women and children. The police fired back and a large number of women and children got hit.

At this stage, the army intervened without the invitation of the civil government. Did not General Mirza Aslam Beg protect the terrorists and the recovery of arms? Mian Nawaz Sharif, as chief minister of the Punjab, gave the Hyderabad MQM a gift of Rs[rupees]50 million. This amount was spent on the purchase of arms and ammunition. Did not Nawaz Sharif act as a terrorist?

The ISI [Inter-Services Intelligence], the Intelligence Bureau, the Sindh CIA [Crime Investigation Agency], the special police and all special agencies knew everything. But because the PPP [Pakistan People's Party] lurked in the wings on account of its mass base, and Benazir Bhutto threatened to come back, the IJI [Islami Jamhoorti Ittehad] sold their soul to the devil. Never has anybody given so much for so little. Ghulam Ishaq Khan, Nawaz Sharif, Jam Sadiq Ali, Irfan Marwat, and General Mirza Aslam Beg (possibly) were all terrorists.

According to a press report, hundreds of people who dared to disagree with the pir of Azizabad, were kidnapped and tortured and killed. The KMC [Karachi Municipal Corporation?] issued death certificates. Bundles of blank forms of death certificates were recovered from torture centres. The forms were filled by the killers themselves. Some of the tortured were let off with permanent disabilities to let the people know that the MQM was above the law. People only whispered about the torture cells of the MQM, but the dissidents, Aamir and Afaq, had been screaming about their existence for more than a year. Nobody took any notice of their cries. The coalition was to be preserved at all costs. The PPP had to be kept pinned down. That was the legacy of the great dictator, who had hanged an innocent Bhutto.

Let no one forget that the dissidents have been part of the same MQM. Some of them were, reportedly, in charge of torture cells. They fell out with Altaf Hussain, apparently, because, the pir had, under the advice of General Mirza Aslam Beg, changed the nomenclature of the Mohajir Qaumi Movement to the Mutahida Qaumi Movement. That meant quite another thing.

Aamir and Afaq resented it, not only because of the change of form, but also because Altaf would not share power with them. They had been secretaries of the MQM. Now they had to take orders from the pir of Azizabad, who they believed, was their creation. They decided to break away. This did not suit Altaf Hussain, who tried to persuade them to remain in the 'movement.'

According to a press report, at one point things got so out of control that Afaq shot Altaf in the foot. He had to be taken to Abbasi Shaheed Hospital. Life then became difficult for the dissidents and they had to take refuge in the USA.

While bed-ridden in hospital, Altaf received a telephone call from Aamir Khan from America. Aamir told Altaf that he had penetrated Altaf's closest associates and could have him terminated any time. As a proof, he told Altaf to look under his pillow where he would find a note signed by none other than Aamir Khan. He was told that

he would find another such note in his bathroom. The notes were found, and Altaf Hussain had three of his bodyguards killed. The executions had been arranged by Imran Farooq and Salim Shahzad, according to an insider.

Return from the United States, Aamir Khan, Afaq and some of their compatriots took refuge in Lahore. Reportedly, a police team was sent by Jam Sadiq Ali to Lahore for their arrest, as demanded by Altaf Hussain. The dissidents, had, in their possession, incriminating evidence against Altaf Hussain on video tapes. The Punjab government decided to save the evidence and the Sindh police team had to return empty handed.

How was the MQM created? The guilty conscience of the dictator, Ziaul Haq, took a turn for the worst following the hanging of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and he decided to crush the PPP as a challenger. He had power, but he had failed. The PPP was the only threat to his system. According to one report, General Jehandad Khan proposed the creation of an ethnic organisation in Sindh to maul the PPP in the urban centres and the encouragement of the separatist forces of the Jeay Sindh to deal with the PPP in the interior.

The idea was to reduce it to the level of a Sindhi party, fighting its battle of survival in the parametres of Bhutto's home province. In 1986, Syed Ghuas Ali Shah was Sindh's chief minister, Altaf Hussain, who was then in prison, was released under his orders and given the assignment of forming an ethnic-based party. The assignment was accompanied by two cheques of Rs 50 lakh each for expenses. The cheques had been issued by a seth, who owned cement factories and beverage plants.

Altaf Hussain was guided by special agencies. He formed the MQM in the name of Mohajir rights. Politicians had been talking about a four-nationality Pakistani federation. The Mohajirs, who did not want to be absorbed in Sindh, came out with the slogan of a fifth nationality. In Altaf Hussain, the Mohajirs found a new Messiah. Hitherto, they had supported religious parties without any gain. Now they had a separate identity.

Ziaul Haq backed the MQM personally. He thought that if he could destroy the PPP in Sindh, the rest would take care of itself. He also went to see the ailing G. M. Syed, leader of Sindh separatism, and certified him as a patriot.

Altaf Hussain, because of most favourable circumstances, began to walk tall. He had his own programme. He wanted to expel all non-Mohajirs and all Sindhis from the urban centres of Sindh and make an exclusive Mohajir province. His programme had great emotional appeal. The leaderless Mohajir community began to flock around him. His word became the law. He became a charismatic leader.

The Mohajirs belong to the middle class. They have lands, but no Mohajir farm labour. They have medium industry, but no Mohajir work force. Most of them had

houses of their own. Most of them are educated. They are in middle training and in white-collar jobs. Within their community, there are no social contradictions. The Nazi Party of Germany was middle class. So were Mussolini's fascists. Nearer home, the Awami League was a middle class party. All of them were terrorists in their political approach. The MQM, being a thoroughbred middle class party, could not be an exception. It began to develop as a terrorist party, with the added advantage that it had funds and patronage. It divided Karachi, Hyderabad, Mirpur Khas, Sukkur, and other cities, which had a minimum showing of the Mohajirs, into sectors and sub-sectors, with mini dictators in charge. It began to collect 'jugga tax' from shops, private residences, and mill owners.

According to one report, its collection from the Lines Area for the month of Ramazan amounted to Rs 66 lakh. Power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely. That is what happened to the MQM. Its workers and leaders began to rape innocent girls, lift cars, and rob the people. Everything was done in the open. No police station would register in FIR [First Information Report] under the orders of Irfan Marwat, the then advisor on law and order. The party became a monstrous monolith. Dissidents had nowhere to go. All opposition was crushed by force. Ziaul Haq had manufactured killers.

Altaf Hussain also, reportedly, got in touch with the Indian intelligence agency, RAW [Research and Analysis Wing]. The interior secretary S. K. Mehmood prepared detailed notes for the prime minister and the cabinet, in which had been included details of MQM-RAW relations. Some documentary evidence had also been attached. The notes were also submitted to the president. But no action was taken over the report. Altaf Hussain had been working for the creation of Jinnahpur, and autonomous Mohajir province, as a preliminary to the establishment of an independent homeland. He hoped that the United States would help. She was kindly disposed towards the MQM. Altaf Hussain could, allegedly, get any number of visas from the American embassy. He had a map prepared for his new country. I wrote about it a couple of years ago. It included, in addition to Karachi, Hyderabad, Mirpur Khas, Nawabshah, the whole of Tharparker and all the coastal areas of Pakistan frontiers with India were to be open.

With all the coastal areas included in Jinnahpur, the rest of Pakistan was to be a land-locked country. Following my writing, Altaf Hussain asked me to see him at Azizabad. I happened to be in Karachi then. The time was about 11.30 pm. I was sick that night and apologised. I thus lost my only chance of meeting the pir of Azizabad. I was not too sick to move. I was lazy, and I will for ever regret it.

Altaf Hussain is a very worried man these days. He went to London for the fear of his life. His sojourn is no more comfortable. He cannot come back home and his London visa will soon expire. Where can he go? If he stays on in England, he is likely to be handed to the

Pakistan government. Some of his friends are persuading him to seek refuge in India. But it is highly unlikely to come through. Nobody wants a terrorist and a torturer on his land. He is a tragic character. Yesterday, he was king and conqueror, today this planet has no place for him.

Now that the axe has fallen, where will the Mohajirs of Karachi and Hyderabad go?

I do not think that Aamir and Afaq can reorganise the MQM. It has become a dirty world. I think that the silent majority will support and join nationalist parties. There they will have a respectable future. It is also not impossible that a large majority of people may remain loyal to Altaf Hussain. The MQM has a touch of deep emotion under his leadership. He was a dictator and dictators do not groom their seconds.

But because of exposure of all terrorists in and out of the government, the whole system has become unmanageable. The situation calls for a dissolution of all assemblies and the holding of fresh election under the management of a national government. The army is here to stay longer than envisioned.

#### MQM Will Survive Operation

92AS1312R *Karachi Dawn in English* 10 Jul 92 p 11

[Article by Saquib Yusuf: "MQM: Down, But Not Yet Out"]

[Text] Royal announcements of the demise of the sovereign and the succession of the heir-apparent are accompanied by the phrase "The King is dead; long live the King."

Inevitably, the new King has been schooled in the old ways of the royals, brought up in the footsteps of his father, the same governess, the same public school, the armed services, stiff upper lip, polo and garden parties. His genetic imprint and the controlled environment within which he has awaited the sad and happy day, I ensure that the well-oiled machine will continue to turn over without so much as a stutter from the changing of its cover.

The ruling set-up has recently informed us of the passing away of the old MQM [Mohajir Qaumi Movement] and the birth of a new one. Like the royal succession, plus change, plus le meme chose. Those in the MQM, disgraced Original or blue-eyed Haqiqi, have been produced, nurtured, bank-rolled and tutored by the same institution. Movement into the ranks of the leadership of the party has been strictly upon the approval of the gloved and batoned hands that have firmly held the reins from day one.

Functionaries of the MQM, Original or Haqiqi, have been inspired by the same leader, the goals have been identical, the ceaseless rhetoric has harped on one theme, the methods employed have been the same and a blind eye has been turned to them by indulgent sponsors and

highly placed friends for purely selfish reasons. The progress of the organisation and its leaders has been meticulously managed from one control room. Since Haqiqi is not an infusion of new blood into the family but a subset of the Original, who is to say that our Hercules is not now engaged in the hopeless task of confronting the Hydra of its own making?

Who is to say that those now being paraded around before us as the next acceptable face of the MQM will not shortly be presented to us as the perpetrators of torture and rape, the racketeers extorting protection money from the shopkeepers and residents of their area, the thieves of party funds and the murderers of political opponents?

And who is to say that there will not be a volte face quite in keeping with the political traditions of this country and that there will be a swift rehabilitation? There is as much evidence in the Haqiqi record as there was in the Original record to suggest that this is not an unlikely outcome of the present upheaval, more so in view of the fact that the sponsorship remains unchanged.

To exit the scene hand in hand with the MQM Originals should there not be some of the ruling originals whose hands, hitherto tightly clasped with those of their allies, have quietly slipped free? Now that the government has exposed its own short comings, why are the Federal Minister of the Interior, the Chief Minister of the province and those of his administration responsible for intelligence gathering and for law and order and public security, under whose noses torture cells were carrying out the normal business of torture, "rape cells" were thoughtfully established within hospital compounds, and citizens were disappearing with alarming regularity, still clinging on to office?

If the government's cleaning up has not yet got around to sweeping up the dirt nearest its own house, is there no code of honour, no criteria of self-respect, no self-evaluation of the degree of responsibility and efficiency with which these officials have carried out their duties, that forces them to acknowledge that their task was more than the holding of the title and position, that they have failed miserably, been totally exposed and that time for leaving with whatever dignity is still salvageable from the devastation, is fast becoming yesterday?

Are the ravaged citizenry of Karachi and the other inhabitants of Sindh expected to continue to suffer these failed personalities because the failure is not theirs alone but can be shared by many others of the political, civil and non-civil set-up that has created, presided over and continues to mismanage the situation to its own ends?

It is too much to accept that the previous Chief Minister of Sindh, who made it his job to know exactly what each political pawn in the province was up to in order to retain his loyalty through blackmail if necessary, could not have known about the extra curricular activities of the MQM. Are we being asked to believe that the man over the hill in Islamabad whose heavy dossier on Ms.

Bhutto's government contained minute details of transactions in gas cylinders and purchase of plazas, her make-up, wardrobe and household crockery, did not have prior knowledge of any of the activities of the MQM?

Can we believe that the existence of torture cells and rape cells in the heart of the Karachi was not known to the various intelligence agencies in the civil and military set ups before the launching of the clean up operation? The federal government, whose Prime Minister chose to bring forward a visit to the UK by one month to time his absence to coincide with the clean up and the second Test match, and who had a prolonged meeting with the fallen leader of the MQM in London at the same time as the latter was being vilified by "the government" at home, must surely have had some idea as to the antecedents of those with whom it chose to ally itself in Parliament.

As soon as the antics of the MQM and the existence of any one of these houses of torture was known, those who had that knowledge and who were in a position to do something about it, and did not, must surely be treated as accomplices to each of the brutal crimes that took place in it thereafter.

Who is it that decides when the fouling up can be allowed to continue and when it is appropriate for a clean up to be taken in hand? Who is it that wields the scalpel which remove the offending organ and transplants a carefully nurtured replacement? Each of the major political upheavals in the country, the coups d'etat, the hanging of Mr. Bhutto, the summary dismissal of Ms. Bhutto's government and now the crucifixion and the resurrection of the MQM has demonstrated the tenacious external hold that is being exercised over the creation of political parties, their functioning and continuing existence.

As long as this kind of control is enforced and meekly accepted—so far even as to envisage constitutionally guaranteed roles for the controllers in the realms of foreign affairs, defence and internal security—the people's mandate will continue to be sidelined by the kingmakers and the people will continue to be artificially divided by those who seek to make institutions of themselves in league with the kingmakers, who, in turn, will continue to foist upon us the likes of the government of the day and the Pir of Azizabad and his heirs.

#### Development, Direction of Sindh Operation Viewed

##### Crisis Seen Deepening

92AS1260A Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English  
14 Jul 92 p 4

[Article by Azizur Rahman Bughio: "Political Chaos in Sindh"; quotation marks as published]

[Excerpt] The political crisis in Sindh seems to be deepening, with the passage of the, following MQM

[Muhamir Qaumi Movement] provincial members en-bloc resignations. As a result, the Muzaffar Shah government is in obvious danger of falling. This, in a democratic dispensation, is no crisis, if a defeat is viewed and accepted like a success in a democratic spirit to accommodate opposition in a normal constitutional manner. But, in our feudal society, such issues are seen and addressed to as a challenge under false sense of one's pride and prestige. And, it is this erroneous and dangerous attitude in the game of politics that has been creating a real crisis in our country.

Likewise, if the Shah's government is left to sink or swim in a fair game of democratic and constitutional setting, a situation automatically emerging out of it, would offer a natural and lasting solution. But, this is not being allowed by Islamabad, under its biased attitude based on its likes and dislikes, creating a serious crisis. Sindh province whose people already feel frustrated in an artificially-shaped government set-up, right from Jam days, is being denied its right of representation because that was likely to bring PPP [Pakistan People's Party] in power. In a bid to thwart PPP from forming a government, IJI [Islamic Jamhoori Ittehad] rulers in Islamabad were pushing politically-turbulent province further away from national mainstream. And this is a real crisis which if not resolved to the satisfaction of the people of Sindh, could cause serious repercussions.

The Sindhi press has felt greatly disturbed on the failure of the federal government to take proper notice of new developments in Sindh, not recognising hard realities of Sindhis sentiments and urges. The official reluctance to come out clearly on MQM following their exposure of anti-people role, in the wake of army operation, has added astonishment and anger to the Sindhi dailies which criticise sympathy for this ethnic group voiced by functionaries close to the Prime Minister who could not hide soft corner for MQM leaders.

During and after PM's visit to Karachi, the Sindhi dailies editorially expressed shock and concern over official efforts to save Shah government rather than Sindh.

They also accused the Federal government of showing preference and priority to petty objectives of party politics over those of the country.

The daily Kawish of Hyderabad (9/7) asks: "After all, what is his (PM's) helplessness which compels him to find hajis and zawars from among the criminal organisation of MQM. On many occasions, talk of dialogue between the government and opposition was heard but no advance in this connection, could be made. On such an occasion when country's democratic system has received a set-back as a result of MQM's resignations, the Prime Minister should have extended his hand of co-operation and confidence to the opposition, in the best interest of democracy. But it seems he is not

prepared to give up his ego, even if such an attitude causes harm to democracy and the country itself."

The Jago (9/7) is shocked to see that "our rulers, in innumerable complications and complexities of the situation, have found a way out of saving their skin under all circumstances, treating such a step as a successful politics. Consequently, in the sphere of logic, all doors and windows are closing on them, one-by-one, with the passage of time. And they live under the hope that yet there is a door or a window open to them. They do not visualise a limit and danger of where this process of closing of doors would end one day."

Admitting that Sindhis had not voted for Nawaz Sharif or his Ittehad, the paper says yet he should try to look as the prime minister of every resident of Sindh, after coming to such a high position. The people of Sindh have certain demands, certain requirements and certain emotions, including elimination of dacoits and terrorists. The people of Sindh know that the compulsions of the Centre under its political expediencies, have helped growth of these dacoits and terrorists. The paper, therefore, urges the government to decide restoration of peace in Sindh by being above political expediencies.

The paper opines that the prime minister should achieve this objective even if he has to pay a political price for it because this price could prove to be a political investment for him, in the future."

The Awami Awaz (9/7) feels that the present efforts of the Centre to protect Shah government at all costs, will not only fail to resolve this issue but would further deepen the crisis. According to the paper, "in fact, attempts to establish and retain a government of their choice in Sindh violated the provisions of the Constitution, leading to a dangerous situation for this country."

The paper is critical of what it describes as deliberate efforts "to save criminals in MQM" on the part of the federal government, ignoring all principles and requirements of democracy and constitution. The paper accuses the government of complicating the Sindh situation to perpetuate their rule and of not curing Sindh's real malady. "But, perhaps, you have no comprehension and wisdom to realise being carried away by swiftness of time," warns the paper.

Again writing on the same topic, the Jago (10/7) observes that "this 'culture of instability' in the present shape has emerged because the present democracy is based on Islamabad's wishes and whims and now when MQM has disappeared from the middle, the dispute appears to be purely between Sindhi camps belonging to government and opposition respectively. Some members get inspiration from Islamabad and others enjoy people's confidence." The paper thinks that "most favourable results from Sindh's point of view would be achieved if Islamabad-inspired camp comes out in the open and refuses to toe Islamabad's anti-Sindh and anti-democracy line,

taking a stand that there is limit to everything and we would, no more, fight among ourselves." [Passage omitted]

### Sharif Playing Political Game

92AS1260B Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English  
16 Jul 92 p 6

[Editorial: "PM Echoing Zia's Perceptions of Sindh Situation"; quotation marks as published]

[Text] It is in itself some relief that Prime Minister [PM] Nawaz Sharif has deigned to go down to Karachi personally and spared some moments of his precious time for the minor problems which beset the people of the province of Sindh. What is dispiriting, however, is that the relief part ends there and the pervading unease takes over. When politicians try to put up a show of overwrought strength, the impression they create is one of want of confidence and awareness of the deficiency. In a meeting with his partymen in Sindh Assembly, an assortment which defies definition, Mr. Nawaz Sharif is reported to have assured his apparently shaken stalwarts that the People's Party shall *not be allowed* to come to power in the province under any conditions. This assertion does not, in the first place, provide any evidence that Mr. Nawaz Sharif has learned anything from whatever little he has by way of knowledge about what the problem is. This was the mandate he gave to the late master of skullduggery, Jam Sadiq Ali. There may or may not be any nexus between Mr. Nawaz Sharif's tough talking and the return of Irfanullah Marwat, presumably to take up his task of annihilating PPP [Pakistan People's Party] from where he had left over before he went on his still unexplained pilgrimage abroad. If Mr. Nawaz Sharif's perception of the solution of the problem of Sindh is annihilation of the PPP, or prevention of its coming into power *under any conditions*, then he must be the victim of the pathological fear of his spiritual mentor, Gen. Zia. The General also believed that the only problem in Sindh was the PPP and he resorted to the most devastating voodoo ministrations to get rid of this ghost.

On the issue of the present and future status of MQM [Mujahir Qaumi Movement], the PM seems to be getting more and more unsure, if not confused. On the one hand he says he has lost 15 MQM votes and on the other there are confident reports—so far not denied—of his assiduous efforts to make it up with the MQM. Usually, informed political observers in Karachi tend to the view that Mr. Nawaz Sharif is actually negotiating with the MQM and some hard-nosed horse-trading may be in progress already. Should this be even partly true, obviously the level of political ethos is being depressed to disgustingly low levels. Mr. Nawaz Sharif's strong words in his hectoring to his partymen fail to reinforce public confidence. How the Sindh MPAs [Members of Provincial Assembly] of the government party feel about it is not difficult to define. They have no choice but to stay silent, sulk and make whatever they can of it. The PM

has offered nothing at all to Sindh Chief Minister Muzaffar Shah except the Hobson's choice of making the most of a no-choice situation.

Among the more brilliant gems of wisdom Mr. Nawaz Sharif offered to his audiences in Sindh, was his comment on the law and order situation. In what may be taken as his cheerful conclusion, he notes that the kidnapping-for-ransom market has been made to suffer a steep slump. The Prime Minister sagely points out that the kidnappers who were demanding crores as ransom had now come down to lakhs! Add to this Mr. Nawaz Sharif's perfectly correct confession that the law and order situation in Sindh had been unsatisfactory for the last one decade. Mr. Nawaz Sharif squarely blames the genesis of this curse upon the shoulders of the Zia regime, of which he was the most luminous of the rising stars. His allegation that it got worse during 1988-1990 is a feeble effort to unsay what he has been forced to admit about where, when and how Sindh came actually to be put on fire.

What is the net result of Mr. Nawaz Sharif's reluctantly undertaken study trip to Karachi? Unhappily, the answer is not nil but worse than that. He has once again betrayed a singular inability to grasp the real nature of the problem and talks of an "as-you-were" sort of solution. He is clearly at the end of his tether. It would be little short of a tragedy if even at this pathetically late stage, Mr. Nawaz Sharif remains unable to come to terms with the reality only because it is not as he would like it to be. Some facts are more powerful than even the Prime Minister of Pakistan. When confronted with them, courage and wisdom offer the remedy, not obstinate insistence to hold on to one's favourite lollipop.

How do the commanders of the army units, called into help the IJI civil government in Sindh, feel about the Premier's efforts to wriggle out of an uncomfortable situation instead of facing it with the resolve to solve it in the best interest of the country? How is one to dispel the apprehension that Mr. Nawaz Sharif is more worried, as was Gen. Zia, about the PPP than the peace, tranquillity, conciliation, safety, security, unity and prosperity of Pakistan?

This is not the most reassuring signal Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif is sending out to a nation becoming increasingly uneasy about its affairs.

### Chief Minister Wrongly Supported

92AS1260C Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English  
12 Jul 92 p 6

[Editorial: "The Price of Saving Muzaffar Shah"]

[Text] It is quite simply a question of putting two and two together. The other day, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif told a government party meeting in Sindh that the PPP [Pakistan People's Party] shall be prevented from coming into power under any conditions. He also gave the green signal to the imperilled Chief Minister

Muzaffar Shah to "do all" to save his ministry. Even if the obviously menacing content of these two factors is overlooked for the moment, there is sufficient material here to conclude that the familiar methods of cobbling together a 'majority' have already been put into full force. Add to this the return of the late Jam Sadiq Ali's master-mind, Mr. Irfanullah Marwat. The mercurial Marwat has, in fact, more at stake than even Muzaffar Shah. He would not be wrong in assuming that Jam's mandate of liquidating the PPP is now his responsibility. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif has once again gone on record that his main—perhaps the only—objective remains what he inherited from Gen. Zia: that PPP shall not come into power under any conditions. In the context of these imperious commitments, it is not easy to see what the Sindh Assembly session is being summoned for on July 14. The Prime Minister has made the decision and duly instructed Chief Minister Shah to take steps to ensure the Assembly carries out the PM's instructions. Call this kind of politics what you might, it is the antithesis of democratic norms and violates the letter and spirit of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.

What may be happening in Sindh how behind the scenes (although such discretion is not the Marwat style) can be imagined. Gen. Zia's formula for keeping PPP out of power under any conditions was a combination of uninhibited bribery and brigandage. Jam, Marwat & Co. followed that, dropping all pretence of any concern for public distaste for abuse of state power and public assets. Let it be said that, after all, there was something to be said for Zia's dentured grin. The manner of his political successors in Sindh is scary. So, the game is on. Our office in Karachi hints that, as of Friday, the price of one vote for the IJI government in Sindh was one million rupees, a valuable plot of land and plus... And those whose mouths do not water at this fare, would of course know what works when even money doesn't.

Now, the question of all questions is simple: how long are we going to perpetuate this kind of skullduggery? Is there nothing at all to show for our gruelling experience and demeaning political self-abuse? We seem to have learned nothing except how to self-destruct. The undeniable fact of the Sindh situation is that the IJI government in that province was a transparently unsustainable political junk from day one. Assuming Mr. Nawaz Sharif manages to keep this tottering outfit somehow from falling, what then? What of any value would we have achieved? Why the PM and the President fail to see what everybody else in this nation of 125 million people can: that quackery and patchwork not only do not work but also debase those who resort to such gimmicks. There is an infinite lot more to politics than hanging on to power at any price. At this critical crossroads in our history, anymore wayward straggling could plunge us into crises of unspeakable gravity.

Political jugglery in Sindh now would be embarrassing not only for the government of Mr. Nawaz Sharif but also for the army. The army is there to restore respect for

law, which cannot logically exclude respect for the fundamental law of the land. Is it possible to visualise that, in their reckless search for a majority in the Assembly on July 14, M/S Muzaffar and Marwat would be on the prowl—bullying, bribing and browbeating MPAs at will—and the army would look the other way? Abduction is abduction, without any qualification. Intimidation is intimidation, without any difference and bribery is bribery, without any distinction. The average law-abiding citizen would expect the army, now that it is on the spot, would spare no one engaged in any activity in conflict with the law. And every patriotic Pakistani would hope and pray that the governments at the centre and in Karachi would not do anything remotely likely to embarrass the army.

### Political Leadership Inept

92AS1260D Karachi DAWN in English 6 Jul 92 p 7

[Article by Ayaz Amir: "Does Anyone Know What's Going On?"; italicized words as published]

[Text] "*It is a democratic process and everyone is playing his own fiddle.*"—Mian Nawaz Sharif

Asked in Islamabad on Saturday what he thought of the conflicting statements being made by some of the senior members of his government about the army action in Sindh, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif said that people should be allowed to express their opinions and it was only when a debate was allowed on national issues and after hearing out different views that a policy was evolved.

This about sums up the Prime Minister's broad understanding of cabinet responsibility. Follow this doctrine to the letter and there would be even shriller confusion in the country than there is at present. Every minister and every wiseacre in an increasingly disoriented government shooting off his mouth, all in the service of evolving a higher national consensus.

Does anyone really know what is happening? The army is reacting to circumstances and feeling peeved when various aspects of its action in Sindh come under the glare of unfriendly publicity. The civilian government, as borne out by the utterances of Chief Minister Wyne and the PM's special assistant Ch. Nisar, unhappy with the army operation because the army is not selective enough for its liking. Mohammad Khan Junejo saying that Wyne did not know what he was talking about. Muzaffar Hussain Shah, surely one of the more volatile chief ministers Sindh has produced of late, insisting, despite all the evidence to the contrary, that he enjoys the support of the majority in the Sindh Assembly. And the President, in his eyrie, nursing his misgivings in silence. From the bizarre to the ridiculous—that's where things are headed with no one in the Republic in a position to check this trend or even to lighten the edges of this monumental confusion.

Take any aspect of the present operation and you will be left groping for adequate answers. Has anyone in the army, from the Chief of the Army Staff to the bright staff officers playing their little games with the Karachi Press, cared to explain what prompted the army action in the first place. Was it a considered decision or a panic reaction to the kidnapping of the Agha Khan business man, Seth Ashiq Ali? Was some sort of action against the MQM [Mujahir Qaumi Movement] always on the cards or was the action that was eventually taken a reaction to the Tando Bahawal killings which exposed the army to a great deal of criticism? Now that the MQM has been targeted, is the army clear about what it wants? Is it fighting lawlessness in Karachi or is it trying to break the MQM as a political force?

Are we never going to learn from our mistakes? Ayub Khan roped Shaikh Mujib into the Agartala conspiracy case and look what happened. A leader of the third rank was transformed into a national hero. Zia-ul-Haq tried to destroy the Pakistan People's Party [PPP]. Did he succeed in his aim? Not all his machinations could dent the party's image or destroy the mystique of its present leader. The PPP was finally discredited by the shenanigans of the Zardari clan and by Benazir Bhutto's own ineffectiveness as a leader. The PPP's graph is again on the rise purely as a reaction to the corruption, the money-making and the floundering of the present government.

The army would be making a serious mistake if it thinks that by its Press releases alone it can destroy the political standing of Altaf Hussain. So far its methods have had just the opposite effect. Whereas yesterday the MQM was the greatest source and vehicle of injustice in Karachi, today it is being seen as a victim of injustice. Yesterday you couldn't register an FIR [First Information Report] against the MQM. Today the MQM cannot get an FIR registered in its favour. The MQM certainly needed to have some of its arrogance knocked out of it. It had become a state within a state. There can hardly be any two opinions about that. Nor can it be disputed that it was only the army which could have taken on the MQM. But means should not be subordinate to the ends we are trying to achieve. Otherwise, injustice results and a feeling of bitterness is born.

Events in Karachi and Sindh have such an obsessive quality about them that it is easy to lose sight of the wood for the trees. Disorder may be present in a more virulent form in Sindh but the crisis of the Pakistani state goes beyond the borders of Sindh. Everywhere you look order is breaking down and the concept of the rule of law is falling into disrepute. It is this state of affairs which needs to be turned around.

But it will not be done by the empty phrases and the tired slogans we have been hearing all these years. Democracy is a fine thing but it alone will not take us to the promised land. For all its frequent elections India is not a better place today than it was four decades ago. Nor have we

managed to send a better crop of people into our assemblies as a result of the last three elections.

An elite whose moral and intellectual standards are so high that it can provide a direction to the nation is what we stand in crying need of. But this precisely is our tragedy: we have a leadership class rotten to the core. No wonder every discussion of Pakistani politics ends on a despairing note.

#### Junejo Supportive

*92AS1260E Karachi DAWN in English 4 Jul 92 p 1*

[Quotation marks as published]

[Text] Islamabad, July 3: Mohammad Khan Junejo, President of the Pakistan Muslim League, has termed a statement of Punjab Chief Minister about military operation in Sindh "uncalled-for."

"Punjab Chief Minister Ghulam Haider Wyne has no right to comment on the manner in which the operation is being conducted," he said at a Press conference here on Friday.

Mr. Junejo was highly appreciative of the operation in Sindh. "Things are improving in the province," he said while recalling the increasing lawlessness in the urban centres of Sindh and a growing sense of insecurity among the people. He said the people of Hyderabad and Karachi had been complaining to him about "terrorist activities of the MQM since 1990." Mr. Junejo said he conveyed these complaints to the Prime Minister.

Asked why the Government did not take any action against the MQM, which was also its coalition partner, he said governments had their own way of taking decisions. He admitted that there were certain political compulsions which prevented governments from taking a tough stand. He pointed out that the Sindh government could not survive even for a minute without the support of MQM.

The people, Mr. Junejo said, were satisfied with the operation in Sindh. It was a first step to restore the writ of the provincial government and normality. It should be followed by a dialogue between major political forces, he added.

He supported the idea of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif that sober elements of the MQM should be invited for a dialogue. "Talks could be held with sober elements," Mr. Junejo, insisting that sober elements existed in every political party and group.

He refuted reports of his illness and said that he was very much active. He said the Muslim League would play a more important role. He also contradicted reports regarding any move inside the party ranks to dislodge him from the presidency. "During the last meeting of central working committee I made it plain to all the members that it was my government which had restored credibility of the Pakistan Muslim League. I will not

allow any person or group to undermine the credibility and respect of the party," he added.

Mr. Junejo said people of Karachi and Hyderabad had very old ties with the Muslim League. Their forefathers, under the banner of the Muslim League, had struggled for independence, he said and added that people in the interior of Sindh, who were also patriotic, would join the PML, which would emerge as a major political force.

### Chief Minister Rule Illegitimate

92ASI260F Karachi DAWN in English 6 Jul 92 pp 1, 5

[Quotation marks as published]

[Text] Karachi, July 5: PPP [Pakistan People's Party] Co-chairman and Leader of the Opposition, Benazir Bhutto, alleged on Sunday that in the aftermath of the resignations of MQM MPAs [Mujahir Qaumi Movement Members of Provincial Assembly], Sindh was without a chief minister or a Speaker.

Speaking at a seminar on "Sindh Crisis and its Solution" sponsored by the Thinkers Forum, Ms. Bhutto declared that since Syed Muzzafer Hussain Shah had the confidence of only 46 MPAs, "how can he be chief minister?" Furthermore, with the Speaker's resignation the House was leaderless. "How can they say in Islamabad that everything is all right in Sindh?" she asked.

At the seminar, also addressed by journalists to mark the anniversary of martial law imposed on July 5, 1977, Ms. Bhutto declared that when "Operation Clean-up," was unearthing MQM torture cells and mass graves where was the "son-in-law"? She wondered how the administration would treat the PPP in a similar situation, "because we're not sons-in-law."

Referring to the acquittal of the four PPP [Pakistan People's Party] activists who had been charged with the murder of Special Judge Nabi Sher Junejo, Ms. Bhutto left another question for the audience to answer: "Who will ask who murdered Junejo because he was not happy with the type of judgements he was giving?"

Ms. Bhutto declared that "Operation Clean-up" had left the PPP "confused" because its parameters were not clearly defined. Alluding to a statement by Chaudhry Nisar Ali that the operation would target 26 PPP leaders, including six or seven MNAs [Members of National Assembly], she expressed surprise that "six armed divisions were being sent to catch them." From August, 1990 to March, 1992, she alleged, 5,000 PPP workers had been arrested.

According to her "contradictory statements" were being issued by the federal government regarding the Sindh operation. In particular, she said, while the army made it appear that the operation would be against "kidnappers" and "terrorists," statements by Chaudhry Nisar and Punjab Chief Minister Ghulam Haider Wyne suggested that there would be "political victimisation" under the garb of the clean-up.

Ms. Bhutto denied references made by preceding speakers that under the previous PPP regime, PSF [Pakistan Student Federation] and MQM activists were "exchanged in the presence of the army." According to her, when the MQM kidnapped PSF activists, the latter got "out of control of the PPP" and kidnapped MQM workers in retaliation. She said she had asked that the exchange of the kidnapped activists be carried out in front of the Commissioner, but the MQM had demanded that it must take place in front of the army.

Ms. Bhutto declared that her party workers who had resorted to "terrorism" by kidnapping the MQM activists had violated party discipline, "and we rejected them."

The PPP Co-Chairman asked why the resignations of the MQM MPAs were not being accepted while the resignations of dissident MQM members had been accepted at once by the then Speaker of the Sindh Assembly?

Coming to other issues, Ms. Bhutto said the people of Sindh would have to deal with the "most controversial" Bihari issue by considering whether they could accommodate the Biharis in Sindh, already faced with severe shortage of land and other problems. According to her, the repercussions of the Biharis' arrival could be to reduce Sindhis to the status of Red Indians in their own province.

She alleged that a number of projects started during the PPP era remained incomplete under the present government. These included a pipeline the PPP government had started to lay between Jamshoro and Karachi, two water desalination plants, financial credits for industry, setting up industries, and a proposed port near Thatta.

Ms. Bhutto claimed if the PPP returned to power, it would strike "a new balance of power" between federal, provincial and local governments so that each would have "a share of the socio-economic cake."

Earlier, the editor of Sindhi daily *Kawish*, Mohammad Ali Qazi, called the PPP and Sindh as "synonymous." He noted that Zulfikar Ali Bhutto had first introduced the idea of "power sharing" by enabling Sindh to enter into agreement with the federal government. This power-sharing agreement was broken with the martial law of Gen. Zia-ul-Haq on July 5, 1977, he added.

Nizam Siddiqui from the *Jang* newspaper was of the opinion that the "MQM was a live entity" which could not be finished through force. Noting that all political parties used arms, he recommended that these groups have a spirit of accommodation while dealing with each other.

He suggested that the PPP and the MQM open dialogue at this stage to work for the larger interests of Sindh.

Using nationalist arguments, Faqir Mohammed Lashari, editor of Sindhi daily *Jaago*, called upon the PPP to become the "trade union" of the people of Sindh to negotiate domestic and international deals for them. He

stressed that the commonality of people's cultures on both sides of the River Indus be emphasised to create a sense of unity in the federation.

**Dawn** columnist Sultan Ahmed blamed Sindhi feudal lords for collaborating with Gen. Zia-ul-Haq's regime. He noted that their refusal to accept land reforms or to industrialise had led to "agricultural stagnation" in Sindh.

Prof. N.D. Khan, who organised the seminar, recommended that the government initiate a dialogue with the Opposition to "promote political peace" after the temporary phase of "Operation Clean-up" was over.

### PPP Could Escalate Crisis

92AS1260G Karachi *DAWN* in English 6 Jul 92 p 5

[Quotation marks as published]

[Text] Islamabad, July 5: Leader of Jamaat-i-Islami's parliamentary group in the National Assembly, Mr. Liaquat Baluch, has said the resignations by PPP [Pakistan People's Party] members from the National and provincial assemblies can pose a serious problem for the government.

Talking to newsmen in the assembly cafeteria on Sunday, Liaquat Baluch said the resignations would create a vacuum which would not be easy to fulfil.

Referring to the statements of IJI [Islami Jamhoori Ittehad] ministers that the government would hold by-elections in case the PPP decided to resign from Assemblies, the Jamaat-i-Islami leader said it would not be that easy for the government to hold by-elections on such a large number of seats. He said the by-elections would be nothing less than "mini-elections" creating severe problems for the government.

Mr. Liaquat Baluch said the holding of elections on such a large number of seats was not an easy task as it would mean holding complete elections at least in Sindh province.

He said the ruling party members were also forcing the Jamaat-i-Islami members to resign from their seats by claiming that since they had fought elections on IJI tickets they had lost the mandate after quitting the IJI. "We are considering all pros and cons of resigning from the assemblies though a decision has not been taken as yet," he said.

Mr. Liaquat Baluch accused the government of adopting an indifferent attitude towards the national issues confronting the country.

Referring to the recent statements of Punjab Chief Minister and PM's Special Assistant questioning the partiality of the clean-up operation, the Jamaat-i-Islami leader said it was the government which had called the

Army in Sindh under Article 147 in aid of civil power. "Now they are themselves raising hue and cry over it," he observed.

Asked whether there were any chances that Jamaat-i-Islami and PPP would cooperate with each other in case by-elections were held by the government on the seats vacated by MQM members in the National and Sindh Assemblies, Mr. Liaquat Baluch said "it was too early to say as the seats have yet to be declared vacant." He, however, said the possibility of such a cooperation cannot be ruled out totally.

The Jamaat-i-Islami leader said the government has lost its justification to rule the country and it was high time for it to resign and save the situation.

He said the government should not try to impose its own people on the seats vacated by the MQM. "We should avoid to repeat mistakes which we committed in East Pakistan," he warned.

### Political Paralysis Growing

92AS1260H Islamabad *THE MUSLIM* in English  
4 Jul 92 p 6

[Article by S. Ahmed: "Political Paralysis in Sindh After Army Action"]

[Text] The political situation in Sindh seems as messy as ever in recent times and predictions about even the immediate future can be misleading or utterly unreliable.

The question most asked is about the future of the Muzaffar Shah cabinet after six of his MQM [Mujahir Qaumi Movement] Ministers and two Advisers have resigned and 22 out of 28 MQM members of the Sindh Assembly have submitted their resignations, while four others have joined the Haqqiqi Group.

It is easy for the Prime Minister to say that he is not affected by the resignations of 12 out of 15 MQM MNAs [Members of National Assembly] from the National Assembly as the Muslim League has still a majority in the NA; but in the case of Mr. Muzaffar Shah he does not command a majority in the Sindh Assembly without the backing of the MQM which was hitherto the sheet anchor of political support in Sindh.

But Mr. Shah is a cheerful and confident CM [Chief Minister] still, and jokes with the friends he meets as if nothing much can happen to him in the immediate future.

He has three good reasons for that:

1) The Federal Cabinet on Sunday decided to back him while continuing the army crackdown on the lawless elements.

2) The centre has decided not to have Governor's rule in Sindh. For that matter not only the CM is opposed to that but also Governor Mahmoud Haroon as Governor's rule could mean a change in the Governor.

3) The PPP has decided not to try to dislodge Mr. Muzaffar Shah now nor to seek to come to power in Sindh or association with the Jatoi Group.

Simultaneously efforts are to be made by the government to win the support of the moderate elements in the MQM, including the Haqqiqi Group. But the Haqqiqi Group, according to Afaq Khan and Amir Khan, have so far secured the support of only four MPAs and two MNAs along with the backing of a large number of sector chiefs of the MQM whose support they value. They say they are not going all out to win the support of other MQM leaders but they were coming to them by themselves.

Mr. Muzaffar Shah has another reason to be hopeful of the immediate future. He says that the opposition needs majority support in the Sindh Assembly on the basis of its inherent strength of 109 Members to oust him, but the total number of MPA in the PDA [People's Democratic Alliance]-Jatoi Group is far below 55.

Here comes a constitutional or procedural issues. Is not the inherent strength of the Sindh Assembly reduced following the resignation of a large number of members? After the resignation of 22 MQM members from the 109-member House the strength of the House is reduced to 87 and the majority needed then to topple the government is 44. The PPP and Jatoi Group has that much strength or may be a couple of members less, which could be made up in the fluid situation in Sindh.

The Sindh Government is avoiding such an eventuality by not accepting the resignations of the MQM members but subjecting them to a leisurely scrutiny so that if the PDA makes a move for ouster of the Muzaffar Shah government it would need the support of 55 members which it does not have following the desertion of 9 of its members after it won 46 seats in the 1990 elections.

The PDA has hence decided to test its strength by requisitioning a meeting of the Sindh Assembly not to topple Mr. Shah, but to elect a new Speaker in place of Mr. Razik Khan who has sent in his resignation. And that leaves the confused Deputy Speaker in a quandary.

The PDA cannot decide its own final course of action until after the military operation the interior of Sindh is over [as published]. With leaders like the Chief Minister of the Punjab Ghulam Haider Wyne calling for military action against the Al-Zulfikar organisation and its PPP backers so as to insure even-handed conduct on urban areas of the province, the PDA is not sure how many of its workers, office-bearers and MPAs may be picked up from the interior of Sindh. Hence on the one side it condemns Mr. Shah and makes him a part of the trio along with the President and the Prime Minister who had inflicted grave miseries on Sindh and on the other side it does not want to topple, him now.

The inclination of PPP is not to accept power in Sindh even if offered much less try for that. And it certainly does not seem that the government is willing to transfer

power to the PPP now or after the elections. Hence the Centre is doing all that is possible not to have Governor's rule, and elections within 90 days thereafter.

While the PPP is relieved by the rout the MQM has suffered, the MQM Haq Parast Group would not welcome the prospect of the PPP coming to power in Sindh at all. It would do everything possible to block that even after it has been alienated from the Centre, particularly from Mr. Nawaz Sharif following the army action.

Every major party in Sindh is playing a one step forward and one step backward game. There is a clear strategy in the swiftness with which MQM has resigned its seats in the NA [National Assembly] and PA [Provincial Assembly]. Under the rules fresh elections have to be held within 60 days, and MQM is hopeful it could win back most of the seats it has vacated, vindicate itself and embarrass the government.

That is precisely what the Centre and Mr. Muzaffar Shah do not want. Hence the slow motion is scrutinising the resignations and accepting them. Meanwhile the government would try hard to win over the moderate MQM elements and use the MQM Haqqiqi Group, too, to mobilise such support.

The question has arisen whether the government would register cases in respect of the torture cells and other crimes committed by the MQM activists and proceed against them legally. If it does not it would seem absurd as exposure of crimes without punishment or a trial would seem mockery of justice.

And if those guilty of serious offences in Karachi are not punished, those who have been rounded up in the interior of Sindh and more who would be arrested could not be punished either. Punishing them only in the interior would violate the spirit of even-handedness of the army action.

There is the genuine fear in Karachi that the stern action against MQM might result in a severe backlash later, particularly because the total of arms seized in Sindh is very small—about 350 so far. So it is a kind of back-to-square-one situation which Sindh faces now with the army in a position to propose while other elements will dispose. No party can take a positive and decisive initiative as a host of factors have to be considered in the complex situation each party faces in a real political quagmire.

#### New Elections Necessary

92AS1260I Lahore THE FRIDAY TIMES in English  
9 Jul 92 p 7

[Interview with journalist I.A. Rehman (IAR) by THE FRIDAY TIMES (TFT): "An Independent Machinery Must Be Created for Holding Fresh Elections"; boldface words, quotation marks as published]

[Text] TFT—Do you think that everything you have heard about the MQM [Mujahir Qaumi Movement] during the army's Karachi operation is true?

IAR—It's not only true, the MQM is actually worse than the disclosures so far have indicated. Everyone knew that it was an organisation that secured loyalty through coercion and extorted funds from its followers. All those who promoted it are guilty of sewing seeds of hatred which will not be easy to remove.

TFT—How do you look at the PM and President's stance toward the operation against the MQM?

IAR—The President and the PM knew everything about the MQM and actively encouraged it because they didn't want a representative government in Sindh. Their sole objective now is that somehow or the other Sindh should be ruled by their cronies. The PM's colleagues have been criticising the action because they want to save their coalition partners.

There are some signs of tension within the ruling troika. The obvious reason seems to be that the politicians want a selective operation while the army has to protect its own integrity.

TFT—Do you think the Operation will be effective?

IAR—Even an undesirable political organisation cannot be liquidated through undesirable means. Although the MQM was nurtured by an unrepresentative government with the specific objective of creating a force to fight the Sindhis, it has now grown now into a considerable political force. And this is no way of dealing with a political force.

Any action not perceived as legitimate or fair by followers of the party will fail to achieve its purpose. In particular, the help provided to dissidents to create a semblance of an inner party revolt has raised serious doubts among MQM members.

The main issue, of old and new Sindhis finding a framework for peaceful coexistence, remains unaddressed. This is a political problem of which law and order is only one aspect. This operation is being carried out in aid of a provincial government that has itself been indulging in lawlessness and whose complicity in torture has been proved. People can't therefore be blamed if they think that the Operation is being conducted to sustain an illegal government.

TFT—Do you think that the army will encounter resistance in interior Sindh once the Operation resumes there?

IAR—I don't know about resistance because political parties are half bind these days. But the consequences of such operations have always been harmful in the long run. In a polarised situation, matters should be negotiated. For years the state apparatus has been used to destroy the dominant Sindhi group. This Operation is

aimed at destroying all groups, of old and new Sindhis. This fragmentation of political forces will only pave the way for extremists.

There is no guarantee that only criminals are being rooted out, and in any case, the definition of a "criminal" will change from place to place. There is also the problem of the public perception of any executive step. At the moment, both in interior Sindh and Karachi, the Operation is being perceived as political oppression, and that is very dangerous. The army is sustaining the MQM dissidents and there is a great danger of replacing one detestable mafia with another.

TFT—What in your view must be done following the Operation?

IAR—The question of "rehabilitation" is not confined to Sindh. There is no consensus on democracy in Pakistan. There has to be a commitment to democratic values. I don't see this anywhere at the moment.

TFT—Should the assemblies be dissolved and fresh elections held?

IAR—This government has no moral ground to stand on. Its ministers, advisors etc. are criminals. The system of election has been corrupted by those in power to such an extent that it is essential for an independent machinery to be created for the holding of fresh elections. There would be no point in holding elections under the present electoral system.

TFT—Do you think that a national government should be formed at this stage?

IAR—I think if all the parties take their prejudices, partisan interests and greed and then form a national government it will fail. But if a national consensus is developed first on democratic priorities, then a national government can prove useful. And by national consensus I mean you have to democratise the Constitution to permit the proper functioning of parliamentary democracy.

#### Sindh: Situation Viewed, Lessons Learned

##### Sindhi Press Reviewed

92AS1348A Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English  
15 Jul 92 p 5

[Article by Dr. Azizur Rahman Bughio: "Scrutiny of Irregularities by Bureaucracy Essential"; quotation marks as published]

[Text] A popular Sindhi daily JAGO (12/7) has, editorially, supported Senator and former Sindh Assembly Speaker, Syed Abdullah Shah's demand for a legal scrutiny of all misdeeds and irregularities committed by the bureaucracy in Sindh on the instigation and encouragement of MQM [Mohajir Qaumi Movement] which, according to the paper, fall in another category of terrorism undertaken to play havoc with administrative

and financial discipline to benefit a particular ethnic group at the peril of another. Exposure of MQM is necessary to have complete view of the harm caused by the group under the cover of politics.

The importance of this issue has cropped up, in view of the rulers' search for 'sober elements' in the Mohajir Qaumi Movement which the daily considers as a very dangerous indication.

The paper observes: "This indication has a background which sounds to be under a future planning. The Punjab has been successful from the very beginning in keeping away the Urdu-speaking population in Sindh, from the struggle of Sindhis for their awareness, interests and democratic rights."

This is obvious from the apathy and opposition demonstrated by the Urdu-speaking people right from Sindhi movement against One Unit to the issue of construction of Kalabagh Dam, including the late Bhutto's period and Zia regime in between, argues the paper.

According to the paper, "Sindhis received bullets and had their heads broken during One Unit Movement but the Urdu population kept on chewing pan [beetle leaf]. Sindhis, for the first time, got a government in name, under Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto but these people rose, with 'dandas', against it, resting only when Bhutto was hanged." Similarly unhelpful was their attitude during a movement against dictator General Ziaul Haq, thinks the paper.

The paper adds, "They saw Sindhi's movement against Kalabagh Dam in a manner, as they drank water from a river flowing from space instead of the River Indus." They prefer jobs going to outsiders rather than to Sindhis, alleges the paper. "All this continued to happen under the alliance of Punjab's narrow-minded, anti-democracy and vested interests group, from which they also received a share of benefits.

Now the search for 'sober elements' in fact, is a preparation of continuing that filthy alliance. This is not only anti-Sindh but also anti-Pakistan attitude on which the rulers seem to be determined, because it is on that instigation and backing that the leadership of Urdu population does not allow Urdu-speaking people to come to terms with the Sindhis, thus feeding a blaze of fire of instability for Pakistan in Sindh, through hatred," complains the paper.

In conclusion, the paper demands the entire affair of MQM to be entrusted to a commission comprised of Supreme Court Judges to minutely examine what this ethnic group is accused of in terms of all kinds of terrorism.

#### **PPP Blocking Condemned**

92ASI348B Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English  
17 Jul 92 p 6

[Editorial: "Before, During and After the Sindh Assembly Session"]

[Text] It is such a pity that the two-day session of the Sindh provincial Legislative Assembly was not televised. We certainly have missed a great deal of action: noise and fury signifying little except our nearly total lack of political manners. So whatever happened, or was resolutely prevented from happening, is more or less known, by now, to those who would care to know. What remains of greater interest is what happened before the Sindh Legislative Assembly actually met, and what is now happening and going to happen for some time. The status of the resignation of the Speaker remains obscure. The same has to be said about the resignations of the MQM [Mohajir Qaumi Movement] members of the Assembly. There is absolutely no reason why these issues should not be crystal clear. The moment a letter of resignation, written by hand by the person resigning is received by the competent authority under the rules, it must be passed on to the Chief Election Commissioner for further action. A resignation letter is like the proverbial arrow shot out of the bow: The confusion over the resignations, that of the Speaker and the MQM MPAs [Member of Provincial Assembly] is a deliberate distortion of the rules and the whole rumpus is mala fide. Even if it is argued that the letter of the relevant rules has been conformed to, the spirit has been not only violated but nearly vandalised. This leaves the Muzaffar Shah government and its supporters in a poor light. That a person of Mr. Shah's education and refinement should have succumbed to such petty-fogging politics cannot be deplored too strongly.

What is happening now? The Assembly has been pro-rogued in a huff. It transacted no business beyond a demonstration of frustration and frayed nerves all over. There evidently was more action behind the facade of the actual assembly sitting. Where are the missing MQM MPAs? What are they doing? Or, perhaps more interesting, what is being done to them? One report from Karachi speaks of the police busy combing those localities where the MQM strongholds are supposed to be. They are mostly lower middle class districts of Karachi. Reports rife suggest that the police is under orders to locate the unavailable MQM-walas. It doesn't take much argument to establish that if this version of the police activity is correct, the government of Mr. Muzaffar Shah is out to get the wayward MQM partners of his government back among his troops. And also evident is their reluctance to do so. What our politicians in power do to bring the estranged supporters round is now fairly common knowledge. You start with gifts (the going term for bribe) and if that doesn't work then the police takes over. And one can rest assured that the officers know their job. They are almost certain to deliver. From what one can see and surmise, much friendly persuasion is in progress. The name of the game is horse-trading.

Is Syed Muzaffar Shah alone in the game? Hardly. Mr. Shah is actually on assignment from Islamabad. He lands in Islamabad quite frequently and unexpectedly—to receive instructions. For the man in Karachi, it is the same task which was first given to the late Jam Sadiq Ali.

## POLITICAL

In plain terms the exercise has only one purpose: keep the PPP [Pakistan People's Party] out, whatever the means or cost in terms of anything, not excluding distortion of the political process. Mr. Shah is doing that and thereby staying the Chief Minister of the province. This determination to block the PPP represents the wish and objective not so much of Mr. Shah as of his lords and masters in the federal capital. This factor is no longer hidden from the public eye. It is hardly likely at any stage to enhance the credibility of the Nawaz Sharif government. It is wholly counterproductive. Even dangerous. All attempts at suppression of political forces backed by popular support end up in failure. The mistreatment meted out to both the PPP and MQM now is more likely to drive the more restive among their ranks into well organised and angry underground activity. Only the very short-sighted and selfish political leaders would take the risk and imperil further the peace prospects in Sindh.

### Pressure for Change Increases

92AS1348C Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English  
18 Jul 92 p 5

[Article by Dr. Azizur Rahman Bughio: "Increasing Pressure for Change"; quotation marks as published]

[Text] Although, apparently, various topics have been editorially raised by the Sindhi press, during the last couple of days, the thrust made again, centres round the question as to what would happen of Sindh in the context of what appear to be unsurmountable problems confronting the province. Vital among the issues discussed include political situation, influx of outsiders in Sindh, distribution of state lands in Katcha (area on both sides of River Indus) and raid on the house of Sindh's eminent poet, Shaikh Ayaz.

As usual, the popular daily JAGO has talked more and in wider perspective with queries worthy of notice and response. In its issue dated 16 July 1992, JAGO feels that the army operation in Sindh carries more objectives on its agenda than meets an eye, including clearance of mess created by different martial law regimes and President Ishaq Khan's decision of 6 August 1990 pushing the country to unnecessary uncertainties. "That is the reason why cracks have appeared in the confidence of martial law remnants and Chaudhry Nisar and Wyne are crying hoars against what would spoil their plans and have felt the pain caused by the 'danda' on MQM [Mohajir Quami Movement]," argues the paper.

In this connection, the paper has referred to the implications of the controversy arising out from the stands taken by Ch Nisar Ali Khan and former COAS [Chief of Army Staff] Gen. Beg on the issue of MQM, down to the present music faced by Syed Muzaffar Hussain Shah "who, if speaks to PDA [Peoples' Democratic Alliance], as sounded by the army authorities, will be failing in his faithfulness to Islamabad."

The paper observes: "In totality, we see a clear shape emerging and it is that Mian Nawaz Sharif and President

Ishaq's strategy is under increasing pressure for a change and instead of understanding and identifying the pulse of the conditions with old methods, they are resisting in an out-dated manner. When the appropriate action needed is that they should themselves be partners in the process of change."

The paper also mentions the threatened resignations by PDA legislators and the President's reported talks with NWFP [North-West Frontier Province] Chief Minister Afzal Khan and Maulana Kausar Niazi, for a possible way-out and predicts that if the present rulers did not change appropriately and that too in time, they might be rendered irrelevant in the swiftly changing situation.

Commenting on the sectarian bloody incident in Peshawar and feeling ashamed of it, the JAGO (15/7) opines that "nothing in Pakistan is settled finally. Neither religion, nor politics, nor democracy, nor justice nor law. It is a bloody jungle whose animals have gone mad, eager to bite each other." The paper, in this connection, refers to the shameless doings of 'Marwats' as narrated by the English magazine THE NEWSLINE recently and the meaningless politics pursued in this country and thinks that most-troubled and tortured in this system are those individuals who, because of nobility and virtues are misfit in it. According to the paper, in no country of the world, will this level of degradation and moral bankruptcy be found as is rampant in Pakistan today.

The paper says that the 'concerned ruling clique' fails to feel for the people because they do not see eye to eye with the manner the rulers are conducting the country's affairs. "All arguments of country's existence and justification are losing their importance and despite this by closing all entrances to good things and concealing keys, they (rulers) have become so obstinate that they look absolutely mad," alleges the paper. The paper prays to Allah "to deliver the people from state conspiracies and restore their right to rule."

The daily KAWISH (16/7) referring to the Chief Minister Muzaffar Shah's assurance to weed out criminal elements from his cabinet given in his recent interview to the paper, draws his attention to the misdeeds of Irfanullah Marwat as disclosed by THE NEWSLINE and waits for the day when Mr. Shah acts on his pledge to the people. The paper complains that Sindh has suffered and sacrificed in an indescribable manner from the very inception of Pakistan, climaxed during the days of Jam Sadiq Ali with aides like Marwats. No words can condemn the tyranny inflicted on Sindh by these so-called guardians of law and order, alleges the paper.

The Awami Awaz (16/7) is critical of the raid of law enforcement agencies on Sindhi poet Shaikh Ayaz's Sukkur house and procuring objectionable material. According to the paper, Shaikh Ayaz is a popular poet and highly respected man and any excess done to him will create wide repercussions throughout Sindh. On the reported confiscation of his books, the paper feels reminded of the Tando Bahawal incident in which an

attempt was made to accuse the innocent villagers of being Indian agents and of subversion. The paper says that allegation of subversive literature with Shaikh Ayaz is tantamount to calling the entire Sindhi people as traitors. The paper, therefore, demands a judicial probe into the raid on Ayaz's house.

A continued and unhindered influx of outsiders into Sindh has caused concern to the HILAL-I-PAKISTAN (14/7) which in the opinion of the daily began with the establishment of Pakistan. At the beginning, Sindhis formed 80 per cent population in the province which reduced to 52 per cent in 1980, says the paper. This, obviously, is a serious threat of being reduced in one's own province. Analysing the problem, the paper feels that Karachi being the capital of the new country, attracted all incoming people from India with heavy concentration in all cities and towns and during One Unit period, many people from Punjab and NWFP were settled on new lands commanded by Ghulam Mohammad Barrage. Later, people from Afghanistan, Bengal, Burma, India, Iran and Sri Lanka came to Karachi in great numbers with MQM [Mohajir Qaumi Movement] making every effort to increase its population on political grounds.

Referring to Sindh's sacrifices and role played for creation of Pakistan, the paper argues that "situation would have been different if the people of Sindh had known that they would be faced with more horrible exploitation, on the departure of Hindus."

Appreciating the plan of the Army Operation to distribute Katcha state lands among the landless Haris in Sindh, the JAGO (14/7) fears that these might be given to non-Sindhis on the pretext that such a step would prove more effective to root out the dacoit factor for ever. Another danger, in the view of the paper, is that such a thinking might justify replacement of the old with new i.e. "the creation of the impression that both the local government and the society have lost qualities to conduct themselves." This, the paper, considers as dangerous development which in fact is the result of unrepresentative governments for a long period of time.

The paper, therefore, demands postponement of the issue of distribution of these lands to the next truly representative government on the basis of free and fair elections, in the country.

#### Administrative Faults Probed

92AS1348D Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English  
18 Jul 92 p 6

[Editorial: "And Now, Some Lessons From Sindh"]

[Text] Latest reports from the interior of Sindh province, though few and far between, carry hints to suggest that the law and order situation in some places may be moving towards stability. Some good news the country has been waiting for with bated breath. It is of course too

soon to call for any celebration. But just enough to breathe a sigh of some little relief. For years, Sindh has been in a state of appalling unrest. The architect of Sindh's present trauma was, without any doubt, late Gen. Zia. He could not think of Sindh as the soil from where would rise the hand of nemesis to bring him down. It is not given to mortals to cure another man's heart-aches and the pangs of a lacerated soul. What the subsequent administrations at the federal level—first the PPP [Pakistan People's Party] headed by Ms. Benazir Bhutto and now the IJI [Islami Jamhoori Ittehad] coalition headed by Mr. Nawaz Sharif—did to Sindh was destined to further complicate Sindh's problems. Ms. Bhutto's handling of Sindh was far from unbiased or far-sighted. She could not rise above her mind blocks. The physician needed to cure herself first. She didn't. The patient only got worse under the ministrations of a physician who failed to make the proper diagnosis. The Nawaz Sharif government brought back the Zia syndrome to Sindh. Putting the late Jam Sadiq Ali on top of Sindh with instructions to trounce the PPP at any price was a piece of political immorality which history is unlikely to forgive. Up to now, one must say that before the Jam could be denounced, the target of criticism should be those whose chestnuts that half lunatic and half paralytic agent was trying to rescue from the flame of Sindh's raging fires. As far as Sindh's problems are concerned, barring the ones which are a hang-over of centuries of history, Ms. Benazir is blameworthy as indeed is Mr. Nawaz Sharif. The difference between the errors of the two must not be lost sight of, however. Ms. Benazir acted to the detriment of Sindh but only an unwise well-wisher, Mr. Nawaz Sharif doesn't seem entitled to this qualification. What the third protagonist in this sad play, the present Chief Minister Muzaffar Shah, can be accused of is simply that the task is just too complicated and risky for his meagre resources of head, heart and political stature.

From what little news has begun to trickle through, it seems that the army is coming to grips with the task unfairly assigned to it. Inept civilian governments make a hash of their situations and then call in the army to bring things under control. That's just what happened in Peshawar the other day. This frequent display of helplessness by civil administration needs to be seriously looked into. From an amateur's point of view, this phenomenon has become endemic in Pakistan because respect for law has been diminishing, not because of the odd law-breaker but because of the malfeasance of government in power. If the police is to abuse, to harass or eliminate lawful political opposition, it would soon cease to be a force to act in support of law and protection of order. It is no longer a matter of any doubt that police forces in all provinces have long since ceased to be instruments of law. On the contrary, organised law-breaking and lawlessness is now the chief occupation of police forces in all provinces. And all this with not only the knowledge but on the bidding of the governments. More or less the same abuse is now giving an unenviable name to security agencies. While we put the army to

quell civil commotion, we ought to address the vitally important task of ridding the police of its shortcomings and restoring it to the position it ought to have in society—as protectors of the victims of the law-breakers and anti-social elements. Today, a man wronged is more afraid of the man in police uniform than the criminal

whose victim he knows he is. The police is no longer police. More often it is the outlaw's accomplice. How sad. But it is not the police which is at fault. It is the government at the centre as well as in the provinces. When you have rulers like Jam Sadiq Ali, how do you expect the police to protect you against the brigand?

## Escalating Sectarian Violence Viewed, Analyzed

### TNFJ Leader Interviewed

92AS1315A Lahore THE NATION in English 10 Jul 92  
pp 6-7

[Interview with Allama Sajid Ali Naqvi by Shadab Ahmed; place and date not given: "Sectarian Issues Must Be Solved Through Dialogue"; italicized words as published]

[Text] Allama Sajid Ali Naqvi is among the most prominent leaders of our national life. Heading the Tehrik-i-Nifaz-i-Fiqh-i-Jafria [TNFJ], he is also among the main leaders of the Opposition alliance—the Pakistan Democratic Alliance (PDA). Yet he leads a simple life away from the ostentations and pretensions. He is also quite humble in his statements and when asked to speak, utters simple phrases without any exaggeration or offence.

He usually stays in a well-guarded office of the TNFJ in a small Satellite Townhouse in Rawalpindi. Sitting on floor carpet and reclining against cushions in a typical traditional style, the Allama comments on all the issues with remarkable eloquence and intellectual ability. He talked to THE NATION with a subdued passionate voice on the ills of our socio-political structure as well as the needs for building a progressive, Islamic society in Pakistan. Excerpts from the interview:

**Q: How do you view the current wave of sectarian violence?**

A: It is a continuation of the sectarian unrest which was unleashed upon the people of Pakistan by the rulers to protect their own interests. The situation will continue to deteriorate unless the law-enforcing agencies realise their duty to protect the citizens. Anti-peace slogans are written on street walls during the night and Shiites are blatantly harassed but none of the men in power show any concern. They think that there is no need to take any action.

**Q: But breach of law and lack of accountability is everywhere. Don't you think in present circumstances for asking protection for your community's rights from the government is too much to expect?**

A: We can defend ourselves quite well and so can they. But resorting to such anarchistic solutions is none of the ways the TNFJ has ever followed. Governments frame laws and they have the power as well as the capacity to ensure the rule of the law. So, we will first of all look towards them to come and protect our basic rights. We are prepared to defend ourselves but we will not allow any disturbance to ruin the peace of the people and integrity of the country.

Due to such sectarian hatred and violence, governments got toppled and states disintegrated—this is our history, history of the Muslim people. But what is the use when we know that the dispute is a creation of some base and mean minds. After all for centuries Shiites and Sunnis

have been living quite peacefully and in an atmosphere of mutual respect for each others values, rituals and rites.

**Q: Recently some Sunni sects have demanded that the processions and activities of the Shiite community must be restricted to their religious places only and they should not be allowed to come out in the public places?**

A: It is insane to demand such restrictions on human freedom. Some sectarian elements who do not care about the repercussions of their utterances give such statements to satisfy their whims. I have a right to observe the Marasim and rituals of my system of beliefs according to my wishes and it is the duty of the law enforcing agencies to give me protection. It is their responsibility and they should not shrink from it though we are also clear on the point that our successive governments have been trying to protect their rule only and adhocism has been the main trait of all the rulers.

**Q: What in your opinion is the real solution of the sectarian conflicts in Pakistan?**

A: We believe that various interpretations of the Holy Quran and Sunnah are the source of dispute among Muslims in our country. The recognised interpretation of Holy Quran and Sunnah which is acceptable to all the main Muslim sects should be enforced. The majority of Sunni ulema do not regard our interpretation as untrue (Batil). We think that a consensus on the establishment of an Islamic order can be achieved if the differences among the ulema themselves and the traditionalists on the one hand and the enlightened people on the other are removed which can be achieved through dialogue. An understanding on all the issues is possible and even the frivolous disputes among the sectarian-minded ulema can be resolved if an atmosphere of understanding is created through dialogue.

**Q: What is required to initiate such a dialogue?**

A: I think *Ijtehad* [independent judgment] is a must to open such a dialogue. Space and time are two important elements and we can not hope to begin reviewing our religious opinions unless we take these two elements into consideration. It is only through the process of *Ijtehad* that the dispute between the conservatives and the enlightened people can be resolved.

In our talks about the Islamic system we should focus on general laws and sectarian views should be put aside. It should be up to each sect's will to exercise its own rules and observe its rituals, but the main evils such as bribery, corruption and undue use of authority or interest on capital are the things on which two opinions are not possible. Everyone wants to eliminate these evils therefore they should be eliminated without delay.

It is the basic thing and rest of the things can be decided by representatives of the people later on and gradually.

**Q: How will you solve the problem of *Figh* [Islamic jurisprudence].**

## ISLAMIC AFFAIRS

A: I say leave that aside for the moment. Pakistan was not created on the basis of *Fiqh*. The followers of one *Fiqh* must not be allowed to dominate the followers of another *Fiqh*.

Pakistan was created for the sake of Islam and we must concentrate on that only. Suppressing the rights of any section of people will not lead us anywhere. It will only increase resentment and bitterness.

**Q: Ms. Bhutto has been talking of a new social contract. She thinks only a new social contract can solve our present problems and the rest of the proposed solutions are just an exercise in futility. What is your opinion on the subject?**

A: We believe that restoration of the 1973 Constitution in its original form would do the same and we will be saved from a lot of useless effort.

**Q: How do you view the politics of alliances as it has been in practice in the country for a long time now?**

A: I think it is good to unitedly fight on issues because it is more effective but the unfortunate thing is that after reaching the mansions of power, the main ruling party parts its ways from the allies and tends to establish an exclusive rule. This is unfortunate because united we can achieve larger goals.

The TNFJ party instead of entering into a sectarian politics devised a straight political role and during the MRD [Movement for the Restoration of Democracy] years offered maximum number of sacrifices. It is a recorded fact that TNFJ paid the highest price for the restoration of democracy in Pakistan. Still we were almost completely ignored when the democratic order was restored to some extent.

**Q: You had announced that the TNFJ will be reorganised. What happened to that plan?**

A: A lot of work in that direction has been done already and some little details are to be decided upon. Soon it will be done. The delay came mainly because of my engagement with other things. First I was in Beirut and then came this sectarian tension and then recently I was away for Haj.

However, now I have time to concentrate on the reorganisation plan. Soon you will hear details of the programme.

**Q: It is often maintained by way of allegation that Shiite leaders in Pakistan are Iran-sponsored. What is the truth?**

A: This is absolutely false accusation. We have had absolutely independent position on the issues and our opposition to Zia regime is a most vivid example of our independence from Tehran's positions. The government of Iran was supporting Ziaul Haq's Martial Law regime while we opposed it tooth and nail. There are other examples also but this one should suffice.

We believe that the situation in Pakistan has its own dynamics and the peculiar characteristics of its culture demand indigenous analysis and action. We don't believe in borrowing of ideas or action plans. However, we think that Iran has provided us with examples in many areas and we can learn from their experience in many fields. Just the way we can learn from other Muslim countries, we can learn from Iran. More from Iran because they have come out with innovative answers to many questions and their unique experiences make them a very precious model. But of course they had their own set of problems, difficulties and opportunities. Pakistan has a different situation and our problems are also different in nature.

**Q: The kind of hardships Iranian people have gone through during the post-revolution period to maintain their freedom and revolutionary truth were perhaps unavoidable. Do you foresee similar hardships if Pakistan tries to assert similar radical positions?**

A: There are many misunderstandings in the minds of the enlightened people as far as the Islamic order is concerned. I have no doubts in my mind that Pakistan is the fort of Islam and the situation here is quite different one.

There are peculiarities of each situation and these must be taken care of differently in each country. Pakistan has a rich cultural heritage and we can not do away with it in any way. The issue of Hijab or Purdah for example is one such thing. During a recent visit to Middle Eastern and Gulf states I found that our Shalwar-Kameez dress was becoming popular in those countries and people like it. Recently a senior Iranian leader, during his visit to Pakistan, also expressed admiration for the dress.

No they raise controversies about what sort of Burqa a woman should put on to appear completely dressed in an Islamic way but I can not support such debates. These are useless exercises. We must also consider which of our traditions best help us in changing for betterment and which of the traditions are dead ones. It would be pointless to coerce upon people those traditions which are no longer alive.

**Q: Recently TNFJ had reached an agreement with Pakistan Awami Tehrik [PAT] and its Chairman Allama Tahirul Qadri was very optimistic about a working relationship. But now we don't hear of any collaboration between your organisation and the PAT. Why?**

A: We had concluded an unprecedented deal. This was first-ever written agreement on sectarian disputes in the entire history of the Sub-continent. However, due to narrow-minded policies of some biased mullahs the alliance of the two important organisations could not bear any practical results. It was unfortunate and indicative of sectarian prejudices.

**Foreign Involvement Likely**

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[Article by Zafar Samdani: "Sectarianism: More Than What Meets the Eye"; quotation marks as published]

[Text] In the early sixties a clash took place in Lahore on the 10th of Muharram which sent shivers down the city's spine. As mourners and others fought each other on that hot and humid afternoon in the city, news quickly spread around that scores of people had been killed and hundreds injured. Tension gripped Lahore. It was so concrete one could touch it only to pull back the hand as if it had received an electric shock.

By the time dust settled down, reporters covering the event, which was originally the 10th of Muharram procession had seen and learnt enough to realise that the details of the clash were less horrifying than rumour had them. Two persons had been killed - not that two lives lost in such a situation is not tragic; it nevertheless indicated the extent of the people's aberration and diluted the first impression and relieved tension and antagonism.

An enquiry was instituted which continued its investigations for about a fortnight, the committee members thoroughly looking into all aspects of the ugly episode. It transpired that labelling the clash as sectarian wasn't exactly correct. Trouble was triggered by a long-standing rivalry between two individuals, both reportedly of dubious reputations, who decided to use the occasion to even up old score. Once they started trouble it quickly engulfed everything like wild fire; a stone was thrown and soon there was a barrage. Mass hysteria took over everyone, the processionists and the rest, the former convinced that an attempt had been made to injure their feelings. All segments were in fact reacting to what was seen as an offence and it developed into a clash, a bloody one indeed; two deaths and injuries to a large number of people is not a small matter. In the end, it was established that sectarian colour was given to the event because of the day of its occurrence. The enquiry report ruled out sectarian differences as the motive of the clash after witnesses had revealed facts.

For days, however, a majority of people in the city would not accept the findings of the Enquiry Committee, clinging to the version they had first heard, credibility of the government being low even then though not so comprehensively sunk as it is today. Newspaper reports were dubbed as command performance and conclusions of the committee as an effort to produce agreed conclusions, conclusions contrary to facts. But reality soon dawned on people who realised that dead bodies had not been removed by police or other officials of the government to escape adverse public opinion (which mattered till then). Death count, it was reluctantly admitted, was not so large as earlier believed. Relief replaced tension, amity was exchanged for antagonism.

Years later (1985), I was in Parachinar following reports of an extremely bloody sectarian conflict which had already continued for some days. Mountains in the rugged tribal region stood bathed in blood because of sectarianism, reports said. Curfew was imposed in the area in the wake of widespread fighting among tribesmen taking a heavy toll of life from both Sunni and Shia segments. From a distance, it looked a very explosive situation, one that could blow the mountains to bits. Things looked all the more grim because it wasn't the first eruption of violence of a sectarian nature in an area both stark and strikingly beautiful, it's people simple and straight-forward, committed to a value system of honour, their integrity concrete like the rocks in the midst of which they lived. This part of the tribal area bordered Afghanistan, its grey heights forming the boundary between Pakistan and Afghanistan, proving protection to people from invaders and arms storage facilities to some of the Afghan resistance fighters. Barring 'sectarian' fighting and presence of resistance elements, tranquillity was the title of the terrain.

Most reports had presented Parachinar as a hotbed of sectarian strife, marked by an unbridgeable divide deepened by sporadic fighting and killings which compounded life in the context of tribal pursuit of vendetta. Parachinar had seemed poised for casting dark shadow over adjacent areas, the whole of North-West Frontier Province [NWFP] if not the entire country. Differences between Sunni and Shia members of the society, not unknown to the rest of the country, had been reported from some areas of NWFP too. They had carried on ominous ring. Trouble seemed to be heading towards a wider territory.

Three days in Parachinar revealed an essentially different backdrop. There had been fighting between members of the two sects but strictly speaking, it wasn't motivated by sectarian bigotry. The confrontation was basically between tribes which is nothing new to the area or its people. It so happened that on the one side were Sunni tribes and Shias on the other. Sects to which clashing tribes belonged were incidental to their rivalry which had been practised for more than one generation if not for a longer period of time; it had dated to time when sectarianism had not been subjected to the present day interpretation or seen in contemporary dimensions. Elsewhere in NWFP similar tribal scenarios were being played out all the time but as warring tribesmen represented the same sect, fighting and bloodshed were not considered subjects for national or international focus. Such fighting is still to be seen in NWFP and the tribal belt and is never an occasion for raising of eyebrows. Admittedly, other factors also featured in Parachinar, such as the fall-out from the Afghanistan conflict but by and large it was typical tribal landscape. Parachinar came to be presented as sectarian because of a lack of insight and hasty evaluation, possibly because other people in other parts of the world wished it so.

Not all on the sectarian front has, however, been a case of misrepresentation, particularly the more recent developments. Blood has certainly flowed down sectarian streams during the last half a decade or so. Murders of some religious leaders presumably took place because of the sect they represented. Victims were chosen for their beliefs. To this extent, some recent killing did involve shedding of blood on a sectarian basis. Even so these murderers should not be treated as incontrovertible evidence for the existence of such sectarian hatred that can only be satisfied by bloodletting, by members of communities killing each other. There certainly is more than what appears before the eye. The picture reveals motives too.

There appears a plan to the murders. Firstly, some of them were committed when the month of Muharram was drawing near. Then the fact that religious leaders from both sides have been killed suggests more than mere differences. Disagreements have been systematically fanned to grow into a fire. Gilgit is a quiet place yet sectarianism has reached there. Lahore has lived in an atmosphere of amity with non-Muslim populations in the pre-independence period and for nearly five decades since then. The only incident of a sectarian nature had its origins in another scene. This is true of the rest of Pakistan no less except for Jhang.

But Jhang's problem needs to be looked into with a view to finding out the actual malaise. It is to be doubted if clashes in that poverty-plagued place is rooted in beliefs. There is likelihood that origins of the conflict are other than the identified ones. At the back could well be, at least as the original source, the local populations' resentment of feudalism. Like Parachinar, it so happens that feudals are from one sect and a considerable percentage of population from another. That aspect should not be ignored.

There also is every chance of foreign involvement. Just look at the world map. Ethnicity is on the rise because it is receiving external support. It has already led to the break up of an empire though it wasn't the only factor responsible for the demise of the Soviet Union. But it was an important reason. East Europe too has been similarly hit, mostly by storms, in one or two places by a design for disintegration. Religious differences have also developed into bloody confrontations. Members of Sunni and Shia sects have been fighting each other in more than one Muslim country and those who do not have such potential for self-destruction stand troubled by liberal and fundamentalist forces refusing to live with each other, the antagonists are determined to destroy each other. The issue of sectarianism in Pakistan. Thus need to be viewed in a wider context, not just confined to narrow sectarian confines. [sentences as published] This is, of course, the easy exit for ineffective intelligence agencies travelling by short cuts and an unintelligent administration concerned only with its survival. But tilting some of the developments as sectarian is a

national disservice because wrong diagnosis and administering unsuitable prescription could turn into a fatal disease which is no more than a minor ailment at the moment.

### Ethnic Conflict Growing

92AS1315C Lahore *THE NATION* in English 15 Jul 92  
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[Article by Mohammad Yaqoob Bajwa: "The Menace of Ethnicity"; italicized words as published]

[Text] The recent happenings and discoveries reported in the Press about the MQM [Mohajir Qaumi Movement], after start of the Army operation, have sent shocking shudders down the spines of patriot Pakistanis. The MQM leadership deny that they are an ethnic group and are in any way working against Pakistan. They at one time announced their intention to replace the word *mohajir* with *mutihida* to make MQM stand for Muthida Qaumi Movement but obviously it was not their objective. Recent Press reports show that they planned to establish a Hong Kong type of city state at Karachi with its surrounding areas. The word *mohajir* was used by the MQM for the Urdu-speaking people, whose fathers or forefathers originally hailed from UP [Uttar Pradesh] and Behar and not for all *mohajirs* who migrated from India in the wake of the Partition.

The claim of the MQM leadership that they were not an ethnic group now stand debunked. An ethnic minority is a group of people who differ in, language, race, colour, or in religion or cultural origin, from the dominant group, usually the majority population of the country in which they live. The differing identity of an ethnic minority may be displayed in a number of ways, ranging from distinctive customs, lifestyles, speaking accents, dress or food preferences, etc.

Ethnic minorities exist almost throughout the world. It is estimated that one quarter of the world population belongs to some kind of ethnic minority. Often the ethnic minorities are discriminated against by members of the dominant group. A frequent by-product of minority group status is the emergence of ethnocentrism. If the minority group is not made to feel particularly welcome in its new environment, it is likely to fall back on its own culture, language, and customs as a means of psychological self-defence.

All large countries suffer from some problem of ethnicity. In the United States, ethnic minorities constitute 29 percent of the population and the recent race riots merely indicate the extent of the poignancy of the problem. In Canada, the ethnic population is 45 percent. South Africa presents a queer picture. The 20 percent white minority has subjugated 80 percent black majority and has thus made the latter ethnic. Nearer home, there are more than a dozen ethnic minorities in India and some of them Sikhs, Mizos, Tamils, Nagas, etc., are exerting ethnocentrism. Pakistan being a large country provides no exception. The MQM is just one manifestation of

ethnicity; there are many others. The important point is whether the nation recognises the reality and takes steps for assimilation and integration of the ethnic groups in the mainstream of national life so that they do not feel any threat to their interests and play their part for the greater good of all the people.

Unfortunate, reality is that the Pakistani politic-religious landscape presents a bizarre scene of some forms of ethnicity, though many of us including the leadership may not admit it. With the exception of the Muslim League, the Peoples Party, the NPP [National People's Party] and perhaps Jama'at-i-Islami, (because it too is selective in recruitment of its members) all other political parties or groups are ethnic in one sense of another, to a greater or lesser extent. Khan Abdul Wali Khan, veteran leader of the ANP [Awami National Party], projects himself as a Pathan leader. Jamiat Ulema-i-Pakistan draws its inspiration from the Brelvi school. The Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam is based on the Deoband school of thought. The Jamiat Ahle Hadith, the Jamiatul Mushaikh, the Jamiat Ahle Sunnat-wal-Jama'at (which becomes active only at the time of elections), Tehrik-Nifaz-i-Fiqah-Jafaria (which has not clarified whether it wants to impose Fiqah Jafaria on one digit percentage—population of its followers or the whole of the country), all represent or emphasis some aspects of Islam. The latest addition is Anjuman Sipah-i-Sahaba. There are regional and linguistic political parties like the Balochistan National Movement, the PNP [Pakistan National Party], the Jamhoori Watan Party, the Pakhtoon Khawa Milli and other which cater only to specific political interests in certain geographical pockets. Different versions of the Jeay Sindh Movement make no secret about their ethnic inclinations.

Altaf Hussain, the MQM founder, in a PTV interview said that he was basically motivated to start the movement because he found that the *mohajirs* (of his own version) were not getting just and fair treatment. Whether launching of the MQM was motivated by this sentiment or by the then Martial Law regime, as a countervailing force against the nationalists of Jeay Sindh (as claimed by some Senators in the debate in the Senate) is not important anymore.

As mentioned earlier, the MQM does not accept people other than those from the UP and Behar as *mohajirs*. It is an undeniable fact that the majority of the people of Karachi are constituted by original Sindhis, and migrants from Gujarat, Kathiawar, Bombay, Hyderabad State, other parts of the Southern India, East Punjab, as well as Pakistani Punjab, NWFP [North-West Frontier Province] and Balochistan. Hundreds and thousands of Sindhi, Balochi and Punjabi families speak as good Urdu as the people of UP and Behar. Speaking of Urdu alone is not the criterion of making any one a *mohajir*.

Bulk of the refugees from India settled in the Punjab. Some also settled in parts of NWFP and Balochistan, particularly the bigger urban centres of Peshawar, Quetta, etc. All Urdu and non-Urdu speaking *mohajirs*

were assimilated in these areas. The offspring of these *mohajirs* speak local languages and wear shalwarqameez like the indigenous people. The narrow pyjama and gharara, signs of UP dress, are almost extinct in these areas. The integration took place mainly because of dispersal of population. But in Karachi and partly in Hyderabad, the position remained different because of concentration of population of the so-called *mohajirs*.

Nothing is wrong with ethnicity per se. People from the same area or speaking the same language are bound to have affinity and sympathy with each other. It is its manifestation in the form of ethnocentrism backed up by militarism and terrorism, as has happened in Pakistan, which is dangerous for the body politic. Following the MQM, the other political parties and groups came up with their own private armies. None of them, however, except the PPP [Pakistan People's Party] could resist the MQM and bloody encounters and abductions started to take place among them. An exchange of prisoners between the MQM and the PPP reportedly took place when the present Chief of the Army Staff was GOC [General Commanding Officer] Karachi in 1990. The MQM did not allow the *mohajirs*, particularly those from Punjab and NWFP to be registered as voters after the mid eighties. This fact coupled with their militarism and terrorism explains the abnormal proportion of votes (some times going up to more than 20 times of those of their rivals) scored by them in 1988 and 1990 elections even when majority of the population was comprised of the so-called non-*mohajirs*. With the domination of Karachi by the MQM, the Sindhis naturally feel frustrated. They have become alien within their own provincial metropolis.

The matter cannot end just with a lamentation or criticism. The people of Pakistan whether they are *mohajirs*, non-*mohajirs* or locals are to be considered loyal citizens of this country, unless otherwise proved. They have every right to stay here and to participate as respectable and honourable citizens in all walks of life. They must get justice and their legitimate rights must be protected. The MQM problem or manifestations of this type cannot just be handled through law and order measures. Their leadership may be misguided but all the *mohajirs* cannot be disloyal to Pakistan and need to be treated as such. The first priority of the government should be national integration. Apart from legal and constitutional measures, political parties have to play a vital role. The major political parties must immediately open up dialogue with the ethnic minorities and groups to find out ways of national integration, with due protection of legitimate and just rights of all the citizens, classes and regions. They must come up with a formula for setting the issue within the constitutional framework.

#### National Cancer

92AS1315D Lahore THE NATION in English 15 Jul 92  
p 8

[Editorial: "Sectarian Violence"]

[Text] The incident of sectarian violence in Peshawar, greatly disturbing as it is, needs much more than the

homilies being preached about the unity of the Ummah and needs a far more effective cure than the compensation for the dead and the wounded. It needs to be acknowledged now that it is a cancer planted by someone in the body of the nation a few years back, ostensibly in the name of Islam but in fact aimed at perpetuating a specific vested interest. It is futile now to identify those who were responsible for it and bemoan the shortsightedness of those who supported it. It is enough to say that the deed has been done with patently dishonest motives. And once done, it has acquired a lift of its own. The traditional rivalry which has now turned into fixed enmity, between two identifiable groups of opposite religious schools, was already known. It had already claimed many lives, elsewhere in the country. Curfews had been imposed to keep them apart. And yet on the day of the Ashura, there was little awareness in the local administration of how inflammable the situation was. There was a mosque belonging to one group of hardliners on the very route of the procession of the other group. No precaution was taken to keep the two apart. Even when the whole thing blew up, the administration stood like a helpless spectator. In the exchange of fire many were killed and wounded. The explanation offered by the administration that such a thing never happened before and therefore they feared no trouble, shows what imbeciles we had looking after law and order on that day. It was a grave lapse on their part and they should be made to pay for it. Yet it is obvious that such measures taken there or elsewhere are no solution. They do not address the core of the problem. The real problem is the split among the people on sectarian lines and it comes from the high profile given to such differences by some of the more influential people among us.

Doing so in a country where Muslims are not in a majority, would have made sense. It would be necessary for the identity and survival of the Ummah. But doing so in a country where the overwhelming majority of people are Muslims and where underplaying matters of faith could actually help healing of splits, such conduct can be fatal.

Without compromising on the basic principle of freedom to believe and freedom to practice the kind of faith that one prefers—as enshrined in the Constitution—wouldn't be wise to work for a national consensus in which none is allowed to flaunt either religion or a specific faith in the face of others. Islam is in no danger here. So why can't it be made obligatory on everyone not to talk or act, as if it is.

#### Clashes Detailed

92AS1315E Lahore THE NATION in English 14 Jul 92  
pp 1, 4

[Article: "11 Killed, Many Hurt in Sectarian Clashes"; italicized words as published]

[Text] Peshawar—For the first time in the history of provincial capital, Ashura concluded with the eruption

of sectarian clashes in which at least nine persons lost their lives and more than two dozen received injuries here on Sunday afternoon.

The armed clashes, which started at 5.45 pm, continued for several hours in the presence of heavy contingents of the police and Frontier Constabulary. Later, Army personnel also joined them in the midnight.

As per details, the bloody clashes erupted at 5.45 pm when the armed persons, allegedly affiliated with Anjuman-i-Sipahe Sahaba opened fire on the traditional Muharram procession when it was passing in front of Masjid Farooq-i-Azam at Kohati Gate. As a result of firing, nine persons were killed while 29 including three police constables received injuries.

There were conflicting reports, regarding opening of fire on the Muharram procession. It was stated that when the mourning procession reached near Farooq-i-Azam Mosque, the participants exchanged hot words with activists of Anjuman-i-Sipahe Sahaba [ASSP] present inside the mosque. In the meantime, some ASSP activists felted [as published] glasses on the mourners.

Another report says that some activists of the Anjuman-i-Sipahe Sahaba present in the mosque opened fire on the mourners when they allegedly abused them. A police Head Constable, who was eye-witness of the whole account, informed that firing was started by Maulana Fazal Ahmad and Shahid Noor from inside the mosque, while another eye-witness said that during the exchange of hot words between the two groups, a *jawan* of Frontier Constabulary [FC] has fired a shot which was followed by firing on the procession from inside the mosque.

It may be mentioned here that Kohati area, where a number of Imambaras and headquarters of the Anjuman-i-Sipahe Sahaba are situated is considered as the most tense area. On the eve of Ashura, heavy contingents of the police were assisted by *jawans* of Frontier Constabulary. Most of the policemen and *jawans* of FC including high-level civil and police officers lost the place when firing was opened on the mourners from the mosque. A policeman said that he was not authorised to open fire even for his own security.

After firing from inside the mosque, the mourners dispersed while some youngsters brought arms from the nearby houses. They opened fire on the mosque. Some of the youngsters allegedly entered the mosque and set ablaze the religious books including copies of the Holy Quran.

It was further stated that the mourners violated the accord which they had signed with the authorities regarding the passing of the procession beside Masjid Farooq-i-Azam. It was stated that they fixed the passing of the procession near the mosque at 6.30 pm while they reached at 5.45 pm at the time when the Anjuman-i-Sipahe Sahaba activists gathered for Asr pray. When

the activists of both the rival sects gathered in front of Masjid Farooq-i-Azam, they exchange hot words followed by fire-exchange. During the incident, the police apprehended 35 persons.

Those killed were Syed Yawar Hayat son of Syed Fayyaz of Kocha Risaldaran, Syed Saqlain Mehdi, son of Farman Ali of Mohallah Khudadad, Syed Mir Hussain Shah Zaidi of Kocha Risaldaran, Adil Shehzad of Faqirabad, Shakeel of Mohallah Jogan Shah, Naveed, son of Aziz Khan of Yakkatoot, and Nisar Ahmad, son of Abdul Ghani of Jehangirpura, Peshawar.

Amongst the injured the condition of five persons is precarious. A police constable Latif Khan who received bullet injury on his head was removed to Neuro-surgery block. Those admitted in Lady Reading Hospital included, Iftikhar Ali, son of Mukhtiar Ali, Aftab Hussain son of Kifayat Hussain, Murtaza, son of Qalb Abbas, Mohammad Iqbal, son of Mohammad Ashraf, Murad Bukhsh, son of Khuda Bukhsh, Syed Agha Hussain Shah, son of Syed Karam Hussain Shah, Amir Mohammad, son of Fauji Amir, Zakir Ullah, son of Khair Mohammad, Fazal Shah, Nawaz Khan, son of Nazir Khan, Suleman Shah, son of Muzammal Shah and police constables, Latif Khan, son of Mir Adam Khan and Ibadat Ali, son of Ashraf Ali. A large number of the injured included personnel of law-enforcing agencies who were discharged after provision of first-aid treatment.

#### Ban Against Sectarian Organizations

92AS1315F Lahore THE NATION in English 21 Jul 92  
p 7

[Article by Azidud Din Ahmad: "Organised Sectarianism in Pakistan"; italicized words, quotation marks as published]

[Text] The Shia community in Peshawar consists of a few thousand *kharis*, bilingual Pakhtuns, speaking Hindko and Pashto with equal facility and living inside the narrow-laned walled city. They have been taking out the Muharram procession for decades without any problem being faced by them. Many non-Shias would throng to see the chest-beating mourners, some with awe, others with amusement. While Shia-Sunni clashes took place in Dera Ismail Khan or Kurram Agency, the rest of the NWFP [North-West Frontier Province] and its capital city were known for sectarian harmony. Live political issues did not allow people to indulge in sectarianism.

Not this time anyway. Fierce battles took place last week in Peshawar when the Shia mourners' procession was fired at as it approached a Sunni mosque under the control of Anjuman-i-Sipah Sahaba [ASSP]. Subsequently armed men belonging to Shia and Sunni sects exchanged fire for three consecutive days. The toll: 16 dead and many more injured.

Whatever happened in Peshawar was not in any way spontaneous. It was a part of a larger enterprise undertaken by certain elements all over the country to pit the Shia and Sunni communities against each other. Part of the initiative has come from certain internal forces but influences working from outside the country have played a greater role in fanning a war that could split the Pakistani society, already sharply divided on ethnic issues, even further to the extent of leading it to a long and bloody civil war.

Clashes between Shias and Sunnis are not altogether a new phenomenon in Pakistan. But there is a marked difference between how they took place earlier and how they are being stage-managed now.

In the past initiative for rioting involving the two communities was always of a local nature; rivalry between maulvis belonging to the same area, or a stiff competition between two local influentials for a Union Council or an Assembly seat led them to appeal to sectarian sentiments with the result that clashes took place.

The situation changed during the Zia era, at the start of the eighties to be more precise. It was around this period that those in power created the MQM [Mohajir Qaumi Movement] in Sindh to make the *mohajirs* fight Sindhis, Punjabis and Pashtuns, while an organisation to divide the society irrevocably on sectarian lines was created in Punjab. The organisation was given the name Anjuman-i-Sipah Sahaba, or the Organisation of the Army of the Friends of the Prophet (PBHU). The simple one point programme of the Organisation was to rid the country of the Shias. Soon the slogan 'Shias are kafirs' was to appear on walls all over the country. Here was a party that had decided not to leave things to spontaneity. It was to launch a country-wide campaign against Shias. Its orators were to deliver fiery speeches against the other sect which were soon to be heard on tape recorders all over the country. It was to challenge them everywhere, and conduct a *Jihad* against them. The sectarian issue took a qualitatively different turn with the emergence of the ASSP. Shia-Sunni clashes were to be no more spontaneous or confined to a locality. They were to be organised consciously and spread all over the country. A deliberate effort was to be made to generate tension and to provoke inter-religious strife. Many people think that both MQM and ASSP were created by Zia in order to divide the movement against him and thus to perpetuate his rule.

A campaign against Shias helped Zia regime in more than one way. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto with whose ghost the regime was still contending was a Shia and any propaganda that was conducted against the sect went against Bhutto. MQM against the Sindhi Bhutto and ASSP against the Shia Bhutto were both helpful to Zia in their own way. A number of developments in the region also helped the formation of the ASSP.

Open warfare started between Iran and Iraq in September 1980. Iraqi regime was keen to create anti-Iran

feelings in the Muslim countries of the region. While the Gulf war had little to do with sectarian issues, one way to isolate Iran in Muslim countries was to provoke ill-will against it through a propaganda campaign against Shiism. This was all the more necessary in Pakistan since the Pakistani Shias, under the influence of Iran, had come out against Iraq and were trying to mould public opinion in favour of Iran. The Pakistani Shias who have always looked towards Iran for spiritual guidance were busy those days removing from their gates and drawing rooms the familiar Sun and Lion insignia of royal Iran and putting up the pictures of Imam Khomeini in its place. As the US and Gulf kingdoms supported Iraq, the Shia community was all set against the "number one Satan" and the Arab kings. A lot of wall chalking had already been undertaken by them with slogans against US and Saudis.

Iraqis spotted anti-Shia maulvis in Pakistan and encouraged them to launch counter propaganda against Shiism. The move was welcomed by the United States and the Arab kingdoms. After the end of Iran-Iraq war the Saudis continued to back up anti-Shi'ite organisations.

A number of religious scholars were enlisted by Iraq to undertake the propaganda task. Soon books and pamphlets started to appear in great number against the Shia beliefs. All-known leader of a rival sect wrote no less than three tomes against Shias. They were translated into English apparently for the benefit of the rest of the Muslim world. He was provided with enough resources to get his voluminous treatises published.

The Middle East politics thus came to play an important role inside Pakistan. It was during this period that the ASSP was launched.

The Shia-Sunni tussle in Pakistan was a proxy war and Zia allowed it to take place as it helped him, harmful though it was to the interests of the people of Pakistan.

The Afghan war exacerbated the tussle. Religious organisations supporting the mujahideen sent their cadres for training in order to participate in the jihad. This was administered to them on the spot. It was in Afghanistan that they learnt the art of sabotage. They were taught how to lay mines, handle time-bombs and use grenades. The knowledge was to stand them in good stead later on when they clashed against each other in Pakistan. No surprise that prominent men belonging to the warring sects were among the casualties. Ehsan Elahi Zaheer in 1986, Arif-ul-Hussaini in 1988, Haq Nawaz Jhangvi in 1989, Sadiq Ganji in 1990, and Israr-ul-Qasimi in 1991. The trend continues still.

The Afghan war provided the militant religious groups with deadly automatic weapons. Prior to the Afghan war the casualty rate in sectarian clashes was low. The warring parties used brickbats, knives or outmoded rifles and pistols. Now they use Kalashnikovs, light machine-guns, rockets and sophisticated explosive devices. More people, therefore, die in clashes now. The Afghan war has ended but its legacy persists.

As if the rivalries in the Middle East had not been enough, a new external factor, that of the Indian secret agencies, has now been introduced in the sectarian politics of Pakistan. Regarding Pakistan responsible for the events in Indian Punjab and Held Kashmir, India is out to do anything that could destabilise Pakistan. Sectarianism offers a good opportunity to agencies like RAW. What Zia initiated to perpetuate his rule is threatening the very unity and integrity of the country today.

With ASSP and TNFJ [Tehrik-i-Nifaz-i-Fiqah-i-Jafria] appearing as representatives of communities at war, the pattern that is emerging is deadly simple, an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth. Vendetta is the rule, with ASSP being the principal culprit and the Shia organisation paying back in the same coin.

The non-party elections introduced by Zia have also contributed to the sectarian rivalry. With candidates debarred from contesting elections with a political programme, some of them made appeals to sectarian sentiments. Ziaul Haq encouraged the use of religion for political benefits and a number of maulvis entered the Majlis-e-Shoora under his prompting. Some of them later on contested elections in 1988 and 1990. Sectarianism became an election issue in constituencies like Jhang where traditional political elite which happened to be Shia was challenged in successive elections by Sunni maulvis assisted by pockets of urban Mohajirs. Jhang thus qualified to be the birth place of ASSP. It was here that its founder Haq Nawaz Jhangvi contested elections against Abida Hussain in 1988 elections. Such was the appeal of sectarianism that he got over 38 thousand votes and lost by less than 9 thousand. In 1990 his successor Qari Israrul Qasmi defeated PDA [People's Democratic Alliance] candidate Nawab Amanullah Sial with a margin of about 30 thousand votes. In 1991 bye-elections the ASSP candidate Maulana Azim Tariq defeated the IJI [Islami Jamhoori Ittehad] candidate with a margin of over 9 thousand votes in the same constituency.

Among the fire brand speakers at the Peshawar riots was Maulvi Hassan Jan who had defeated in 1990 Khan Abdul Wali Khan in the Charsadda constituency. Maulvi Hassan Jan had earlier campaigned for ASSP at Jhang.

The monster of sectarianism has raised its head and is out to divide and destroy the society of Pakistan. Ground was being prepared for staging Muharram riots all over the country during the last three months. Just recount the incidents that took place during this period. In May Sikander Shah, a Shia leader, was assassinated in Lahore. A couple of days later a leader of the ASSP Gilgit was killed in broad daylight. The ASSP responded within hours, killing the local leader of TNFJ. This led to riots in Gilgit spread over three days. Thirteen persons were killed from May 31 to June 2. In the first week of June ASSP clashed with police in Kabirwala. ASSP men were rounded up in Karachi for being involved in firing. An

ASSP local leader was assassinated in Jhang in the middle of June. The brother of a Shia leader was killed at Kot Addu and at Rahimyar Khan firing took place between ASSP men and followers of TNFJ. Curfew was imposed in Jhang on 17 June and a few days later army was called in. In the second week of July two persons were killed at Uch Sharif and then occurred the Peshawar incident refers to earlier.

In order to deal with the rising phenomenon of sectarianism it is necessary to put a ban on all sectarian organisations that preach hatred against rivals. Sectarian issues should not be allowed to be raised during elections. These, however, are temporary measures. We must ultimately decide if religion is to remain a political issue at all in a country which is overwhelmingly Muslim and where there is no party opposed to Islam at all.

#### Violent Literature Being Published

92ASI315G Lahore THE FRIDAY TIMES in English  
16 Jul 92 p 6

[Article by Aamer Ahmed Khan: "The ASSP's (Anjuman-i-Sipah-e-Sahaba) Fatwa of Death"]

[Text] The Punjab CM [Chief Minister] announced on Moharram 11 that the provincial government had passed a crucial test by ensuring peace during Ashura. For once, Ch Wyne had a reason to sound triumphant because this year's Moharram had followed an extremely tense sectarian build-up. However, the CM's success is only a partial one because the factors creating all the tensions are still as active as ever.

This year, while the government succeeded in controlling the situation through tight administrative measures, it left untouched one of the major modes of creating sectarian tensions; the year saw an unprecedented increase in the circulation of anti-Shia pamphlets sponsored by the Anjuman-i-Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (ASSP). Each one of these dozen-odd pamphlets explains in detail, and justifies, different reasons for killing Shias.

Of the dozen or so such pamphlets, the most widely circulated six were obtained by TFT [expansion not given] from the ASSP's central distribution office at Lahore. The first one is titled "Shan-e-Ameer Muawiya" (Greatness of Ameer Muawiya). This pamphlet says that criticising Ameer Muawiya because he killed Hazrat Imam Hussain (raa) is kufir. It says that Ameer Muawiya and Imam Hussain were like brothers, and "outsiders have no right to interfere in personal fights of two brothers." The pamphlet goes on to list all the "authentic Ahadith" in favour of Ameer Muawiya.

The second pamphlet is an ASSP propaganda sheet which warns that "if you are not a member of the ASSP then you should be a very worried person." The pamphlet urges all the Ahle Sunnah people to combine against their common enemy, which by implication are

the Shias. Anti-Shia unity among the Ahle Sunnah, according to the ASSP logic, would put an end to sectarianism.

The third pamphlet is more direct, titled, "Why Shias are not Muslims." Written by someone called Maulana Qazi Mazhar Hussain Madzzallah and published by the ASSP, this pamphlet urges social boycott of the Shias as a religious duty of all Ahle Sunnah. It is basically a compilation of over two dozen statements allegedly made by Shia scholars claiming that the Holy Quran as we know it is incomplete. At the end, the ASSP's maulvi asks why people who say such things are being allowed to live. Besides, the pamphlet also has a list of those Shia scholars that the ASSP thinks must necessarily be killed. A number of Ahle Sunnah fatwas declared the Shias to be kafirs are also included in the pamphlet. The pamphlet ends in a particularly vicious fatwa from Darul Uloom Deoband: "Anyone who marries a Shia, eats an animal butchered by them, participates in their namaz i janaza, participates in their annual Eid sacrifices, makes them witnesses in one's marriage, eats with them, offers prayers in their mosques or has any kind of social contact with them" is a kafir. At the end, a post script says that "even voting for the Shias is a kufr."

The fourth pamphlet warns that Shias are an "alarm bell for the entire Muslim Ummah." Divided into three sections, the pamphlet first argues that the Shias have been the greatest threat to Islam throughout Islamic history. It then goes on to "expose the real face of the Iranian Revolution," which according to the ASSP, is a global conspiracy against Islam. The pamphlet argues that the Khomeini revolution was the first major attempt by the Shias to "spread Shiaism in all of Europe through Turkey, up to Russia through the Central Asian Muslim states and down to Sri Lanka through Pakistan." This pamphlet also accuses Syeda Abida Husain of "protecting the interests of the Shias by influencing the government." The last section describes the alleged "torture being meted out to Ahle Sunnah people in Iran" and how Ahle Sunnah students are being "forced to read Shia texts in Iranian universities." The pamphlet concludes with an appeal to the government to declare Pakistan as a Sunni state and Shias as non-Muslims.

The fifth pamphlet is a sort of a charge sheet against the Shias. It accuses the Shias of bringing down 50 Muslim empires. It lists 25 instances in which Shias conspired to bring down Muslim empires. Interestingly, if the ASSP is to be believed, then even the Moghul empire was brought down primarily because of a Shia traitor, Mir Jafar. Interestingly, the 1985 ethnic riots in Karachi were also instigated by Shias because Bushra Zaidi, the school girl whose accident triggered the rioting, was a Shia! The pamphlet describes all Shias as the "worst kafirs in the universe." On the title, it implores "ignorant Sunnis to wake up." And at the back, it has compact advice for anyone interested in helping the ASSP: "If you want to help us distribute this pamphlet, just make photocopies of it on a tracing paper and have it printed from any press. It will cost you Rs.[rupees]1 per pamphlet.

Remember, distributing 1,000 pamphlets means that you have saved 1,000 people from the evils of Shiaism."

The sixth and the last pamphlet is a tirade against Mutta marriages. It describes the institution of Mutta as a Shia conspiracy to "take the younger generation away from Islamic values and propagate vulgarity and sexual perversion."

These pamphlets are openly available at all offices of the ASSP. Besides, they are sold at any public rally held by the ASSP. The ASSP is the declared publishers of all such pamphlets. However, the government refuses to do anything about them.

Lawyers say that such pamphlets fall squarely under the Penal Code provision which makes "incitement to religious hatred" a culpable offence. Under the law, not only are the publishers of such material guilty under the law but even the printing presses involved in their publishing can be sealed and their licenses cancelled.

However, sources in the provincial government say that such instigatory literature has never even featured in any of the cabinet meetings in which sectarian parties or the law and order situation resulting from sectarian tensions was discussed. "For all practical purposes, the government seems to be unaware even of the existence of ASSP's pamphlets," says a cabinet minister in the Punjab government.

### Shia Institutions Preach Violence

*92AS1315H Lahore THE FRIDAY TIMES in English  
16 Jul 92 p 6*

[Article by Naqi Akbar: "The Making of an Ayatollah"; quotation marks as published]

[Text] The Shia clergy of Pakistan has reemerged from obscurity following a spate of sectarian violence in the last few years. The Iranian revolution, on the one hand, and the birth of an orthodox Sunni organisation, Anjuman i Sipah e Sahaba Pakistan (ASSP), on the other, have galvanised the stagnating Shia madaris into a major phase of expansion.

A TFT [expansion not given] probe reveals that Shia madaris have sprung up by the dozens in areas troubled by sectarian tensions. The most glaring example of this is Gilgit, a small tourist town in the Karakoram, which has as many as 23 Shia madaris.

In all, there are a total of 167 shia madaris all over Pakistan. Interestingly, at the time of Independence the areas comprising Pakistan had only two Shia madaris, one in Sargodha (Madrasah e Mohammadi, est 1938) and the other in Multan (Babul ul Uloom, est 1925). Most religious institutions were concentrated in Lucknow. But after the Iranian revolution in 1979, their number rose rapidly. Today, the Punjab has 106 madaris, Azad Jammu and Kashmir has 38, Sindh has 15, The NWFP [North-West Frontier Province] six and Quetta only two.

The distribution of these madaris in the Punjab shows that the Shia clergy is concentrating on the Seraiki belt, which has seen some of the worst sectarian violence over the past few years. For example, Dera Ghazi Khan alone has 19 madaris followed by 18 in Bahawalpur and five in Jhang. Compared to that, more populous cities have less number of madaris. Lahore, where the central controlling office of all these madaris, Wafaq e Madaris e Shias, is based, has only eight madaris; Gujranwala has 12 and Rawalpindi 11.

In Azad Kashmir, the highest concentration is again in areas where sectarian tensions keep erupting in violence from time to time. Baltistan, the worst affected area, alone has 23 Shia madaris.

The ASSP, a virulently anti-Shia organisation, alleges that the Pakistani Shia clergy was heavily financed by Iran to set up these madaris. Senior members of the Wafaq e Madaris e Shias maintain that their madaris are financed almost completely by Khums, a form of taxation among the Shia community akin to the Sunni institution of Zakat. Khums is collected in the name of the various grand Ayatollahs but instead of being forwarded to the Ayatollahs, it is spent on the place of its origin.

The Shia madaris are closely linked to the politics of Pakistan's largest Shia political party, the Tehrik-i-Nifaz-i-Fiqh-Jafria (TNFJ). Most of the TNFJ leaders are graduates from these madaris. Not surprisingly, these madaris have become quite militant with the growth of sectarian politics following the advent of the ASSP. The training procedures are curricula of these madaris indicates that militancy is imparted to the students as an integral part of their training and this militancy is perpetuated mainly through creating a 'minority mentality' amongst the pupils.

By 1958, senior Shia clergy had organised a regular curricula and a uniform system of examination for the entire madrassahs structure. General Zia's martial law, opposed by the Shia community because of its emphasis on a particular brand of Islamisation, and the Iranian revolution inspired the Shia clergy to seek recognition for its madaris and its pupils. Shia leaders claim that their representatives held 55 meetings with government representatives before recognition for their madaris could be formalised. On November 17, 1982, the University Grants Commission (UGC) issued a notification recognising the degrees issued by the Shia madaris. According to that notification, the premier Shia degree, Sultan Al Fazil, was recognised to be equivalent to an MA (Arabic or Islamiat) from any university under UGC's jurisdiction. The notification was formally adopted by almost all Pakistani universities in February 1984.

The Sultan Al Fazil degree takes a total of six years. Usually unrolled after matriculation, a student gets a Shahadat e Sania e Khasa after two years, a Shahadat e

Aalia after four years and finally, he is declared to be a Sultan ul Fazil after six years.

During these six years of concentrated study, a student is taught Saraf and Nahav (Arabic grammar), Mantiq (logic), Hadith (traditions of the Holy Prophet), Ilm e Rijal (sources of Hadith), Tafaseer (commentaries on the Holy Quran), Islamic History and Ilm e Fiqh (jurisprudence) and Philosophy. In Philosophy, the early Greek philosophers and the later Muslim ones are taught in detail. History is mostly derived from famous Arabic and Persian texts like Tabari, Tabqat Ibn Massoud etc.

The thrust of the course is on making the pupil proficient in Arabic and Persian. Though Persian is optional, a pupil has little choice but to learn it because the only means of getting higher education for him is to go to Iran after becoming a Sultan ul Fazil. In Iran, Qom and Mashad are the main centres while in Iraq, Kerbala and Najaf are the most well known university towns. Interestingly, most of the madaris in Kerbala and Najaf have

been closed down by the Saddam regime for allegedly harbouring anti-government activists.

But before going to Iran or Iraq, a Sultan ul Fazil has to take a two-year practical course called Dars e Kharij. This dars is a basic qualification for anyone aspiring to become a Hujatul Islam, a senior title among the Shia clergy. A Hujatul Islam is empowered to issue fatwas and allocate the money collected from Khums to various uses. The purpose of this course is to familiarise a pupil to everyday practical problems. The teacher raises some practical question and seeks a solution from the pupil. Only after he certifies a pupil's intellectual abilities can the pupil proceed abroad.

It is the transition from a Hujatollah to an Ayatollah, the highest office in the Shia clergy, which involves a pupil's militancy. An aspiring Ayatollah not only needs to be in tune with the general socio-political environment of his region, but is also expected to be capable of shaping it to some extent. If it involves sectarian politics, then a successful Ayatollah is the one who can come out of it with an upper hand, no matter what it requires.

**Economic Uncertainty Seen Discouraging Investment**  
*92ASI317E Lahore THE NATION Supplement  
in English 11 Jul 92 p I*

[Article by Mahmood Awan: "Caught in the Shoot-Out"; quotation marks as published]

[Text] Pakistani businesses are paying quite a heavy price for the operation clean up currently on in the Sindh province, and expect to profit the most from its success. They, however, appear generally afraid of the 'possibility of a change in the government.'

A survey conducted by THE NATION last week, where businessmen and industrialists in Karachi and Lahore were interviewed on how the operation has affected their businesses, reveals that Prime Minister Mian Nawaz Sharif's solid constituency of traders and industrialists is now losing faith in his government and looking 'for a positive change.'

There has never been anything as consistent as the economic inconsistency and political uncertainty in Pakistan and it has led to the business community's desperate 'desire' for a change every once in a while. But then status quo of any kind is better for businesses, and this is the ironic contradiction Pakistani businessmen face today.

Businessmen and industrialists in Pakistan are weary of the conditions prevailing at present but still appear unable to decide what they want. They want the representative of the industry, the prime minister, to stay in power. Yet they want a change in the government at the same time. They appear in favour of a civilian set up but they believe the whole civilian state machinery is corrupt and incompetent and it is about time the set up was changed.

The liberalisation measures introduced by Mian Nawaz have also contributed to this confusion. 'The first thing that happens in case of an abrupt change in the political set up, say a martial law, would be massive flow of capital from Pakistan to abroad. And mind you it is going to be quite scary with the present policy of no checks on the transfer of foreign exchange intact,' argues a senior executive of a leading private bank. Such are the considerations which make a businessman wish that the present set up survives even if he hates it.

Punjabi businessmen appear more vocal in demanding a 'moral radical' change and go as far as to say even a martial law will suit their interests. But the more seasoned businessmen of Karachi-now spread all over the country—the Memon community, is not that rash in its judgement and says 'army rule has always added to the uncertainty, and never helped in creating an atmosphere conducive to investment.'

Surprisingly Punjabi businessmen shared their opinion irrespective of where they were based. They wanted a change but did not appear sure if army rule was what

they looked for. And this 'desire' for a change was also restricted to the trading community, the industrialists, and educated ones among them, thought there was 'no room for an army rule.' They thought martial law could upset the whole process of growth and the most they said was they wanted a 'more responsible government.' Most of them did not want Mian Nawaz to go. 'He is an industrialist and understands the problems of Pakistani industry.'

Eruption of this sudden concern in the business and industrial community, which some analysts think borders on revolt, against its prime minister is not without solid grounds. Overall business confidence has fallen drastically over the past few months. Investments are down to standstill and production is falling, trading activity has slowed down considerably and exports becoming difficult.

The barometers of economy, Karachi and Lahore stock markets, are finding it quite difficult to resist the pressure caused by the uncertain political conditions, the final outcome of the Sindh operation and the effects of the two on the foreign investments in the business and industry here.

Expecting heavy foreign investments in the equity market and industries, the market had taken a fresh start a couple of months back, and the value and volume of stocks traded on the stock exchanges showed consistent upward mobility on the graph. The fond hopes, if not exactly dashed, remain unrealised. Consequently the stock markets in the last fortnight have had a tumble, with share prices going quite low. It has been struggling ever since to remain at its current 'medium' level of 1500 points at the KSE100 index.

The uncertainty is visible in the strength of the blue chips and extreme weakness of the average stocks on the Karachi Stock Exchange. And yet the investors are hopeful, at least to an extent, as they have not left the market altogether. Every stretch of bear raid is followed by a bull raid keeping the market at the same level but taking only the few selected stocks up while most of the listed companies continue to slide.

Average shares have been weakened by the tendency to liquidate risky investments and turn towards safe havens. This in turn keeps the blue chips strong, and the KSE100 reading on the higher side.

Last week was probably the worst in many months for the investors who seemed inclined to adjusting their positions according to every 'news' churned out by the rumour factories working day and night. The erratic behaviour of the stock market bore witness to that. Investors were also visibly tired of the present situation and discussed all sorts of changes possible in the country, only to be assured by the Prime Minister by the weekend they were to hear 'a good news' soon. All wondered what will that be?

**Privatisation Seen Only Benefiting Wealthy**  
*92AS1263H Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English*  
*10 Jul 92 p 6*

[Editorial: "The No-Questions-Asked Privatisation"]

[Text] The leader of the Opposition, Ms Benazir Bhutto, accuses the government of managing the privatisation in a manner that only the Punjab, in fact, one city in it, Lahore, benefits by it and not all the provinces and the people. Her kind of privatisation as prime minister was certainly the exact opposite of what is being done now. She sought to sell shares to the largest number of people beginning with PIA [Pakistan International Airlines] whose shares have greatly helped their buyers. But her process was too slow and far too dilatory.

Modelled after Mrs Margaret Thatcher's privatisation in Britain, Ms Bhutto wanted the people as a whole to be immediate beneficiaries of the privatisation of the national assets, although in due course of time, many of the shares would have been sold to the rich buyers who would have taken over the management of such privatised companies. But the process would certainly have enabled the millions of share-holders ultimately to be involved in the corporate enterprises in Pakistan and be their beneficiaries if the government had regulated such industries well.

But what is happening now in the name of privatisation is swift disposal of over 100 public sector units with no questions asked at all except one: the price offered. That was not how the privatisation had started under the Nawaz Sharif government. When the 26 percent of the

MCB [expansion not given] shares were to be sold last year, the bidders were asked about the source of funds, antecedents of those funding the front men, the amount of income tax they had paid, and their track record in respect of dealings with banks, etc.

But now such questions are a taboo in the Privatisation Commission. What matters for the Commission is the highest bid offered and nothing else. That is because the Privatisation Commission headed by Lt Gen Saeed Qadir is in a desperate hurry, and hopes to complete the disposal of the 100 units quick, having sold off 50 of them by the end of this month.

As a result, it has encouraged monopolists to take hold of many units. When Mian Mansha and Mr Tariq Saigol take hold of four to six cement plants with about 28 percent cement production or more and the factories are all situated in the north of the country, that certainly becomes a monopoly. Replacing the official monopoly in many key sectors with such private sector monopoly or near-monopoly by some of the most dubious men, is not proper, although Gen Qadir may say he is getting a lot more money through this process than he would have got by asking the old kind of questions about the credentials of the potential buyers. Why should the government be a party to making the big figures in the drug trade and those who have profited by a vast variety of illegal activities, as some of the names in Karachi have done, owners of large industries overnight? The United States too had its robber barons a century or more ago but must we create them at the end of the 20th century and make the state and the people become their victims indiscriminately.

### Population Control Seen Massive Failure

#### Men Not Participating

92AS1314A Peshawar *THE FRONTIER POST*  
in English 12 Jul 92 p 10

[Article by Kishwar Naheed: "Male Participation in Population Planning"; italicized words, quotation marks as published]

[Text] I work voluntarily for the Women Development Centre at Yakki Gate. One day, I found the mid-wife that works at the centre in a dejected mood, sitting with her head resting on the table. I went and stood near her, but she remained oblivious of my presence. I touched her shoulder lightly, she looked up, her eyes reflecting anger and disappointment.

Madam, this is an unlucky month. The five deliveries I managed this month were all baby girls. I couldn't get a single penny and my whole budget has been disturbed. I had taken a loan for paying my children's fees for the months of summer vacation and now I don't have the money to return that loan," she almost burst out.

"But didn't you get paid for the deliveries?" I asked in a somewhat incredulous tone.

"What are you talking about ma'am. How could I ask them for money? They would have abused me, could even have thrown me out of the house physically. By now, I know the people's reaction on the birth of a girl child, so I never stay back even for a minute. I immediately come out, without uttering a word," she said sobbing.

There was nothing I could do to ameliorate her situation. But what she said made me think a lot of things. Who should be blamed for not preparing our men to accept the birth of a girl child; that a girl is no less a blessing of God than a boy? Who might it be—the Family Planning Association, or Dr. Attiya Inayatullah, or the Population Welfare Division, or Safdar Javed Syed, who?

The annual report of the Family Planning Association for 1991 indicates in the Chapter, *Change of lifestyle—Parenthood by choice through male support*, sub-section, *Male Responsibility*, that Pakistan's tradition bound society is slowly slipping into retrogressive obscurantism. The male societal dominance increases male apathy and resistance of family planning and contraceptive adoption. Hence the low contraceptive prevalence rate in the country.

That, plus the martial power dynamics, with the husband and the all-powerful mother-in-law exercising virtual control, makes the concept of a small family almost impossible. Preference for the boy is another major negative cultural component at all levels of the society that militates against the small family.

To make men see reason and to effect some kind of a behavioural change in their attitudes, the Family Planning Association has undertaken industrial coverage projects—Hujra project in the NWFP [North-West Frontier Province], Kutchery project in Sindh and Labour Unions in the Punjab—which will target about 250,000 males employed in industry.

All said, this report does not come across as very authentic in terms of male orientation. The publicity campaign of the Population Welfare Department depicts a girl bringing a glass of water for her brother and the mother saying: "How much work a daughter does, don't cry on her birth." Another advertisement by the state-owned department states: *larka naimat hai, larki rehmat hai*. Such attitudinal reflexes indicate how much the planners are interested in the males' involvement for promoting family planning.

The need for a dialogue, or any strategy aimed at motivating men, and redefining the male's responsibility in regard to family planning is regarded by the planners as a joke. All they can think of are the traditional role-models without realising that it is the tradition, which is the prime factor undermining the efforts towards redefining the social structure. This could be one of the reasons for integrating family planning into women's programmes, instead of directing the efforts towards men. While it is argued that most development programmes that help men, also help the women, it is not argued that the programmes good for women can also be good for men.

Women are invited to participate in planning meetings that deal with the health and education issues, but never those that deal with technology, or economies when, in fact, all issues are women-related. Male emancipation, male motivation, and male participation in family planning programmes, is also a women's issue. Face the reality and re-organise motivational objectives. You might have heard the African saying: *'Lions are not historians, they do not know who were the hunters.'*

Paasban, perhaps, is the only organisation in South Asia to take up the girl child programme on the significant scale. All this activity will only bear fruit if it eschews the traditional role-models and redefine the societal structure. Otherwise, as the African say [as published]: Lions are not historians.

#### Threat to Nation

92AS1314B Karachi *DAWN* in English 11 Jul 92 p 11

[Editorial: "Defusing the Population Bomb"]

[Text] Perfunctory seminars and platitudes from high officialdom mark the observance of World Population Day in Pakistan, a country imperilled by its alarming population increase. The trouble is that the problem of unbridled population growth remains an abstraction in popular perception in the absence of sufficient awareness of its implications, as well as inadequate motivation,

services and counselling for family planning. Incredible as it is, considering the virtual collapse of the existing urban infrastructure, which is bursting at the seams, the consequences of failing to lower the population growth rate hold no real dread for the general public. Advocates of cuts in military spending on socio-economic grounds, or the idea of an effective development strategy make a better impact and engage more attention than pleas and exhortations for a lower birth rate. The case for the former formulates itself dramatically and effectively and it is this response-eliciting approach that needs to be brought to bear on addressing the grim threat posed by an evergrowing population increase. In fact, the common man has not learnt to relate his socio-economic deprivation, educational inadequacy, lack of employment and other privations to the simple fact of over-population.

Citizens for whom urban life is a daily battle for necessities like water and housing or the basic facilities of power, transportation, telephones, and so on do not progress towards the realisation that burgeoning population is the root cause of their misery and a grim threat to their future, and that the population growth is one problem which is entirely within their grasp to curtail it. The family planning concept must become a reality for our people. At present it is limited to a tuneful jingle. The idea is turned off along with the radio or TV and fares little better than those pieces of pontification and cliched preaching which are easier forgotten than remembered.

Unfortunately, repeated and unimaginative treatment of the issue by the relevant agencies and the media has made it stale and needs to be presented more forcefully and convincingly. There is no point in rehashing here over-familiar statistics to restate a problem we know well enough theoretically and yet fail to apprehend viscerally. The issue of population growth is of a dimension that needs to be approached at several levels. But the backbone of the effort, if it is to be coordinated and made fruitful, has to be official. The organisational efforts of the state have so far produced minimal results. This has to change. Bureaucracy as ever is hidebound and dilatory; and corruption takes the usual toll of funds and allocations. The role of the NGOs [Nongovernmental organisations] is particularly significant in this sector, for family planning addresses human problems within the community, the NGO personnel have an expertise and motivation government functionaries often lack abysmally. But the services and mobilisation, the centres and clinics in easy access of villages, these need government structuring to be on a scale that is effective and useful. The excuse of hostile reactionary mental attitudes is often made.

Yet, conservative societies with a predominant Muslim population like Bangladesh and Indonesia have been able to put Pakistan's efforts and achievements in this field in a faint light. In any case, the problem of a reactionary backlash or objections from schools of Ulema has to be grasped firmly. False prejudice must be fought with a resolute will. The simple truth is that no

national strategy for development, no effort to raise the per capita income, improve health services, or provide education has a chance to work without population control. The target of bringing the rate down to 2.5 from its present alarming level of 3.1 has to be achieved. This is a battle that has to be fought and won for our progress and survival as a nation.

### Rate Increasing

92AS1314C Karachi DAWN in English 11 Jul 92 p 11

[Article by Wirsat Hussnain: "The Elusive Population Goal"; quotation marks as published]

[Text] Recent assessments of the working of national population welfare programme carried out by the concerned personnel, local consultants and the donor agencies reveal a disappointing state of affairs. There is a common conclusion that the programme is nowhere near success; rather it is an utter failure. The growth rate of the population, three percent being official and 3.6 percent according to World Bank, meanwhile, continues to swirl upwards.

The fact which further dismays a social demographer on this occasion of World Population Day—which is being observed the world over today (July 11)—is that the population control programme has failed to woo even an eligible couple, let alone harmonise its relationship with other developmental activities.

The failure story of the FP [Family Planning] programme is supported by the Pakistan Fertility Survey (PFS) (1974-77), which should now be treated as obsolete, that only 22 percent eligible women knew the source of information and services and only about 6 percent were practising method of contraception during the period survey was conducted. However, in the absence of any further authentic study to show any improvement in PFS figures over the years, there are only official conjunctures and estimates in support of the "usefulness" of the programme.

Should the FP programme be linked with the national health care network? Though it is being actively considered, there exists no chances of its success as this approach will not be able to produce continuous users of contraceptives.

Many of the couples who did adopt a method of contraceptions abandoned it after too short a time. The effect of dropouts upon the new intending couples has been negative. It has discouraged them from using the contraceptives.

With number of dropouts being increasingly high, we are now left with about 19-22 percent acceptors of different methods of contraception and the situation resembles to the one which prevailed in 1977. Keeping in view this percentage of acceptors and the population growth rate as 3 percent, which is one of the highest in the world, the present population of Pakistan will reach 154 million

mark by the year 2001. The population of this part of the land which constitutes Pakistan was 16.1 million in 1901. It rose to 32.5 million in 1947. During 1991-92 the estimated population of the country is 115.6 million. The first doubling of the population since 1901, took place in 50 years. It is being doubled after every 20-23 years. During 1901-1991 the population of Pakistan has witnessed seven fold increase whereas the world population grew by about twice its size and that of the developing countries by about four times.

The FP programme was integrated, sometimes in the past, with the national public health programme. The complexities of integration posed various difficulties and administrative problems. The real understanding of the importance of the health and population planning remained lacking among both the health and population staff. At the same time, the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank financed Provincial Line Department Project (PLD) of the Population Welfare Department, comprising health outlets of Labour, Local government and health departments. It has already provided a failure as the medical and paramedical personnel of these departments did not like to work as FP service providers for a number of reasons. The reason for fresh thinking in support of integrating the two programmes is related to the fact that rural and urban health establishments of the health department will serve as catchment areas for the family planning programme.

The "FP input into the Health Programm," a proposed scheme to integrate FP into health, is going to be the fifth major experimental change in the national population welfare programme. As a matter of fact the FP programme has never been allowed to function as a systematic, continuous, independent, and smooth activity. Changes and innovations introduced into the programme have never been allowed to last longer nor there has ever been any effort to monitor the progress of different approaches. Changes made in the programme, from time to time, show that these were based upon presumptions or on the results of birth control efforts obtained in some other countries.

The integration of the two programmes should not be repeated under any disguise. The population welfare programme, precisely speaking, is a birth control programme. It should be redesigned as an independent sociological programme aimed at bringing about behavioral changes in an individual rather than finding adhoc solutions of complex sociological problems.

#### Hindering Economic Development

92AS1314D Lahore THE NATION in English 22 Jul 92 p 9

[Article by M. Anees Parvez: "Population and Socio-Economic Development in Pakistan"; quotation marks as published]

[Text] Lahore—Pakistan, scrambling to enter the 21st century as a developed welfare state finds its efforts

seriously impaired by a population spiral—the population burgeoning at a frightening rate of 3.1 percent annually, one of the highest in the world.

The country which had a population of 32.5 million people in 1947 has since witnessed a four-fold increase in population which now stands at 117.32 million and if not scaled down, is projected to climb to 150 million by the year 2000 and touch a staggering mark of 580 million in 2040.

The entire developing world is groaning under the pulls of rising population. The world population doubled between 1950 and 1985 while the growth as a global problem accentuated during the 1970s.

The share of this population living in the poorest developing regions rose from two-thirds to three-fourths during this period. The pace of population growth the world over has never been so fast as it is now—three persons every second, more than 2,50,000 [as published] every day.

At the beginning of the 1990s, the annual addition was 93 million; by the end it will approach 100 million. At this rate the world will have almost a billion more people by 2001. About 95 percent of this growth is taking place in the developing countries.

According to the latest United Nations population estimates presently 78 percent of the world population (4.3 billion) lives in the less-developed regions and only 22 percent of it resides in the developed regions.

The average annual population growth rate is about 0.5 percent for more developed regions and four-time high, i.e., 20.0 percent for the less developed regions.

High population growth rates obtaining in the developing countries chiefly account for their socio-economic backwardness. It is an established fact that poverty and rapidly-growing population reinforce each other. 'Low wages, inadequate education and high infant mortality—all linked to poverty—contribute to high fertility rates and thus to rapid population growth.'

The UN projections indicate that the population of the more developed regions will increase by 179 million between 1992 and 2025, whereas the population of the less-developed regions is expected to increase nearly 16 times, by 2.8 billion. It is estimated that by 2025, 1.4 billion people will live in the more developed regions and 7.1 billion in the less developed regions.

Viewed in this perspective and the population growth in developing countries (around 2.0 percent per annum), the population upsurge in Pakistan at a phenomenal pace of 3.1 percent per annum is appalling. Already ranked as 9th most populous state in the world, this population growth (41 births per 1000 population and 6.5 total fertility rate) places the country in a highly volatile situation with startling socio-economic implications.

The proportion of children in a country's total population is one of the vital determinants of development. In case of Pakistan this proportion is world's highest—45 percent of the population is under the age of 15.

In developed countries, this proportion is about 20-23 percent, in developing nations it is around 39 percent, in Asian countries the figure is 37 percent and in South Asian region it is 41 percent.

The total labour force in the country was estimated at 33.82 million during 1991-92, out of which 32.76 million persons were employed while 1.06 million were reported unemployed yielding an unemployment rate of 3.13 percent with 10.32 percent categorised as disguised unemployment.

The unemployment rate for the urban areas was estimated to be as high as 4.58 percent. The number of unemployed is projected to rise by another 3.1 percent during the current year. It will jump to 13.45 percent if all the disguised unemployed persons (10.32 percent) are also counted as unemployed.

The prevailing high ratio of population under 15 and unemployment levels stem from population increases experienced by the country in the past which also pushed percentage of urban inhabitants from 15.4 percent in 1947 to 28.3 percent in 1981.

Growing urbanisation is a major problem, indeed. The urban population is estimated to increase from 42 million (35 percent) in 1992-93 to 53 million in 1997-98 or 38 percent of total population. To meet the requirements of additional urban population alone, Pakistan will have to improve the provision of essential services, living conditions, human settlement and necessary infrastructure to a satisfactory level.

The GDP growth averaged about 6 percent per annum during 1980's. As a matter of fact the country was the fifth fastest-growing economy during the eighties. But owing to rising population, growth in per capita income stayed at an annual average of only 3.0 percent.

The per capita income presently stands at \$414.3. On the agriculture side also, the production graph has been moving upwards. In case of cash crops, especially cotton, the country made some major breakthroughs. However, population increases have acted to force the nation to spend substantial amounts of precious foreign exchange almost every year on imports of wheat to feed the growing mouths.

The social and physical infrastructure scene in Pakistan is characterised by inadequacy and inefficacy. The population census of 1981 put the literacy rate in the country at 26.2 percent (male—35.1 percent and female—16 percent). In the estimation of the Planning and Development Division the literacy level has improved to 34 percent (male—45.5 percent and female 21.3 percent) in 1991-92.